

CHOICE OF EMOTION AND IDEAL DEVELOPMENT

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At first glance, the relationship between emotion and ideal development might seem to depend simply on what one means by "emotion" and what one takes to be "ideal development." For example, if one conceives of emotion as an alternative to action, a degraded form of consciousness that occurs when a person cannot imagine how to act (i.e., Sartre, 1948), then emotion is a regressive move which is, at best, a necessary detour on the way to mature action. If one takes ideal development to be the state of Nirvana pursued in Buddhism, then some emotions, such as *Metta* (loving-kindness), will facilitate, whereas others, such as *Dosa* (hatred), will retard development (de Silva, 1976).

Further study suggests that emotion and ideal development are so intertwined that it may be fruitful to consider the terms to have interdependent meaning. In this chapter I explore three different aspects of this interdependence: (a) the relationships between emotion and value, (b) the interface between emotional relationship and what is taken to be ideal development, and (c) the role that "choice" of emotion may play in the realization of ideal development.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMOTION AND VALUE

There is an intimate connection between the perception of an object and the existence of that object as a real entity. Thus, in his critique of

Descartes, Merleau-Ponty (1962) pointed out that one *cannot* really doubt the existence of an object without also doubting that one perceives the object. If one *perceives* an object (rather than simply *thinking* that one sees it), one does not doubt its existence.

In a similar manner, there is connection between the emotion one has toward an "object" and the value of that object. That is, one cannot intuit the goodness or badness of an object without having some positive or negative emotion toward that object. One cannot have an emotion without intuiting the value of the object of the emotion.

Of course, there can be emotional illusions, just as there can be perceptual illusions, and later I discuss such "mistakes" in some detail. Nevertheless, as soon as a person is disillusioned, both the emotion of the person and the value of the object disappear. Just as true existence can only be revealed by true perception, true value can only be revealed by true emotion.

When we speak of value and emotion, it is important to distinguish between the perceived value of the object of an emotion, the hedonic quality of an emotional experience, and the evaluation of an emotion. The goodness of the object we love or the badness of whatever we hate or fear is different from the pleasant quality that feels good or the painful quality that feels bad, and both are different still from our judgment that the emotion is good or bad for us to have. Yet most studies that have asked persons to rate emotions as positive or negative have overlooked that at least three different things may be meant: (a) Is one attracted to the goodness or repulsed by the badness of the object at which the emotion is directed? (b) Is the emotion pleasant or unpleasant? and (c) Is the emotion evaluated as good or bad to have? Although there is some general tendency for all three aspects to be either positive or negative, they are often clearly different. Thus, a person may subject himself or herself to dangerous situations in order to get pleasurable thrills yet later come to evaluate such fear as childish.

For our purposes it is most useful to focus on the *first* of the aforementioned meanings. For one thing, the various emotions, such as love, admiration, and anger are essentially characterized by the property of attraction or repulsion to the valued object of the emotion. Both hedonic quality and evaluation may vary, whereas the attraction to a perceived good or repulsion from a perceived bad object is an invariant aspect of the emotion. That is, fear may have either a pleasant or an unpleasant quality and may be judged to be good in some situations and bad in others, yet fear always involves a perception of danger and an impulse to escape that danger. Value appears to be grounded in perceptions of goodness or badness rather than in felt pleasantness or pain or reasoned judgments of right or wrong. I discuss this assertion in a bit

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more detail later, but begin by examining how the perceived value of an object is intertwined with the emotion that is experienced and, in fact, may be regarded as a part of the emotion's structure.

The structural theory of emotions (de Rivera, 1977) asserts that any type of emotion (e.g., anger, love, anxiety) may be described as a dynamic structure of three interrelated parts. A number of studies (Kahn, 1984; Kane, 1976; Lindsay-Hartz, 1981, 1984) have demonstrated that these structural descriptions may be used to discriminate closely related emotions and to articulate how different emotions function to reveal value and to enhance the ideals to which the person is committed. The three parts of each emotion's structure involve: (a) the particular way in which the person perceives the object of the emotion; (b) the transformation of the person's body; and (c) the "impulse" of the emotion or way in which the person is "instructed" to behave. For example, when a person is angry he or she perceives the object of anger to be a challenge to what the person asserts *ought* to exist. The body is energized and expands. This empowered body is "instructed" to remove the perceived challenge.

The dynamic of this structure is related to value in three distinct ways. First, it charges the object of anger with the responsibility for acting in a way that is perceived to be wrong or "bad." This "judgment" (cf. Solomon, 1984) of negative value is not experienced to be dependent on the person's own needs. Second, the anger functions to remove the challenge to the values to which the person is committed. Third, somewhat paradoxically, the anger functions to maintain a *closeness* between the person and the other, for if the other is perceived to challenge the person's values, the other must be subject to the same thoughts as the person and, hence, "worth" getting angry with.

Relationships Between Structure, Hedonic Tone, and Evaluation

The relationship between an emotion's hedonic tone and its underlying value-revealing structure is a complex one. Consider the emotion of anger. For some persons, anger is an intensely unpleasant experience. They don't like feeling the emotion, and they dislike the consequences that occur when they express it. Others seem to enjoy anger, and they report that the expression of anger "clears the atmosphere." In part, hedonic tone appears to be a function of the "flow" of an emotion, so that persons who feel comfortable with the expression of an emotion experience it as pleasant, whereas others, uncomfortable with the expressive ways that they have learned, block the expression and experience the emotion as unpleasant.

The "flow" of an emotion may be a function of all three aspects of its structure. In the case of anger, the body is experienced as energized and growing outward, and there is an impulse to remove the challenge. Perception of a "challenge" may be pleasant or unpleasant, depending on our power to meet it. Likewise, the removal of a challenge may be pleasant, but persons who have not learned benign forms of expression may check their impulse to remove the challenge, and this may be quite unpleasant. Finally, the experience of having an energized and expanded body may lead the person to have a clearer self-boundary or to feel as though the self is in danger of falling apart.

There is another important factor that affects hedonic tone. The emotion and its expression often become the object of a second emotion. Thus, in one context a person may be pleased that he or she got angry, whereas in another the person may feel guilty or get angry at the self for getting angry. Although the pleasantness or unpleasantness of an emotion may be quite separate from whether we abstractly judge the emotion to be ideally good or bad, it would seem that when an emotion is the object of an immediate emotional judgment its hedonic quality might well be affected.

There is an equally complex relationship between the perception of value that is inherent in emotional structure, and rational evaluation. On the one hand, as previously noted, an emotion may become the object of a second emotion and, hence, may itself become valued as good or bad. On the other hand, we may rationally evaluate an emotion or action from an objective standpoint. As we mature, we learn that our emotions may be in error, and we attempt to evaluate our feelings by asking others how they see our situation, or by comparing our present situation with our past experience. This process of evaluation requires us to move back from our involvement with the other, and to examine our situation from a distance so that we may "see" it from different perspectives and not simply "feel" it from our position of involvement.

Of course, in an important sense, this movement itself is an emotional act, and Lawrence (1960) argued that the very stance of evaluation—the detached, cool, observation of the other as object—is one of four basic emotional relationships that precede language. The resulting position of detachment enables us to make a comparison of different situations, to learn from the perspectives of others, and to reason theoretically about our emotional involvement before we move back to reimmerse ourselves in the immediate concrete situation.

This move to abstract reflection may be very freeing. It may enable a person to see new possibilities, make objective comparisons, and give responsible evaluations. However, these new possibilities and objective comparisons must still work with the values revealed by emotional

experience. Although an objective evaluation may suggest that a particular object or action has the greatest value, this value can only be realized if it is translated into a new emotional perception. Thus, while a judge may objectively decide the excellence of a performance, this evaluation is only realized when the judge awards some recognition, and the winner is exalted. Or, although a person may objectively evaluate a course of action, this evaluation will remain intellectual until the person's emotional relationship is restructured. The person will be an observer rather than an historical actor until he or she again becomes emotionally involved and able to express the value in action.

Of course, the evaluation of emotions, like the evaluation of action, depends on personal and cultural context. Sommers (1984) showed that persons from some cultural backgrounds evaluate anger, love, or shame as more valuable than persons from other backgrounds. Nevertheless, any differences in evaluation will always relate to the structure of the emotion. Thus, Lindsay-Hartz (1981) showed that personal differences in the evaluation of elation are related to the way in which the elated person is lifted from the level of reality to the level of unreality and, hence, loses contact with other persons. Some persons are appalled by this loss of contact, experience it as bad and, hence, devalue the emotion. Others are delighted by the freedom from the restraints of responsibility and value the elation as a form of recreation. Similarly, while the Japanese appear to value shame more highly than Americans, Vogel's (1986) data suggest that this is because, in Japan, the exhibition of the unworthiness that is a structural aspect of shame demonstrates that a person is not shameless.

The Conceptualization of Value and Emotional Structure

Value refers to the goodness or badness of an object, person, event, or action. What determines or constitutes this goodness or badness? Many psychologists seem to equate positive value with what is desirable and negative value with what is feared. Thus, a person is said to value what he or she wants or finds useful or likeable. Although there is some truth here, such an assertion makes value dependent on personal needs and fails to provide any grounds for distinguishing between objective value and mere subjective preference.

Developments in anthropology and economics have supported this conflation of value and preference. Anthropology's current stress on the uniqueness of different cultures has emphasized the relativity, rather than the universality, of what is valued, and this makes values appear to

only be cultural preferences. Economists, who once attempted to relate the concept of value to the worth of realities such as the amount of expended labor or resources or the usefulness or scarcity of an item, have settled on operationalizing the value of a good or service to simply mean how much money it can command in the marketplace. Thus, the "value" of a machine, an act of service, or a work of art does not refer to any objective factors or to anything of intrinsic merit, but simply to personal preferences as expressed by how much money someone is willing to pay.

Although we do value what we want to possess, it seems clear that there is more to value than mere preference. For one thing, when we desire an object, we experience value as inherent in the object, rather than projected by the desire; the goodness or badness of an object appears as an objective property of the object rather than as a subjective imposition of personal tastes. When I say an orange is good I am referring to the objective qualities of the orange and not simply to the fact that I like oranges and prefer ones that combine juicy sweetness with sourness and a certain amount of firm texture. As Murdoch (1970, p. 97) observed, "The ordinary person does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that he creates values by his choices. He thinks that some things really are better than others and that he is capable of getting it wrong. We are not usually in doubt about the direction in which good lies."

There is another important fact. At least some goodness and badness seems to have nothing to do with personal desires or fears, with utility or disfunction. We may look at some act of kindness or heroism, or witness some tragedy and directly intuit a goodness or badness that has nothing to do with what we desire or fear for ourselves. Such values are "objective" in the sense that they refer to a goodness or badness that is experienced as existing independently of personal preference.

Indeed, it is *this* type of value, or this meaning of "value," that is referred to by psychologists such as Lewin, Heider, and Kohler. Lewin (1951), for example, distinguished between "valence" and value. Valence is the property of objects that attracts or repels us: a chair's ability to "command" us to sit down, or an exposed electric wire's command that we stay away. Valence depends both on the character of the object and the state of the person's own needs. If we are tired, a chair's command to "sit down" will be stronger. If we are hungry, a cookie's attractive properties will be heightened. The greater the need, the greater the object's valence and the attractive or repulsive force that exists between the object and the self. Likewise, a person's intentions or "will" may induce valence in an appropriate object. If we intend to mail a letter, a mailbox will acquire valence, attract us to it, and command us

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to deposit our letter. Just as a person's *own* needs and intentions affect the valence of objects, it is possible for an *other's* will to induce valences. When a parent commands a child to had over a toy, or a stranger asks for the time, valences are induced that have more to do with the other's needs and will than with our own.

Lewin suggested that a person's values are formally similar to the will or commands of others. That is, they are capable of inducing valences that are not a result of the person's own needs or will. Our values may even command us to perform some activity that is not in our personal self-interest. We may do what *ought* to be done rather than what we would personally desire to do.

In a similar manner, Heider (1958) related values to what ought to be. What ought to exist is not what a person desires, but what a suprapersonal objective order desires. If a person has a value, he or she believes that the objective order is constituted in such a way that under certain conditions persons ought to behave in certain ways. Similarly, Kohler (1938) pointed to the relationship between value and what is required by the objective order (rather than desired by the person). Because values are the "needs" of an objective order, they have the same status as a belief in what is real. Thus, Heider pointed out that we are not disturbed when an other has different preferences from our own, but are as upset when the other has different values as when the other sees blue where we see yellow. The mere fact of value disagreement creates tension between persons.

There are two rather different meanings to value. The first relates to what a person desires for him or herself. It is this personal desire that, together with the properties of the object, constitutes the object's value. The second meaning relates to a goodness that is independent of a person's own desires. These two meanings of value, or types of value, may be related to the structures of different kinds of emotions.

As previously noted, the structure of anger involves the perception that an other is challenging what a person asserts *ought* to exist and not simply what the person would like to exist. Contrasting this structure with that of fear (cf. de Rivera, 1981), in the latter the person perceives a danger to the *self* (or to something with which the self identifies). Of course, the self is valued, and the fear functions to preserve this value, but the object of fear is not seen as "wrong" or absolutely bad, but as dangerous—as relatively bad for the self.

In a similar manner, we may contrast the structures of desire with the structure of love (cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1957). In the emotion of desire, a person has the urge to possess an object which is perceived to meet his or her needs, and the body is somewhat tense with the will to gain the object. The object is perceived as "good" in the sense that the

person believes it has certain properties that are anticipated to give pleasure once the object is possessed. On the other hand, in the case of love the person has the urge to give to, or care for or affirm, an object that is perceived as good in its own right, and the body, which has "surrendered" its will, is more free in its movements. The object is perceived as "good" in the sense that it is an example of some absolute goodness that transcends personal desires. It "ought" to exist. In contrast to desire, which instructs the person to *get* the object, love instructs the person to "surrender" his or her will and *give* to the beloved.

It may be noted that each of the four emotions we have discussed involves a transformation of the relationship between the person having the emotion and the object of his or her concern. The "valence" of the object, its value relative to the needs of the person, may be said to be related to the emotions of desire and fear, and the "absolute value" of the object may be said to be related to the emotions of love and anger.

Emotional Transformation and the Revelation of Value

There are at least three different ways of conceiving these relationships between emotion and value. William James (1902, p. 150) suggested that emotions *impart* value, thereby transforming the *appearance* of an objective, value-free world. On the other hand, Brentano (1889/1969) argued that emotion *constitutes* value in the sense that value exists in the world but does not exist independently from emotion. Finally, Scheler (1916/1973) asserted that emotion *discloses* value in a manner similar to sight disclosing color.

The contrast between the first and third views is particularly evident in the contrasting views of love presented by Stendahl (1957) and Ortega y Gasset (1957). In the former's account, the lover projects his or her ideals upon the beloved, perceiving what he or she wants to see. In the latter, the lover's involvement allows him or her to see the value that others may miss.

My own view is much closer to Scheler's. That is, I believe that we may directly perceive certain actions and events to be inherently good or bad. For example, when I see one person being kind to another person or animal, I may perceive goodness as objectively present in the world. I intuitively grasp this meaning, and it feels good to me. This suggests that the value of an object is revealed by (or "co-constituted" by) emotion. However, I am asserting that in the case of desire and fear, the value of the object is relative to the person's needs, whereas in love

and anger it is experienced as absolute. Of course, such a view must account for times when emotion does *not* reveal the actual value of the object, as in the type of infatuated love described by Stendahl. Here, I simply want to affirm the position that value must be initially revealed by emotion.

In opposition to the idea of objective value, it might be argued that values are taught and that the same behavior may be valued differently by different persons, in different cultures, and at various times. Abortion, infanticide, and human sacrifice, for example, may be regarded with horror, acceptance, or approval. However, Duncker (1939) pointed out that the "same" behavior is really quite different in different circumstances. The *meaning* of the foregoing behaviors may vary from murder to obedience to God, and the moral valuation of behaviors with similar situational meanings may actually be invariant.

For example, consider the difference in how Americans and Japanese value "assertive" behavior. If a person states what he or she would like in an unambiguous way, he or she will be regarded with approval by most Americans, who will view the person as "direct" or appropriately assertive. The "same" behavior will appall most Japanese, who may view the person as aggressively ill-mannered and insensitive.

It might be argued that the American culture confers positive value on assertiveness by teaching children to approve assertive acts, whereas the Japanese confer a negative value on assertiveness by teaching their children to feel appalled. However, this ignores that directly stating what one would like has a different meaning in the two cultural contexts. In the American context, a direct statement of what one would like may require a certain amount of self-worth, security, or confidence; it may require some courage, because in American culture the person is an individual whose audience may not care about what the person wants. Hence, a direct assertion has the risk of falling on deaf ears. In the Japanese context, directly stating what one would like may be egocentric and insulting, because one is part of a group in which everyone is sensitively attuned to the other. Hence, directly stating what one wants may be egocentrically calling undue attention to the self, or insultingly implying that others are not attuned. In fact, both cultures value courage and sensitivity and devalue egocentricity and boorishness. In both cultures these values are revealed or "co-constituted" by emotions such as approval and appall. Acts of courage and sensitivity *are* good acts that arouse approval; acts of egocentricity and insensitivity *are* appalling.

Of course, cultures will differ in their capacity to promote courage, sensitivity, and other valuable behavior. Later, I discuss that some cultures may be based more on relationships of love, whereas others

may be based more on fear. Societies may degenerate and become barbaric. When fear is dominant or social conditions encourage torture, there will be a relative absence of love and happiness.

Values are not taught, in the sense of being assigned to abstract activities divorced from context. That is, a parent does not teach a child that assertion is valuable by saying "assertion is good" or by somehow attaching "goodness" to assertive activity. Rather, the child learns to recognize the goodness of a particular assertive act by seeing how it pleases the parent, or how it is greeted with approval, admiration, and so forth. What is taught is the recognition of value, and this is taught by the expression, recognition, and encouragement of emotion for specific actions that are embedded in personal and cultural contexts and that guide the person in *doing* what is right.

Also taught, or rather encouraged, are commitments to various abstract ideals: honesty, generosity, courageousness, hospitality, and so forth. These ideals may be reflected upon, and one can reason about how to attain them. However, they must be based on concrete instances of behavior whose value is revealed by emotion.

Given the importance and pervasiveness of values, it may seem that an enormous weight is resting on a handful of emotions. In fact, however, there are at least a hundred emotional structures, whose distinct dynamics respond to the various situations persons may inhabit. Of particular importance is that each one of these structures reveals value by transforming the relationship between the person who is experiencing the emotion and some significant other. This allows us to systematically relate the emotions (and, hence, different types of valuations) to one another, and suggests that values may be grounded in the relationship between person and other.

The various transformations that reveal value may be described by specifying different aspects of the relationship between person and other. Four of these aspects are described following:

1. Is the person the "subject" or the "object" of the transformation? When the person is the subject of the transformation, the emotion will appear to be transitive and will usually take the other as its object; for example, I love him, I am angry at her, I fear him. Thus, the emotion reveals the value of the other.

When the person is the object of the transformation, the emotion will usually appear to be intransitive and will reveal the value of the self, as in the case of pride, depression, confidence. (When an other appears to be the object, as in the case when one is proud or ashamed of someone else, analysis shows that the self is identified with the other, so that the self is still involved as the object of the transformation.) Whenever the

person is the object of the transformation, there is an *implicit* other who is the subject of the transformation. For example, when a person is proud, there is an implicit other who is admiring the person.

2. Is there an attraction or a repulsion between the subject of the emotion and the object? In the case of attraction, the good value of the object is revealed; in the case of repulsion, its bad value. By an "attraction" emotion I mean an emotion whose structure includes a perception of good value and an instruction to the subject (or implicit subject) to either get or give to the positively valued object. We do *not* mean a pleasant emotion or an emotion that is, necessarily, good to have.

3. Does the attraction, (or the repulsion) involve the subject extending toward the other—giving (or pushing away)—or does it involve a contraction from the other—getting from (or pulling away)? When an extension is involved, the object's "absolute" value is experienced; when a contraction is involved, the object's value is relative to the subject's needs.

4. Does the transformation alter whether or not the person and other *belong* in a common unit with shared values, or *recognize* each other's social value or moral worth, or *exist* as valuable in their own right?

The intersection of these different facets defines 24 different emotional transformations that may be labeled in the manner shown in Table 1.1. In every case, the emotion term we have used has a meaning that refers to the transformation that is described. In some cases, the meaning is circumscribed by the transformational definition. Thus, "love" certainly may be used to refer to an emotional transformation in which the value of the other is enhanced, and the matrix circumscribes this usage to mean cases where giving (extension) is involved (e.g., "my heart belongs to you") as opposed to cases where "love" refers to the longing to possess the "loved" object (e.g., "be mine, valentine")—which is referred to as "desire."

As previously noted, in cases where the person is the object of the emotion, the value of the self will be revealed. We might expect that just as the other's value may either be absolute or relative to the person's own needs, so the value of the self may be absolute or relative to the needs of the other. This appears to be the case. The person may feel good about the self in his or her own right—as revealed by emotions such as security, worth, and serenity—or good when he or she is successful—as revealed by confidence, pride, or joy. Conversely, a person may feel bad about the way the self is—as revealed by depression or shame—or about his or her own responsibility for some action

TABLE 11
Twenty-four Emotional Transformations

Person Is Subject of Transformation Revealing Value of Other As:					
Good (Attraction)		Bad (Repulsion)			
Relative to Self's Needs (Extension)		Relative to Other's Needs (Contraction)		Relative to Self's Needs (Contraction)	
love	desire	anger	anger	desire	fear
esteem	admiration	contempt	contempt	admiration	horror
acceptance	wonder	rejection	rejection	wonder	dread
Person Is Object of Transformation Revealing Value of Self As:					
Good (Attraction)		Bad (Repulsion)			
Relative to Other's Needs		Relative to Other's Needs			
security	confidence	depression	depression	confidence	anxiety
worth	pride	shame	shame	pride	guilt
serenity	joy	sorrow	sorrow	joy	panic

that may fail or be morally incorrect—as in anxiety or guilt. In Table 1.1, the self-directed emotions, where the person is the object of the transformation, are in the lower half of the table directly beneath the emotion that would be experienced if the person were the subject of the transformation—the emotion directed at the self by an implicit other. It may be noted that differences in whether the self has absolute or relative value are related to whether the self reveals an absolute or a relative value to the implicit other. That is, security corresponds to the implicit other's *love* for the self, whereas confidence corresponds to the implicit other's *desire* for what the self can offer the other.

Note that the relative type of self-goodness may be gained by accomplishment, whereas inherent goodness is equivalent to finding that one's self is loved, is in a state of grace. Similarly, the one type of self-badness is equivalent to incurring the wrath of an other by disobeying a command (what ought to be), whereas the other type of

self-badness is equivalent to finding oneself separated from the good. Such differences may well be related to the religious controversy over salvation by works or by faith. An emphasis on different emotional structures may also be seen in the contrast between Christianity's focus on faith, hope, love, and joy (whose structures all involve a distinction between person and Other), and Buddhism's emphasis on compassion and happiness (whose structures involve an identification of the person with all Being). The intimate connection between emotion and the revelation of value is demonstrated in that differences in emotional structures are closely related to different aspects of value.

Emotional Dynamics and the Preservation of Value

The various emotions do not simply reveal value; their structures are dynamic and function in different ways to preserve or enhance the values to which a person is committed. To illustrate, let us consider the different ways in which depression and guilt function to preserve a person's values.

It has been shown that depression often occurs when circumstances lead a person to act in a way which challenges the person's own values (cf. Kane, 1976). For example, external pressures may lead a performer to perform before he or she is ready to give a good performance, or may lead a woman to have an abortion that she feels is wrong. In these cases, persons feel that they have to act as they do, that they *could not* have done otherwise, yet they feel that they are somehow bad in an absolute sense. How can we account for these facts?

On the one hand, the person has acted against his or her own values and, hence, is willfully bad. The depression reveals this badness. On the other hand, just as anger gives a person energy and the ability to remove the *other*, who is challenging what ought to be, depression removes the *self* in that it decreases a person's energy and ability to act so that he or she does not challenge what ought to be. Values demand that a person do what *ought* to be done only when an action can be done. Depression renders the person unable to act (in the sense of choosing the action) and, hence, prevents the person from being responsible for the action. Thus, the depression functions to permit the person to still be committed to the values which have been violated by the person's apparent action. This is *not* rationalization. To the contrary, the depression prevents the dissonance reduction, which would inevitably erode the person's values if the person felt that he or she *chose* to act in a way that was contrary to the value. Unfortunately, this loss of ability can

only be accomplished by losing bodily energy and willpower, and although the person has avoided responsibility for choosing to act against the values to which he or she is committed, the person is "bad" in the same sense that someone who is hated is bad—that is, the self is experienced as incorrigibly bad.

Depression is sometimes said to be a form of guilt, and often the person has violated some value and appears to be punishing the self with merciless accusations. However, the dynamics of the emotion of guilt are quite different. Unlike depression, the person *accepts* responsibility for some evil happening, feeling that he or she *could* and should have acted in a different manner (cf. Lindsay-Hartz, 1984). This acceptance is particularly striking in the case of survivor guilt, when no one else may feel that the person is actually responsible. Paradoxically, a person who accepts responsibility is *not* really absolutely "bad." The person may feel "as if" he or she was a criminal, but a "real" criminal would not feel guilty! Thus, the guilt functions to preserve the person's identity in the face of action that would otherwise cause a loss of that identity. Without the guilt, the person would be an inhuman monster, the object of horror for the implicit other.

As in the case of depression, this preservation of value is no mere rationalization. The person does not reduce dissonance by justifying his or her behavior. Rather, the person is filled with tension; he or she would like to undo the past but is caught by the irreversibility of time. The guilt instructs the person to set things right, to maintain his or her agency, and to seek atonement and forgiveness. Until this occurs, the person is haunted. Note too, that our responsibility for evil cannot be revealed without guilt. By avoiding guilt, by not accepting responsibility, sociopaths do not see the evil created by their behavior. Similarly, many Americans ignore the conditions within prisons in the United States, the bombing of civilians in El Salvador, and the plight of Guatemalan refugees, because they do not want to experience the guilt that they would experience if they allowed themselves to see the evil perpetuated by their nation.

I have argued that all of the emotions in Table 1.1 that involve "extension" have to do with morality in the sense that they reveal "absolute" value as opposed to value that is relative to self-interest. However, the entire set of emotions that involve "recognition" may be said to be "moral" emotions, in the sense that they function to regulate the moral status or worth of members of a society. Each involves the social recognition of the other or the self. Although the functioning of these emotions has been discussed elsewhere (cf. de Rivera, 1984b, pp. 129-133), it may be particularly instructive to consider the dynamics of horror.

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The object of horror may be perceived as inhuman, as monstrous, and at first glance horror might seem to involve a judgment about the existence of absolute evil. We shrink back from the viciousness and depravity of a brutal rape or the gas chambers at Auschwitz. However, a closer examination of the emotion reveals that the object of horror is often the *victim* of the violence we deplore. Analysis shows that in all cases of horror, the person is initially identified with the other and then loses the will to continue the relationship. That is, the dynamics of horror involve a de-identification, so that we no longer put ourself in the other's position. By no longer recognizing ourselves in the object of horror, we preserve our *own* social identity.

IDEAL DEVELOPMENT AND EMOTIONAL RELATIONSHIP

We often speak of the "development" of a child, an animal, or a person; and we may refer to the development of a society, a work of art, or a species, or to more "advanced" societies or species. After a close examination of numerous examples of what are ordinarily taken to be less developed and more highly developed forms, Werner (1948) proposed that the latter could be characterized as both more flexible and more stable. He suggested that these results were achieved by an increased differentiation of parts and an increased hierarchical integration of these parts. Thus, development, as opposed to mere change over time, could be characterized by this orthogenetic principle.

Certain objections can be made to Werner's proposal. Ethologists and anthropologists might object that species or societies that would be characterized as primitive from Werner's perspective are highly developed from the point of view of adaptivity to their environment. Buddhism proposes that the most highly developed person is so unified that the person loses differentiation as an individual. Werner himself (1956) recognized that highly developed artists often made use of the primordial mode of physiognomic perception. Accordingly, Kaplan (1986) suggested that increased differentiation and hierarchical integration may best be regarded as one of a number of possible standards for assessing empirical changes and making comparisons. His suggestion maintained Werner's idea that development implies an ideal, rather than simply referring to change over time, yet enables development to refer to a progression toward different possible ideals.

Although Kaplan's formulation has certain advantages, it also poses a problem, in that it offers no standards for us to judge the value of different ideals. Clearly, most of us would not want to describe the

German people as "developing" as they moved toward the Nazi ideal of establishing a pure Aryan stock.

It would seem that development must be limited to ideals that have a real and absolute value and, if we are correct in our assertion that values are revealed by emotion and absolute values are revealed by the extension emotions, the value of any developmental ideal (or of the progression toward or regression from that ideal) must be revealed by such emotions. Of course, different ideals might well reflect different emotional structures. As previously noted, Christian ideals stress faith, hope, love, and joy (whose structures involve relations between person and Other), whereas Buddhist ideals stress compassion, happiness, and serenity (whose structures involve a oneness between person and Being). However, although there is some room for diversity, the ideals of development must be revealed by one of the attraction extension emotions.

Distinguishing Between Objective and Illusory Emotion

Although value must be revealed by emotion, we know that any particular emotion may be illusory. Emotion may reveal value, but it can also mislead us and even obscure value. There are at least two sorts of common errors. The first involves a misidentification. The person mistakes one emotion for another, or is misled by a related physiological state. A woman who is constantly abused by her spouse mistakes her dependency for love. Or a scholar confuses hatred with confidence and fails to recognize the destructiveness of his criticism. Or a patient contemplates suicide because he or she does not realize a depression has been induced by a drug. The second sort of error involves an illusion. An aspect of the person becomes caught up in an emotion which is misdirected. An insecure person may become enraged by someone cutting in front of him in line and, perceiving the evil of what he takes to be a humiliation, murder the offender (cf. Toch, 1969). A person who survives an accident that killed others may become guilty over still being alive or be overwhelmed with depression. Or a person may have an aspect of the self resonate with certain qualities in an other in a way that leads the person to believe that he or she has fallen in love (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 378).

How can we discriminate between emotions that reveal value and emotions that are mistaken or illusory? Both Brentano and Scheler suggested ways to distinguish the quality of value-revealing emotions (cf. Calhoun & Solomon, 1984, pp. 203-229). Brentano pointed out that

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although we *cannot* use degree of conviction as a distinguishing criterion, there is a "clarity" to our experience of the value of the object in correct emotions that is absent from incorrect ones. Because of this clarity, he suggested that when we step back from the emotional involvement we still see that our own judgment is the only possible judgment—that there is a self-evident quality to the judgment that is not present when we examine the object of other emotions. Scheler distinguished "intentional feelings" that are directed toward a clearly perceived value from "feeling-states" (such as moods or being overcome with rage or fear). He also argued that the ability to have intentional feelings is hindered by feeling-states such as resentment.

It might be possible to conduct some empirical research that would examine the preceding claims, but in the current context I want to focus on the conceptual basis for a distinction between emotions that are objective, in the sense of revealing value, and emotions that are merely subjective phenomenon.

A central problem for any such distinction is that most psychological analysis conceives the person as an individual who is fundamentally separate from other individuals. Hence, it conceives of emotion as a fundamentally subjective phenomenon, in the sense that an emotion is directed at a *perceived* other. Although the perception may or may not be correct, there is no real ground for distinguishing between those emotions with correct perception and those with incorrect perception.

Even when psychologists deal with a sophisticated unit of analysis, such as Lewin's life space (1935), Angyal's biosphere (1941), or Wapner's person-in-environment (1987), the person is conceived as an individual, whereas others are conceptualized as parts of the individual's environment, that is, as objects apart from the person. In fact, the idea that a person is in an environment seems so commonsensical to us, so true to experience that it may be hard to imagine any other sensible way to think about people. Where are other persons if they are not in my environment? However, if we reflect upon this statement we may become aware of its fundamental egotism. It sees other persons as in *our* environment and neglects that we are in each of theirs. The moment we become aware of each person as an agent in his or her own right, the conceptualization shatters into as many environments as persons, with each person fundamentally alone, and ourselves forced into the position of a third-person observer. (I am reminded of the probability question as to how many persons must be in a room before there are even odds that two of them have the same birthday. We tend to divide 365 by 2, calculating the odds that someone else has *our* own birthday, forgetting that any two *other* persons may have the same birthday.)

An alternative analysis, which appears to offer a ground for distin-

guishing between emotions that reveal and emotions that obscure value, was advanced by John Macmurray (1961). He argued that persons as human actors (rather than as mere biological organisms) only exist in relation to other persons. Thus, he proposed that the fundamental unit of personal existence is *two* persons in relation to one another or, more exactly, "two persons in community in relation to one common Other which includes them" (p. 178). From this perspective, persons as persons do not exist outside of personal relationships. It is these relationships that are in an environment. Even this environment is fundamentally personal—that is, the world itself may be better conceived in terms of agency than as an impersonal object.

Within this unit of the personal, emotions are not entities that are in the person. Of course, an emotion *belongs* to one person rather than another. We may refer to *Tom's* anger in the same sense that we may refer to Tom's action. However, emotions are not cognitions plus physiological arousal, or any other sort of internal state. Rather, they are *between* the self and the other in a way that is analogous to action. Emotions are aspects of the fundamental relationship between one person and the other, and as such they motivate and sustain each person's activity. Further, the behavior that emotions motivate cannot be satisfied by the person alone; the behavior can only be completed by a response from the other. An infant cannot meet his or her own needs and resolve his or her own discomfort; the discomfort motivates a communication to an other who must satisfy the infant's needs. In turn, the other's caring love cannot be satisfied by anything that he or she can do, but must depend on the infant's communication of comfort. Similarly, in our own relationships with lovers, friends, and colleagues, our most fundamental needs can only be met by others and not by ourselves.

Macmurray proposed that these emotional relationships are structured in a particular way. They have a bipolar form, such that there is always both a concern for the other and a concern for the self. However, at any given moment one of these concerns is dominant and subordinates the other. The dominant pole determines the fundamental direction of the person's behavior. When we are primarily concerned for the other, we may speak of love for the objective other; we are oriented toward the development of the other (whether the "other" be a person, a work of art, a scientific enterprise, or some task in which we are engaged; cf. Mayeroff, 1972). When we are primarily concerned about the self, we may speak of a fear for the self and are oriented toward some sort of defensive activity. We become subjective or irrational. Thus, at any moment of time we may be either heterocentric or egocentric, either "task" or ego oriented (cf. Lewis, 1944). I take this

analysis to constitute a systematic account of the sort of phenomena that concerned Murdoch (1970). She described how the average person has a feeling that objective goodness exists, suggested that the various virtues are hierarchically arranged (in such a way that truth and beauty are subordinate to goodness), and argued that goodness is revealed by the patient close attention of loving eyes and obscured by the veil of our egocentricity.

The fundamental emotional relationships described by Macmurray are *not* the same as the emotional structures noted earlier. The former describe the state of the real relationship between person and other, whereas the latter are concerned with how a person interprets the situations that involve the other—the successes and failures, challenges and hospitalities, dangers and opportunities that occur in the context of the relationship. However, the underlying emotional relationship seems to provide a ground for distinguishing emotional structures that reveal from those that obscure value: We may posit that emotions that lead to a dominance of the love pole will reveal value, whereas emotions that promote the dominance of the fear pole will obscure value.

The Conceptualization of Ideal Development

The last section of this chapter considers ways to influence the "choice" between love and fear, but first I want to pursue the implications of Macmurray's analysis for how we conceptualize ideal development. Macmurray pointed out that certain situations tend to lead to the dominance of the fear pole. These situations, such as abandonment, loss, and violence, inevitably occur in the course of life, awaken our concern for ourselves, and lead the concern for self to become dominant over our love for the other. This dominance of fear has both motivational and cognitive consequences.

From a motivational perspective, persons who are afraid for themselves will either feel that they must be out for themselves (because nobody else is going to care for them) or be good in order to please others (who may *then* care for them). Therefore, to the extent that fear dominates a person's life, the person's ideology will either be a pragmatic individualism that focuses on meeting personal needs without real regard for the needs of others, or an ideal conformism that leads the person to sacrifice his or her own position to the needs of others. (In either case, the person is not really free to be him or herself, because the pragmatic "individualist" will have to compete with others by complying with external standards. Real individuality can only develop out of the caring that occurs when love dominates over fear.)

From a cognitive perspective, the dominance of fear results in a self-focusing that negates the relationship with the Other. The real person is constituted by this relationship (we only exist in relation to others), but the self-focusing splits the self and other apart, so that the person appears to exist as a conscious subject in an objective world that is apart from the self. This dualism is reflected in current psychological units of analysis and in the gap between science and religion. The self divides into a material self with a bodily life and a spiritual self with a spiritual life. In a like manner, the world divides into an actual world that does not meet our needs and an ideal world that we can imagine and that would satisfy us (cf. Macmurray, 1961, p. 123). Two different conceptions of ideal development will occur depending on which of these worlds and selves is taken to be real.

The "pragmatic" person (or culture) takes the actual world and material life to be the *real* world and life and views ideals and idealism as unrealistic. The conformist or "contemplative" person or culture takes the ideal world and spiritual life to be the *real* world and life and views the actual world as illusory and the body as a mere prison for the soul.

These two modes of apperceiving the world and the self lead to different concepts of morality and the ideal society. For the pragmatist, real life is a life of action and the pursuit of individual happiness. Because every individual will seek power in order to satisfy his or her own needs, people will have to be governed by a set of laws, and a strong State must have the power to enforce these laws. The problems humans face will be seen as basically technological problems to be solved by the State. Morality will be conceived as Kant conceived it, as obedience to moral law; the self-limiting its own freedom in order to maintain society. Hence, self-control will be stressed as well as the subordination of emotion to reason. Ideal development will involve the individual recognizing his or her obligation to accept a set of rules that are the same for all and that limit the individual's use of power to do what he or she pleases.

For the contemplative, the real life is a life of spirit and reflection, and this enables the person to conform to whatever is demanded of the self in the actual world. The individual identifies with the whole, which includes the self. Hence, the person can submit to what is required for the general good, conforming to whatever role is required in the social system. The person adopts the attitude of a spectator, and the ideal is a morality of good form that must be "felt" rather than reasoned, an anarchy in which each person surrenders his or her own will for the good of the whole.

Both the pragmatic and contemplative apperceptions and ideals may

be contrasted with the conceptualization of ideal development held when love is dominant in the person's relation with the other. To the extent that it is possible for a person to overcome fear for the self, the person will care about the other, and the ego will recede. The recession of the ego enables cooperation to occur (cf. Lewis & Franklin, 1944), and the caring for the other facilitates the cooperative negotiation of agreements that are good for both (cf. Fisher & Ury, 1981). Accordingly, the ideal society will be conceived as a community of persons who realize that they are different from one another but who respect and care for one another, acting for the sake of the other and not simply for the self. From such a perspective, moral ideals will stress the overcoming of fear so that one's neighbor can be cared for and wrongs can be forgiven. Body and spirit are seen as parts of one whole, and the ideal and the actual are both real. When love is dominant, ideal development involves the celebration of the union between ideal and actual; when a gap opens between them, hope prevents this gap from becoming a split. Because persons only exist in relation to other persons, and because these relationships (and, hence, personal existence) are only fostered when love for the other dominates fear for the self, Macmurray argued that the ideals of cooperative community are superior to those of either individualistic or communistic society.

"CHOICE" OF EMOTION AND IDEAL DEVELOPMENT

If we accept Macmurray's analysis that persons are inescapably intermeshed in relationships with others that involve both caring for the other and fear for the self, then we may argue that ideal development will only occur when love is dominant over fear, so that emotional structures function to reveal the value of their objects rather than to defend the ego.

In a related vein, we may assert that whenever an emotion is responsive to the value of an object, it encourages the dominance of love over fear, so that development may progress.

Although it is not possible for a person to simply decide that he or she will love an other rather than fear for the self, there appear to be a number of ways of cultivating emotional structures that will be responsive to the values inherent in various situations. I briefly discuss three methods for attempting to achieve this.

The first method involves *practicing* loving thoughts or kind actions in the hope that loving feelings will follow. For example, the Buddhist "Metta" meditation begins by wishing happiness, freedom from suffer-

ing, and compassion for one's self ("May I be happy . . ."). Then it continues these good wishes to those whom one is close to, then to strangers, and finally to all living beings. These good wishes, combined with the actual practice of generosity, appear to eventually create a spontaneous attitude of loving-kindness (cf. Nyanaponika, 1960).

Although I do not know of any hard empirical evidence as to the efficacy of this method, Sorokin (1954) reported an interesting study that may be relevant. In this study, he paid five students to do kindly deeds to roommates whom they disliked (and were disliked by). At first, the students felt no goodwill, and their kindly deeds were received with suspicion. However, in every case after a few kindly behaviors the students began to feel more kindly disposed and, again in every case, *after* this affective change occurred the roommates began to reciprocate.

While this sort of experiment may seem rather straightforward, I should mention that, in a different context, Macmurray warned, "any pretence about our feelings results in self-deception and we become incapable of knowing what we really feel" (Macmurray, 1935, p. 31). He would prefer the training of *sensibility* and would favor practices such as sensory awareness (cf. Brooks, 1974), or the loving direction of attention (cf. Murdoch, 1970, p. 22), or role playing, which allow the person to enhance his or her understanding of the other with less risk of any distortion of feeling. Clearly, there is room for some interesting research here.

A second method is an indirect one. If Macmurray is correct, there is no real conflict between emotion and reason, or between love and will. The struggle is to overcome fear so that the love pole can dominate and one can be responsive to the reality of the other, allowing one's perceptions to be influenced by both the emotional core and the cognitive periphery of perception. In Macmurray's terms, ". . . the real struggle is to allow some feelings and desires to be fashioned by things outside us, often by things over which we have no control" (Macmurray, 1935, p. 22). In order to achieve this, to have the faith that will allow one to stop clinging to the false security provided by authority (cf. Krishnamurti, 1968), one may prepare the heart through either prayer, meditation, or imaginative dialogue, so that one is more able to be affected. For example, by placing one's faith in a caring other, a person may attempt to open the heart so that he or she becomes empowered to spontaneously love (cf. Tallon, 1981; von Hildebrand, 1953). I am not familiar with empirical investigations on the success of prayer when it is used to enhance one's capacity to love. However, a study by Hoffmeyer (1980) demonstrates that the rigidity of perceptions is dimin-

ished when persons are encouraged to express their feelings in addition to their cognitions about the other.

A third method, which I have been investigating, involves working with concrete emotional experience. A number of studies suggest that a person often has a "choice" of what emotion to use. For example, a person who has been neglected by a friend may either feel hurt or angry. Often, a person will vacillate between the two. In a previous paper (de Rivera, 1984a) I argued that when a person chooses the "correct" emotion—the one most called for by the situation—he or she develops, whereas an incorrect choice results in stasis or even regression. The reasoning behind this assertion involves that the particular structure for each emotion functions to promote or defend values in very specific ways.

For example, consider the choice of shame or guilt as an emotion. Earlier, I noted that shame involves an experience of objective badness, that one is bad, whereas guilt involves subjective badness in the sense that the person feels that he or she acted badly and, by implication, could have acted differently. When shame is used correctly, it functions to protect a value that has been violated by the person's own behavior and promotes a commitment to personal change. Let us consider the case of a person who believes in the value of altruistic service to others and who is offered a job at a home for the elderly. We would expect that such a person would feel good about the self for taking the job. If the same person turned the job down because it was a difficult job, we might expect cognitive dissonance to operate and the person to begin to view altruistic service as a matter of preference rather than as an objective value—something that is required of worthy persons. What happens, as in fact did happen to one of Lindsay-Hartz's (1984) subjects, when a person discovers that such a job really seems too difficult to handle? If the person believes that he or she freely chooses to turn down a job involving altruistic service, then the value of altruistic service would be weakened. However, there is an alternative. The person can remain committed to the value by viewing the self as incapable of action; by becoming ashamed and viewing the self as not what he or she would like it to be. The person becomes small, but the objectivity of the value is maintained, and the person resolves to change the self for future action.

On the other hand, if circumstances lead one to freely choose to violate an objective value, one's identity may be at stake. One may incur a devalued identity status—be a thief, a prostitute, and so forth. Consider this scenario: Circumstances lead a young woman to break a date with one man, to tell him she isn't feeling well so she can go out

with another man. Would she not, thereby become a "two-timer" or a deceitful person? Not if, as in the case of one of my subjects (de Rivera, 1977), she experienced guilt. If she were really a two-timer, really a deceitful person, she wouldn't experience guilt. As Lindsay-Hartz (1984) pointed out, the guilty person always feels as if he or she was the devalued identity, but there is a force to make right the damaged moral order, and the person's good identity is protected.

Of course, shame or guilt is not always the "correct" emotion to choose. Thus, if the fear pole is dominant, one may choose guilt even when one is not objectively guilty. For example, guilt functions to give one a sense of control and, hence, may be used to avoid facing that one does not have control. In such circumstances, dread or shame may be better choices and help the love pole to become dominant.

We may define a correct choice as one which results in domination by the love rather than the fear pole, and I close this chapter by giving two examples of how the choice of one emotion rather than another can advance the love pole and, hence, promote ideal development.

A young woman who felt unsure of her mother's love and wanted to be closer to her suggested that her mother see a film that portrayed one of the dilemmas that the woman herself experienced. After several weeks, she inquired as to whether her mother had seen the film. When she learned that her mother had not yet "gotten around to it," she developed a stomach ache and alternated between hurt and anger. In his particular case, both these emotional responses clearly involved the domination of the fear pole. Both reflected a fear of being unloved and, because both hurt and anger involve expectations of the other, the motions were unrealistic (given the problematic nature of the relationship with the mother). Thus, both emotions played into the dominance of the fear pole and led the woman to be out of touch with the objective nature of the other. Fortunately, a friend suggested that one might feel *isapointment* in such a circumstance. This emotion immediately felt right, the stomach ache vanished, and the woman felt better about herself and her mother. I believe that the "choice" of disappointment helped the love pole to regain its dominance. This occurred because the structure of disappointment involves hope, rather than expectancy (cf. Farrel, 1967), and this hope (which was realistic) enabled the daughter to feel more separate and the fear to recede.

A college student who often experienced "guilt trips" related that the previous evening, when she had really wanted to stay home, a friend had dropped by and coaxed her into going to a movie. When she had thought of turning the friend down, she felt guilty. It seemed apparent that this guilt was motivated by the dominance of the fear pole (would her friend still like her if she didn't go with her, etc.). It was hard for her

to imagine saying something like, "It's good to see you and thanks for the invitation, but I really want to study tonight." I asked the student to construct a statement—the assertive statement that she would ideally like to make. Then, I asked her to imagine feeling a number of different emotions that I suggested to her. Which would most help her to make her ideal statement? Would guilt or shame help most, would shame or contempt help most, would contempt or anger help most? I felt a bit like an optometrist asking a person to look through different lenses to get the best fit. Anger clearly helped some, but when I asked whether anger or love worked better, her face lightened and her whole posture changed. She was clearly surprised that she actually did love her friend and that this love could be manifested in an assertive remark that required her to risk her love rather than fear for herself.

Although I have had very little experience with this new method, I have personally chosen the emotion of hope, thereby experiencing a certain buoyancy that will help me to continue to work on this and other methods, which may help assert the primacy of love over fear.

DISCUSSION

Helen Lewis argued that de Rivera's ideas would have to be integrated into attachment theory, and that choosing some emotions is possible only in a benign framework. Anger, for instance, would be futile were there no true attachment.

Although de Rivera saw complete compatibility between attachment theory and his own ideas, he maintained that choosing emotions is critical even in nonbenign environments. He said that in the nuclear arms race anger is a better choice than fear for us, because we act to change things if we are angry, and our leaders' fears prevent useful negotiation.

Michael Lewis, after making some suggestions about how to promote love over fear, pointed to research with infants indicating that as they learn to produce an interesting effect by pulling a string, they first look surprised, then show joy, and, when the task becomes routine, finally seem to show sadness. He was impressed by the role of emotion in this kind of action, and, arguing that this example did not concern relationships with other people, he asked de Rivera if he could accommodate such findings in his theory. The reply was that this is a kindly or loving or responsive environment, and that this was implicit in the joy evidenced at attaining the value in the infant's activity.

Scheff, noting that de Rivera's paper included no verbatim dialogue, only paraphrases, objected that the arguments offered could only be

urthered by or tested against minute particulars. Until we get down to text, a human voice, a facial expression, we will go around in circles. de Rivera agreed, remarking that he does study the verbatim dialogues. Sarbin, agreeing with Scheff, asked for more detailed phenomenological analysis of the story behind the abstract emotion word. He suggested that a better metaphor than an optometrist trying on different lenses was a literary critic applying a number of proposed plots to the subject's own life narrative.

De Rivera gave some details of his procedure: He first asked his student to craft the response she would best like to make in the situation and then to try on different emotions to see which would best support that action. Sarbin claimed that de Rivera was introducing a mythology requiring the student to perform a logical analysis to determine what he meant by "try on," and that further examination would ring in the construction of a text. If the student were trying on anything, she was trying on different kinds of narrative plots in which he is one of the actors.

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