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"The Structure of Emotional
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The Structure of Emotional Relationships

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There are at least three approaches to the study of emotion. The first of these, implicitly adopted by most of the contributors to this volume, conceives of emotion as a process occurring within an organism located in an environment. From this perspective one may ask how emotions evolved biologically, how they enable the organism to adapt to situations it encounters in the environment, how different emotions derive from attributions to the self or to the environment, and how emotions motivate behavior and affect cognition. The expressive behavior associated with a particular emotion may be observed and the "feeling component" regarded as a subjective event with qualities (hedonic tone, degree of strength and activity) which may be reported by an introspective subject.

The second approach is phenomenological. From this viewpoint it is inaccurate to speak as though there is an objective world, an environment populated by organisms, which exists independent of personal knowing. Of course, we imagine such a world; most readers of this volume probably assume the existence of an objective world that began billions of years ago and will continue to exist after we die. But that's the point: Each of us *assumes* this world's existence. We actively use imagination to interpret or perceive the "objective" world and must actively continue to assume its reality. Phenomenologists do not argue that the world is a fantasy, that the environment and its organisms are figments of our imagination, but rather that the "objective" world is an insufficient conception of what actually exists, because this world is

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always, in fact, a world-as-perceived-by-us. Each of us is not simply an organism situated in an environment but a "body-subject" at the center of a world that is constituted by us and then assumed to exist independent of our perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). We human beings *created* the theory of evolution, along with ideas such as truth and reality. The objective scientific world is constituted by society, its solid-seeming objective "reality" is our age's mythology, our culture's *interpretation* of what exists.

From this perspective, human emotions are not processes that occur within organisms situated in an objective environment. They only give this appearance when we abstract ourselves from them and look at them from outside the world as we ordinarily live it. When we don't hold ourselves back, when we allow ourselves to stay *inside* an emotion, either our own or someone else's, we immediately notice that the world of depression is strikingly different from the world of euphoria, that the world we experience when we are afraid is not at all like the world we experience when we are loving—or like the "objective" world we experience when we are emotionally detached. In fact, we may view emotions as different ways of being-in-the-world and proceed to describe these different modes of existence.

It can certainly be useful to assume an objective world and investigate within it such phenomena as facial expressions, skin temperature, attribution processes, and adaptive mechanisms; and it is illuminating to think of ourselves as body-subjects at the center of a world, or series of worlds, which is constituted by ourselves. However, neither of these perspectives focuses on the fact that we are continually sharing our world with others. A third approach to emotion takes as its starting point the fundamental fact that each of us exists, necessarily, in relationships with other people.

Just as organisms can exist only within environments and consciousness can inhabit only a perceived world, persons can exist only in relationship with other persons. Each of us is born into a relationship with one or more caretakers and cannot develop normally without being loved. Our most necessary fear is not of bears or precipices, two common examples in the emotion literature, but of the absence of a caring other. Our very existence depends on that presence (Macmurray, 1961). As adults in a society that values independence and self-sufficiency, we like to think of ourselves as separate individuals. In fact, however, we all exist in relation to others, as members of families, embedded in networks of friends, as role occupants within a society that furnishes our food, water, energy, housing, transportation, and medical care and recognizes us as real and legitimate "individuals." Even when we are alone, our thoughts

and behaviors are oriented toward others—as imagined recipients or potential audiences. Even the complete privacy of the individual creative act is performed in the presence of an internalized or imagined other, and much creativity is explicitly social in nature.

From this third perspective on emotion, which is the one I want to examine here, the fundamental unit of analysis is not an organism in an environment or a being-in-the-world, but a person-other relationship. And emotion is viewed as a characteristic of the *relationship* between two people. Thus, we may love the other, in the sense of genuinely caring about the other's welfare; we may fear that the other may abandon us or treat us as an object; we may long for the other to care for us or be envious of the other's position as compared with ours. In this chapter, I will explore the possibility that *all* emotions are concerned with adjusting the relationship between person and other, and that each emotion ideally functions to maximize the *values* of the relationship. I will argue that this—and not mere adaptation of the individual to its environment—is the evolutionary significance of human emotion, and that rather than being mere cultural constructions, emotional relationships are a universal reality that makes interpretation possible and enables us to translate across different cultural realities.

The emotional relationship inherent in the person-other (dyadic) social unit has a structure that can be described in terms of three dimensions. The dimension of *belonging* involves concerns such as whether person and other belong in a common unit and share values. This is conceptually independent of the second dimension, *recognition*, which concerns the recognition of social identity and the values inherent in issues of status, power, and self-presentation. The third dimension concerns *being*, or existence, and involves the meaningfulness of one's life and the very existence of values (the distinction between good and bad). Each of these dimensions involves different sets of emotions that function to promote value. I will consider each of the three in turn and then consider how this relational approach to emotion compares with the more familiar organism-environment approach.

THE DIMENSION OF BELONGING

Emotional relationship begins with the infant and a "mothering" other. The development of this relationship has been studied by Mahler, Pine, and Bergman (1968), Spitz (1963), Wolf (1963), and others. Its dynamics have been carefully described by Kaplan (1978), and the following account is based on her work.

The Relationship Between Infant and Other

At birth, the infant is in a state of limbo, unavailable for human contact and protected from bombardment by the world's stimuli. Any smiles seem to be due simply to discharge of tension, and the eyes are often unfocused; the infant is not really in psychological contact with the world and does not seem to relate to the caretaking other. In a sense, for the infant there is no other. He or she is called out of this limbo by the caretaker's attention. Being held, nursed, gentled, and spoken to provides security and the necessary stimulus for the infant to come out of itself and enter into a relationship. If this relationship does not provide enough safety, the infant may withdraw into itself.

By the third week of life, the infant may smile *at* the other, and its "distress face" pulls the other's care. By the fourth week, the other's voice may have the power to preempt the infant's attention away from the urgency of feeding, and by the eighth week, the infant is in active "dialogue" with the other, "talking" back with coos and goos and smiles, searching for eye contact with the other, who is specifically recognized. Thus, the infant emerges from its initial inner preoccupations to form a "unit" with the person who is caring for its life.

There are at least two different strands to this unity. One is reflected in the way the infant's body "molds" into the body of the other. At such times, evidence of discomfort vanishes and an apparent sense of wholeness emerges as the infant's tensions dissipate and it "merges" with the other, apparently experiencing a state of blissful harmony. The second strand involves an increased desire for "dialogue" with the other. These dialogues are clearly exciting for the infant, who is filled with enthusiasm for the delightful give-and-take of the "talk," eye contact, and smiles with the other. The infant voluntarily persists in this activity and appears to experience a more active sort of pleasure (enjoyment rather than contentment) until he or she is satisfied and relaxes into a state of contentment. Although the infant is clearly unified with the other during these dialogues (and an observer is impressed by the intensity of the union), there is clearly an "other" present in the sense that the infant is not merged into the oneness characteristic of the first strand of unity. While the infant is not really separate from the other, therefore, these smiles and dialogues might be regarded as a predecessor of what will ultimately become love for a separate other. These two strands, of merger and dialogue, appear to work together to form the "attachment bond" described by Bowlby (1969).

At the same time that this emotional development is occurring, the infant demonstrates another developmental pattern of interest. Rather than molding its body to the body of the other in a way that promotes

merger, it can stiffen against the other in a way that appears to establish a self-other boundary. Also, whenever it is uncomfortable, its body stiffens and it cries out. It is as though the infant were trying to *push away* or remove the unpleasant stimulation or tension impinging on it. While the infant is still too undifferentiated to distinguish between self and other, the dynamism involved is an attempt to remove something that is "other," and it may be regarded as a predecessor to rage; this helps to create the beginnings of a boundary between self and other much as dialoguing does. That is, in contrast to a withdrawn state or the state of merger, there is a beginning of self-other differentiation.

I have now distinguished four different emotional dynamics that can easily be observed in infants less than three months of age. These dynamics, together with their more adult forms, are shown in Table 5.1. It is important to note that these emotional dynamics are not really *in* the infant. They are not just physiological states with concomitant facial expressions and subjective feelings. Rather, the dynamics are *between* the infant and the other. Although the infant participates in or "lives" the emotion, and its body is fully involved and exhibits facial expressions and physiological changes, the emotional dynamic involves primarily the infant's relationship with the other. Several contemporary investigators are attempting to assess the degree to which individuals may recognize emotion by facial expressions or by situational context (see Izard, Hübener, Nissen, McGinnes, & Dougherty, 1980; Johnson, Emde, Panabacker, Steinberg, & Davis, 1982). While either of these sets of cues may be used, our approach suggests that ultimately we recognize emotion by observing the relationship between infant and other. Facial cues or context are simply pieces of evidence we use in this assessment.

The emotional relationships shown in Table 5.1 may be coordinated with the movements described in *A Structural Theory of the Emotions* (de Rivera, 1977). If the reader will hold his or her hands in front of the body with palms facing outward, a contraction of the arms will produce

TABLE 5.1
Emotional Dynamics in the Infant-Other Relationship

<i>Emotional Relationship</i>	<i>Characterized by . . .</i>	<i>Predecessor to Adult Emotion of . . .</i>
Withdrawal	removal of self, danger	fear
Merger	molding into other's body, bliss	longing
Dialogue	alert contact with other, enthusiastic enjoyment	love
Removal	stiffening, removal of discomfort	anger

the pulling back inherent in the relationship of withdrawal, while an extension of the arms will result in the pushing away implicit in the relationship of removal. If the palms are faced toward the body, a contraction will result in the pulling together of merger while an extension effects the giving to the other which is involved in dialogue. In fact, these movements are clearly recognizable as the ones used by actors who are portraying the emotions of fear, anger, longing, and love. They govern all of the dynamics of the dimension of emotional relationships I have called "belonging." Thus, in fear we do not want to belong to the other; in anger we do not want the other to belong to us; in longing we want to belong with the other; and in love we belong to the other in the sense of giving our self to the other.

The Relationship Between Infant and World

While the existence of the emotional relationships described above may be granted, the reader may object that other emotions have nothing to do with this theoretical scheme or with another person. After all, infants are also emotionally related to activities and show obvious "moods" of elation and listlessness. We may characterize these phenomena as emotional relationships between the infant and the world. If we examine these apparently impersonal emotions more closely, I submit, we will find them intimately related to the emotional relationship between infant and other.

Previously, I mentioned that the infant's body stiffens when he or she attempts to remove tension by raging. A different sort of stiffening occurs when the body shifts from molding (to the contours of the other) to the alert posture that accompanies an interest in the events of the world. As the infant develops, this interest (in its own hands, in moving objects) develops into a desire to produce effects and an enjoyment of activity for its own sake. In a very real sense, this stiffening away from merger, and this entire emotional development, takes the infant away from the other as attention is turned to the world.

However, this shift of attention can apparently occur only if the bond with the other has been established. If the other is not emotionally available for holding and dialogue, the infant keeps anxiously trying to find this relatedness, or withdraws into itself, either physically dying or developing the split (between an isolated core and a surface self) characteristic of the schizoid character structure (Guntrip, 1971). We see, therefore, that the infant's turn toward the world is completely dependent on contact with the other.

Until the fourth or fifth month, when the infant can attend to activity in the world, he or she has no way to form a boundary between self and

other, no way to imagine the self as separate from the other. For the next six months, the baby begins to develop a self through playing by itself in the presence of the other. This separating play is dependent on the stability of the other's presence; the other's lap is a place of security and comfort, a home base where the baby can "recharge" with doses of the other's love. When the baby can turn its attention to the world and direct excitement into activity that is separate from the other, he or she builds up self-confidence. The self can act, and the baby becomes an active doer, a master who takes charge rather than a passive being that is continually done to. When the baby loses control over what will or will not happen, he or she loses confidence and either becomes passive and depressed or rages against the helpless state to which he or she has been reduced. This rage is no longer a simple thrusting away of discomfort; it protests the injustice of being reduced to helplessness, and the protest maintains the integrity of the developing self-boundary.

To summarize: The infant is pulled from a withdrawn state into a unity with an other which manifests at least two emotional dynamics, merger and dialogue. The security provided by this attachment bond enables the infant to direct attention to the world apart from the other, to become enthusiastically engaged in activities in that world, and to begin to develop confidence and a boundary that distinguishes self from other. When this newly emerging autonomy is challenged, the baby protests its loss of control with an outburst of rage, just as previously the infant stiffened against and attempted to thrust off discomforting stimulation.

As the baby begins to develop apart from the other, from approximately 10 to 18 months, he or she becomes more confident and powerful. Rather than having the other as the center of the world, constantly orienting toward the other, the baby becomes the center of his or her own world. Rather than anxiously checking back to see if the other is present, the baby joyfully hurtles itself through space with high-spirited confidence. In tune with the realities of the world it knows, the baby masters activities with real pleasure. At this stage, the baby is in love with the world and tends to ignore the other, whose existence is taken for granted. It is almost as though the baby imagines that the other is present in the world, that the world is holding it in the same loving manner that the other formerly held it. The baby is not yet aware that the other is a fully separate being; the other still seems to be unified with the self, although there is now a boundary between self and other within this unity.

Yet, in fact, the happiness of this baby kingdom is dependent on the other's background presence. If the other-to-whom-the-baby-is-attached leaves, the baby's mood changes; he or she loses interest in the world and turns inward, perhaps managing the loss of support by conjuring an

inner world that can temporarily hold him or her. When the other returns, there is a burst of tears or anger, a release of the tension of having to hold oneself. However, the other usually still is present for the baby, still focusing to a large extent on the baby's needs and activities, adapting to its desires.

In terms of the structural theory of emotions, these dynamics can be summarized as follows. The emotional relationship of security, which enables the baby to turn away from the other and toward the world, is dependent on the other's love and on the attachment bond and "recharging" made possible by that love. The dynamic of anxiety leads the baby to turn back to the other until it is sure that it can maintain contact with the other. Thus, anxiety will occur if the other is withdrawn (or not present for some reason) or if the baby suspects that one of its activities would lead the other to withdraw. The dynamic of confidence enables the baby to become the center of its world. In part, confidence depends on the success of the baby's activities and, hence, on the baby's abilities; but success is also defined by the response of the other. The structural theory postulates that if the other is proud of the baby's activity and adores its achievement—that is, if the other *wants* the baby—the baby is more likely to perceive its activity as successful, to attribute this success to the self, and, hence, to develop confidence. On the other hand, if the other is angry or if the other's absence leads the baby to feel unwanted, the baby experiences a sense of failure, becoming passive, low-keyed, or even depressed; eventually activity declines and the child stops trying. These dynamics are summarized in Table 5.2.

As the table indicates, the emotional relationship between the baby and the world is dependent on the other's emotional relationship with the baby. Note that if the theory is correct, it should be possible to distinguish the baby's security from its confidence and to distinguish parental love from parental desire for the child. While ordinarily, securi-

TABLE 5.2
Emotional Dynamics in the Infant-World Relationship

<i>Emotional Relationship of Baby to Other</i>	<i>Leads Baby to . . .</i>	<i>Dependent on Other's Emotional Relationship of . . .</i>
Security	turn attention from other to world	love for infant
Anxiety	turn back to other	withdrawal from infant
Confidence	become an active agent, a center of the world	wanting infant
Depression	become passive	not wanting infant

ty and confidence, and love and desire, will go together, there may be somewhat more of one than the other. I would predict that the child's security would correlate with parental love, while child confidence would correlate with the extent to which the child is wanted. Notice that the set of the other's emotional relationships to the infant are the adult equivalents of the first set of infant emotional relationships described in Table 5.1. That is, love for the infant is related to dialoguing, withdrawal is analogous to fear, wanting is analogous to merging, and not wanting is analogous to anger. By "analogous," I mean that there is a structural similarity. For example, the movements of extension or contraction are identical. The entire set of eight emotional dynamics has to do with whether the baby and the other "belong" to each other.

The Separation of Infant and Other

The unity of baby and other cannot last forever. Around 18 months (in our culture at least), the accumulating weight of evidence forces the child to realize that he or she is a separate being, that the other has an existence separate from its own. In part, this trauma seems due to the waning of the child from the mother's attention, in part to the development of cognitive ability, to language and the awareness this brings. In any case, it is a fact that the other's interests are not identical with the baby's, and the baby-unified-with-the-other must become a lonely child with an identity of its own. It now says "I." Of course, the child attempts to overcome this separateness, running to the other with things to share, attempting to attract attention, searching for signs of the lost union. The child's "emotional investment" shifts from the enjoyment of activity in the world to being reunited with the other and staving off the anxiety of being helpless and alone when the other is not physically present. Before the development of separateness, the baby was able to cope with absence of the other by turning inward and imitating the other or conjuring up a presence. Now the child becomes depressed or avoids this blackness by engaging in an unfocused, manic burst of activity.

There is a corresponding shift in the way the child views the world. On the one hand, he or she is no longer the confident master of an imagined kingdom. On the other hand, the child now has a separate identity and possesses some small but uniquely personal space. The child appears to be torn between a longing to merge again into oneness and a fear of doing this at the loss of its newfound self and independence. One solution is to have a part of oneself become like the other, leaving the rest free for independence. Certainly the child attempts to cope with its separateness by enacting the roles played by the other. He or she can comfort a teddy bear (or kick it), combating the aloneness by taking the

other inside the self and making him or her part of the self. Although the other's identity is no longer the same as the self's, the self can become like the other; the comforting (or rejecting) presence can be held inside. Thus, while we separate from the original caretaker, we still carry him or her with us as an internalized other who loves and withdraws, wants and respects.

There is another important remnant of this first union. When, as adults, we enter into a new love relationship and, to some extent, breach boundaries of our identity to form a new union, we reopen the issues inherent in our first relationship (Pearce & Newton, 1968). We may be called out of ourselves by the opportunity for merger and dialogue, or we may withdraw from a union that appears to threaten the self's independent existence or expose the self to the terror of abandonment or isolation.

Once the child is separate, he or she has an "inner" world, an emotional space of closeness and distance. The child can no longer gain security simply by moving toward the other in physical space. The child becomes aware of how small he or she actually is and loses the sense of omnipotence, although apparently retaining a belief in the omnipotence of the other. The experience of the self as good or bad no longer depends on the parent's physical presence but on parental presence in the child's fantasies and thoughts. And, once the child is fully separated, a fear of loss of love may replace the fear of loss of presence of the other. Before the development of the separate self, if the baby was prevented from getting or doing what it wanted and got irritable, he or she could be distracted and satisfied with some substitute. Now, an issue of self-esteem becomes involved and a battle of wills ensues. Note, however, that a complex set of emotional dynamics evolves *before* the self develops and prior to any concerns about self-image or presentation of the self.

Adult Emotions

When the child separates from the other, the structure of its emotional relationships has evolved to the point where the emotional dynamics I have described become the full equivalent of our adult emotions. This set of relationships forms the intricate system shown in Table 5.3.

It may be observed that the "other" emotions involve ways in which we value the other with whom we are relating, while the "self" emotions involve ways of valuing the self in its relations with its own activities in the world. However, the self emotions always reflect the relationship between self and other. Therefore, the self emotions are mirror images of the "other" emotions. One's security reflects the love one is receiving; confidence reflects the fact that one is wanted; depression, that one's self

TABLE 5.3
The System of Emotional Relationships Dealing with
Self-Other Belonging

	"Other" Emotions		Corresponding "Self" Emotions	
	Emotion	"Instruction"	Emotion	"Instruction"
+ Extension	love	give to other	security	let go of other
+ Contraction	longing	merge with other	confidence	take hold
- Extension	anger	remove other	depression	give up
- Contraction	fear	withdraw from other	anxiety	hold on to other

is challenging values; and anxiety, a concern over the loss of the relationship with the other. Even the quality of movement in the self emotions *reflects* the movement inherent in the corresponding other emotions. Thus, the constricted quality of depressive states mirrors the aggressive extension of anger.

Of course, since we carry an internalized other with us, I would predict some characterological differences in the degree to which persons are secure, confident, depressed, and anxious. These should reflect childhood differences in the extent to which persons were loved, wanted, rejected, and subjected to withdrawal. The characterologically secure person will have internalized a loving other, while the confident person will be wanted by the internalized other. Likewise, the characterologically depressed will be submitting to an internalized other, while the anxious person will be attempting to avoid a withdrawal of the other. Of course, when the ego splits into parts these relationships will be more complex. Nevertheless, the personality is best analyzed as Guntrip (1971, p. 59) suggests, "not as a seething cauldron of instincts or id-drives but as a highly personal inner world of ego-object relationships, finding expression in the child's fantasy-life in ways that were *felt* even before they could be *pictured* or *thought*."

According to the structural theory, each emotional relationship has a definitive structure with specific dynamics that function to preserve and advance values in an interpersonal context. Let us see how this is true for each of the eight emotions in Table 5.3.

Love functions to produce a miracle. As James (1890) noted, each person divides the world into self and not-self, and almost all of a person's interest is devoted to the good of the self. However, when a person is in the emotional relationship of love, he or she actually cares about another! Thus, the happiness of the self is affected by the joy and sorrow of the other. As Ortega y Gasset (1957) observed, the self surren-

ders to the other and becomes involved in a warm collaboration, valuing the other rather than the self alone.

Security, as I have noted, enables the infant to move out toward the world. In adulthood, security allows us to "surrender" our rigid hold on reality, as when we allow ourselves to adopt someone else's perspective or give ourselves in love without losing our identity (Wolff, 1964). In fact, the "mothering" of an infant is a demanding role which requires an adult to give up personal interests and attend to the infant, identifying with its interests, loving it. As Guntrip (1971) notes, this is possible only if the adult feels secure, loved by the family and accepted by the wider society. Thus, the relation of security enables a person to act in a way that is valued by the group.

Longing, or the sort of merger that is implicit in dependency, is rather devalued in our culture, with its stress on self-sufficiency. However, we have seen that the infant is, in fact, completely dependent on the other, and a moment's reflection will reveal that we adults are also quite dependent on others for emotional support. When we are sick, tired, drained, or attempting to cope with stress, we return, if we can, to the arms of an other to be comforted, restored, reunified. The value of such renewal seems evident, and in other cultures it is even permissible for adults to *feel* "amae," or "passive dependency love," with the expectation that they will be taken care of (Doi, 1973).

Confidence functions, as noted above, to enable us to *try*, and hence to attribute successes to the self. Elsewhere (de Rivera, 1977), I have shown how confidence enables a person to assert his or her view of reality and, hence, to lead others in situations involving high degrees of risk. There is a feeling of goodness about confidence, that one *can* act, but it is interesting to observe that it is an entirely different kind of "goodness" from that involved in security. There is a sort of egoism or narcissism in confidence that is inherent in the perception that *I* can do it, *I* am wanted, *I* am good. This feeling of goodness may be contrasted with the goodness involved in freely giving to others, in caring about someone or something other than the self.

Anger occurs when an other acts in a way which challenges the person's values. If functions to remove the challenge to those values (to what the person asserts ought to exist; see de Rivera, 1981). The other's actions can be seen only as a challenge to what ought to exist if the other is perceived to share one's values and is capable of acting in a more responsible way. If the other were a stranger who did not subscribe to the group norms, or was a person who was incapable of behaving differently, or was someone to whom one's values did not apply, the other would not be seen as challenging what ought to exist. Hence, a person can always avoid anger by "distancing" the other and seeing the other

as foreign, or as incapable of behaving in the correct way, or as not worth caring about (not belonging to a unit with shared values). Thus, the emotional relationship of anger preserves not only the person's values but also the values of the group and the closeness between self and other.

Situational depression occurs when the pressures of circumstance lead a person to behave in a way that challenges his or her own values. The depression "removes" the conflict posed by the person's own behaviors in a manner analogous to the way in which anger removes the challenge to one's values posed by the other. Holding a value ordinarily implies that one ought to act in a prescribed way. However, one cannot require this action if the person is *unable* to act. As Heider (1958) showed, "ought" implies "can." By rendering a person passive, the depression removes the requirement to act in accord with one's own values; it allows the person to submit to the pressures of external circumstance, permitting behavior that would, otherwise, challenge the person's values.

Fear enables us to attend to what is dangerous and to concentrate all of our powers on acting to avoid the danger (Goodman, 1975). Whereas in anger the other is perceived as subject to the same values (the other "ought" to be responsible), in fear the other is alien, separate, not subject to common values. Hence, one must be wary rather than indignant in order to protect what one values. Just as the emotion of anger may be avoided by "distancing" the other, fear may be avoided by "withdrawal" from the other.

Anxiety (as distinguished from states of panic or terror) occurs in the adult when he or she is on the threshold of leaving an old identity and venturing forth to establish a new one (Goodman, 1981). The person *must* become this new identity to uphold the values and expectations of the social unit to which he or she belongs. The person accepts responsibility for this and feels that he or she *ought* to be able to act in the required way, but there is a real possibility of failure and, hence, of loss of identity. The anxiety functions to stop the person from doing what he or she isn't really ready to do until various skills are learned and problems "worked through." When this is done, anxiety drops enough to allow the risk to be taken.¹

While I have attempted to show the ways in which some of the emotions are related to the others, and Table 5.3 suggests these relationships, the full extent of this intertwining may not be apparent. In fact, each of these emotional relationships or structures is interrelated with all of the others in a specifiable way, so that there is an overall *emotional system* that characterizes the self-other dyad. The importance of this system lies in the fact that it enables us to understand the dynamic transformations that are possible when we "choose" different emotional relationships. I say "choose" because to some extent we can control the

cognitions and actions involved in the establishment of any particular emotional relationship. Thus, for anger to occur we must perceive a challenge and assert an ought, and both of these processes can be modified by choice. If a friend slights us, we may become angry or hurt or depressed or forgiving, and whichever dynamic we "choose" will have definite consequences for our relationship. Of course, what emotion one "chooses" usually depends on one's interpersonal history and context. If a person grows up in a family that doesn't permit anger yet insists on closeness, when the person is challenged, he or she can neither get angry nor distance the other and is therefore almost forced to become depressed and blame the self. However, as adults we at least have the potential to choose the most appropriate emotional dynamic.

Until now, I have considered only one set of emotional relationships, a set that can be observed in early childhood. However, starting at about 18 months, with the development of an independent social identity, a different set of emotions comes into play, a set that is important throughout the remainder of our socialization and affects a different aspect of identity. James (1950) termed this identity the "social self," the self as it is recognized by others, including honor, reputation, and self-image (all of which are validated by others). In one sense, we have as many social selves as others who know us, but we may speak of a "generalized other" who recognizes us (Mead, 1934), or of our self in the eyes of those we love, or of our self in the eyes of God. In all of these cases, we find a special dimension in our relationship with the other, a dimension I call "social recognition."

THE DIMENSION OF SOCIAL RECOGNITION

Social recognition is a crucial element in the regulation of behavior within social systems. Within any social system, there are different roles that different persons are expected to play (or that they may attempt to play): positions of higher or lower status, positions of more or less power, and often unprescribed groups of "players" who are clustered about a charismatic leader. As one looks at such a social system from the perspective of the structural theory of emotion, with an awareness of the emotional relationships between people, one cannot avoid being struck by the way in which emotional dynamics maintain the system and the positions of individuals within it.

For example, positions of status and authority are maintained by the emotional relationship of respect. To some extent, we are socialized to behave with respect for the social position rather than for the particular person who occupies it. One salutes the gold stripe rather than the individual officer. But most people *feel* respect only toward others who

are doing a reputable job. If the officeholder fails to act with the required decorum or abuses the power of the office or does not uphold the appropriate standards of conduct, people lose respect for the position holder (or do not grant it to begin with, in cases where the respect has to be won). This is no light matter, for without respect, position or status holders cannot exercise authority or command deference. They find their positions undermined, their power within the organization usurped by a subordinate or lost to a rival. Hence, if a status holder wishes to be effective, he or she must maintain the proper reputation and behave in accordance with group standards.

While respect is necessary if one is to exercise authority within a group, it does not suffice to command loyalty or to charismatically lead a group when one does not have the benefit of a socially defined office. To lead, rather than simply to exercise authority, another emotional relationship is necessary—that of admiration. While respect involves a certain distance, a separation between person and other, admiration involves an identification and is therefore structurally related to longing and merger. That is, we admire the other who embodies our own ideals and wish to identify with him or her, to be like our hero or heroine. It is easy to follow those whom we admire.

Another emotion, esteem, is involved when we honor the other's achievements, raising him or her to a position of higher status. Although it is not often used in our culture, the emotion of reverence may play an important role in supporting the status of an other and the privileges that go with it.

Of course, we may meet others who embody the opposite of our ideal. They are what we do *not* want to be. We remove them from any claims that their position might otherwise have on our respect and protect our ideals by feeling *contempt*, thereby belittling them and reducing their status. Finally, when the other's behavior completely violates the moral order—our expectations about what ought to be—we are appalled or horrified, no longer certain whether to see the other as a fellow human being, with the rights we accord to humans, or as a sort of monster whom we must, necessarily, chain. Of course, emotional relationships rarely come to this; as Hebb (1954) pointed out, we surround ourselves with norms which restrict behavior that is even slightly unexpected, and most of us are socialized so that we do not even think of breaking these norms. However, it is the dynamic of horror that backs up these norms, and if someone does violate the moral order, he or she is regarded with horror—disidentified with, pulled back from as someone who is definitely *not* like us. This protects us from the evil such a person represents and leaves him or her outcast from the human group (insane, a criminal, a barbarian, and so on).

others. However, in the former, the internalized other or social audience is contemptuous or, rather, would be if the person were not ashamed, while in the latter, the other is horrified, or would be if the self were not guilty.

If one recognizes that one *is* who one wants to be, one experiences pride—the reflection of admiration—and, in opposition to shame, feels bigger, has more presence, and displays the self. A person who takes pride in his or her work upholds standards of which others may not even be aware, and a person who “has” pride will not consider doing things that a “lesser” person without high standards could easily do. In cultures that stress “honor” and a sense of honor, the social relevance of pride is obvious, but in our own culture we may underestimate its importance.

Finally, quite apart from pride and whether one attains one’s ideals, if a person recognizes that he or she has standards and lives in accord with these, the person will have self-respect, a sense of inherent dignity and worth. While confidence allows us to assert our view of reality and security allows us to enter the reality of the other, self-worth enables us to know that our reality is as good as anyone else’s (Duhl, 1973). Thus, it supports a person’s independence and counters conformity pressures. The person with self-worth can call reality as he or she sees it and exert a tremendous stabilizing influence within the group to which he or she belongs.

Space limitations preclude discussion of a number of other important “self” emotions that affect social identity. Among these are humility, embarrassment, and shyness (de Rivera, 1977). However, we may note that in each of these cases the emotion has a specific structure and functions to regulate the presentation of self to the other in a way that defends against the other’s being envious, appalled, or disrespectful.

A particularly interesting example of the interrelations between self emotions and the responses of others is provided by Kahn’s (1984) analysis of exaltation. This emotional relationship occurs when a person accepts the other’s recognition that he or she has triumphed in a struggle that could have resulted in defeat. Thus, it is a reflection of the audience’s esteem (or reverence). The audience honors the victor by raising him or her up in their esteem. Often there is a ceremony, as in the Olympics, in which the hero mounts a pedestal or is placed on top of others’ shoulders so that he or she is literally raised up. It is interesting to note that people who feel exalted report an increased stature, a greater presence; they feel lifted up and experience a “heightened” sense of sight, hearing, and smell, and a greater spatial and temporal perspective. Yet unlike the elated person, who feels “high” (Lindsay-Hartz, 1981), they feel grounded, behave with decorum, and stay in contact with their

As in the case of emotions that affect belonging, each of the recognition emotions has a mirror image, a self emotion with complementary dynamics. These are shown in Table 5.4.

Guilt, which is the reflection of horror, may be contrasted with shame, the reflection of contempt. In guilt, the self accepts responsibility for a violation of the moral order (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984). Just as in horror the person is unsure whether the other is really a member of the group, in guilt the person is unsure whether the self is still a member. That is, the identity of the self is in question. It is *as if* the person is a cheat, a thief, a two-timer, or whatever it is the person feels guilty of. If the person *really* were a cheat, thief, or two-timer, he or she would not feel guilty about it! Hence, while the person behaves as if he or she has a horrifying identity, neither that person nor we, the audience, believes it.

In shame, on the other hand, the person *is* whoever he or she does not want to be (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984). The person sees the self through the eyes of the other and realizes that the self embodies a lack of its own ideal. Shame, therefore, is a reflection of the emotion of contempt; the self feels small and wishes to hide from others. Note, however, that although the person is lowered, and may lose status, privilege, and even position, he or she is not threatened with exile or the loss of human rights. The *shamed* person does not seek to restore a shattered moral order or hope for forgiveness, but desires to redeem the self’s identity, to restore the personal ideal.

It may be important to note that the difference between shame and guilt is not that the former involves a social audience while the latter is internalized. In fact, both often involve social audiences and internalized

TABLE 5.4
The System of Emotional Relationships Dealing with Social Recognition

	"Other" Emotions		Corresponding "Self" Emotions	
	"Emotion"	"Instruction"	"Emotion"	"Instruction"
+ Extension	respect	recognize other's status	worth	share the "worthwhile" self
	esteem	raises other's status	exaltation	share the "raised" self
+ Contraction	admiration	identify with other	pride	display the "ideal" self
- Extension	contempt	refuse other's status	shame	hide the "small" self
- Contraction	horror	deidentify with other	guilt	confess, atone for the "lost" self

implicit in a nonunit (us versus them) relation. On the other hand, because of the possibility of extending identity, a person with low self-worth can bolster his or her self-perceived value by belonging to a group that can be idealized. As Fromm (1973) demonstrated, the resultant group narcissism is one of the most important sources of human aggression. While it would be valuable to develop the analysis of the role that emotion plays in groups and intergroup relations (Smith & Crandall, 1984), there is another dimension to our relationships with others, and we must turn our attention to one more set of emotions.

THE DIMENSION OF BEING

Although the child, at about 18 months of age, becomes aware of his or her separation from the other and of how small and helpless he or she really is, the child still believes that the parents are omnipotent and still has an absolute sense of right and wrong. As the child matures into an adult, the full precariousness of the self's position becomes apparent. Most adolescents discover that their parents are not omnipotent, that norms are relative, and that much that happens in the world is completely senseless. At some point, all people discover that they are completely separate, uprooted, split, powerless, alone. This fact of our human condition, of the situation in which we find ourselves, gives rise to a number of needs, which Fromm (1955, 1973) has articulated as follows:

- The need for a frame of reference and an object of devotion in order to make sense of what happens and give meaning to the self's isolated existence.
- The need to root the self in strong affective ties with fellow human beings.
- The need to reunify oneself, to achieve oneness.
- The need to establish one's existence by doing and affecting something.
- The need to be stimulated rather than bored.

Fromm argues that each of these needs *must* be met but may be met in either a constructive or a destructive way. Thus, one may be devoted to an ideal or an idol, can root oneself in a loving or a controlling relationship, can reunify oneself by developing a genuine spiritual integration or by losing oneself in one's social role, can be effective by creating or destroying, can be stimulated by becoming related to the world via enjoyable activity or by boredom-avoiding thrill-seeking. If one is not devoted to the other, one will, necessarily, be devoted to an idol of some sort; if one does not create, one will destroy; if one does not enjoy, one will seek thrills.

There appears to be a set of emotions, organized in the same manner as the sets dealing with belonging and social recognition, that stems from

audience. In fact, the entire emotional dynamic maintains a unity between victor and audience.

Interrelations Among the Dimensions

The dimension of social recognition is related to the dimension of belonging by virtue of the fact that status, power, and ideality are recognized (or withheld) by others who belong to the groups to which we belong. To some extent we can substitute an emotional relationship in one domain for an emotional relationship in the other, particularly if analogous extension or contraction movements are involved. Thus, we have already noted that when the child loses unity with the other, he or she may become *like* the other, substituting an admiring sort of merger for the more primitive dependency unit to which he or she belonged.

I have also had occasion to observe that guilt can substitute for separation anxiety. In one case, an adolescent girl, the only child in a tightly knit family, was observed (by her father) to be in the company of a young man who was not approved by the family. In fact, their meeting was unpremeditated (though not unenjoyed) and the daughter was innocent of any misbehavior. However, the father clearly felt betrayed and succeeded in enlisting the mother's support in disbelieving their daughter's protestations of innocence. Rather than becoming angry and separating herself from this ridiculous mythos, the young woman became guilty. That is, she fully accepted responsibility for the violation of the moral order in her family, felt guilty, atoned by doing extra housework, and was, eventually, forgiven. Evidently, she was not ready to experience the anxiety that would have been involved in making a transition to an identity that was more separate from her family.

On the other hand, I noted earlier how anxiety occurs when the person is not quite ready to become the person he or she must become if he or she is to live up to the ideals and expectations of the group. That is, the person "chooses" to risk his or her identity as a group member rather than accept a lower status within the group and the shame of not being who he or she wants to be.

Another important relationship between the dimensions of recognition and belonging has to do with the fact that our self-boundaries are flexible and may easily expand to include our children, our heroes and heroines, and the groups with which we identify (Koffka, 1935). When we are proud or ashamed of our child or friend, it reflects the fact that they are a part of ourselves. This extension of identity has many implications. On the one hand, as Lerner and Whitehead (1980) have shown, the relationship of identity promotes a different sense of justice than either the interdependence inherent in a unit relation or the competition

our aloneness and affects a dimension of relationship that I call "being." That is, even in our aloneness we do not exist in isolation but in relation to an other. Let me begin this section by briefly surveying the emotional relationships that have to do with the other's being.

Acceptance is the emotional relationship that is involved when we do not insist that the other be what we want him or her to be, do not dictate what the other "ought" to be, but simply allow the other to be what he or she is, without our withdrawing or distancing. This necessarily involves a certain separation between person and other, yet a positive relatedness is maintained. Acceptance is an important factor in ensuring that the need to root the self in affective ties is achieved in a loving rather than a symbiotic union, and it is a crucial aspect of caring for another (Mayeroff, 1972). Rogers (1961) has described the discipline necessary to cultivate acceptance and has established that acceptance of an other leads to change in him or her. Thus, paradoxically, the relinquishing of insistence that the other ought to be a certain way often frees the other to grow in the desired direction.

Compassion seems related to acceptance in that one's sense of what ought to be is not at all be imposed. However, it also involves a willingness to suffer with the other, so that the person is able to provide a caring "presence" for the other (see McNeil et al., 1982; and Dembo's [1975] description of "sympathy" as opposed to "pity"). In spite of the probable importance of this emotional relationship in the alleviation of suffering (Tolstoy, 1960), I am not acquainted with any empirical studies of its conditions or effects.

Wonder appears to function in a rather paradoxical way. Rather than stimulating an insistent demand to understand the otherness that confronts the person, it permits a full and sustained focusing of attention in spite of the fact that one does not understand or have any control over the other. Thus, wonder allows us to remain open to the being of the other, to be influenced by and perhaps even to merge with a being that we might otherwise objectify and dismiss. It allows us to engage in paradoxical thinking, which may be essential to creativity, and enables us to meet the need for stimulation in a positive way.

Rejection is not simply the absence of acceptance. It is the denial of a reality that is proposed by the other; it negates the proffered existence, denies its being, insisting that what ought not to be is not. It refuses to allow any claims upon existence that might be suggested by the other. Because of the defensive use of rejection and the devastating effects rejection may have on the other's personhood, we are apt to reject the relationship of rejection! However, every emotional dynamic is functional in certain circumstances. For example, at the end of the Revolutionary War, the American colonies were in financial and social chaos, and a

number of influential people would have liked to establish a strong central government led by a king or dictator. The best candidate for this position was the commander in chief of the army, a man who could command the loyalty of thousands, General Washington. When Colonel Nicola proposed such a military coup to Washington, the general did not simply fail to accept the idea, he rejected it. He wrote: "If I am not deceived in myself, you could not have found a person to whom your scheme were more disagreeable." Thus, Washington ruled out of existence a possible dictatorship.

Dread appears to occur when a person faces the possibility of not being, not simply in the sense of dying, but in the sense of having no meaning, no way to participate in the eternal (Kierkegaard, 1957). However, I am not familiar with any empirical studies of dread. Just as fear functions to keep us alert in a situation of physical danger, dread may awaken us to the spiritual danger of being apart from what is and of meeting existential needs with destruction rather than creativity.

These "other" emotions seem to be related to a set of "self" emotions that also are involved with the being dimension. Thus, acceptance of the other is related to the emotional relationship of serenity, which allows the self simply "to be." However, these self emotions do not appear to be simple reflections of the equivalent "other" emotions, unless perhaps we are willing to speak of a transpersonal other with whom the self has a relationship. While I am unsure about the precise nature of the relationship between the other emotions and the self emotions in the being domain, I have attempted to pair them in the manner shown in Table 5.5.

During adolescence, as I mentioned earlier, many people in our culture discover that parents are not omnipotent, that norms are relative, and that much that happens is senseless. This can cause a person to feel

TABLE 5.5
The System of Emotional Relationships Dealing with Being

"Movement"	"Other" Emotions	Corresponding "Self" Emotions
+ Extension	acceptance compassion	serenity faith
+ Contraction	wonder	joy hope
- Extension	rejection	sorrow loneliness despair
- Contraction	dread	panic

adrift and unsure of what is right or wrong, desirable or undesirable. How is such a person to give meaning to life, to be sure that there is even a potential meaning to give it, to believe that there is a basis for right and wrong beyond simple preference? Of course, these issues have to do with the frame of reference or orientation that Fromm proposed as one of our crucial existential needs. When this framework is missing, the person for whom it is missing is in the emotional relationship of despair.

Unlike panic, in which the self is on the verge of becoming what it must not become (Goodman, 1981), or sorrow, which is occasioned by the loss of what was good, or depression (in which a person perceives the self as bad), or the varieties of being alone (Nisenbaum, 1984), despair seems to be characterized by the absence of any sense of goodness, any real distinction between good and bad—a state of terrible darkness. Without any certainty of an objective goodness, a characteristic of the other that is independent of the self's preferences, the person has no way to transcend the self and can only seek to attain pleasure and avoid pain, can have no objective goals or ideals. There can be no real enjoyment in such activity, for enjoyment comes from an activity having objective goodness (as when one is getting better at surfing, birdwatching, or whatever). Hence, the only pleasure lies in fantasy, or a sort of thrill-seeking that rapidly becomes tiresome unless bigger and better thrills are forthcoming, and the only release from pain is in withdrawal and the escape provided by alcohol, drugs, or activity that lacks real involvement.

Despair is, ordinarily, avoided when a person has the security of living in a community that offers a stable set of norms and provides an opportunity for the development of a sense of efficacy and future expectations. However, there can be a certain shallowness about such security, and the person may be in danger of idolizing the nation, a particular other person or a rigid set of beliefs. Fully to leave the security of home and to develop as an individual, to be completely open to life, the person must enter the emotional relationship of faith.

Faith provides a frame of orientation that is maximally open (Anderson, 1984). The person enters into a relationship with an other who is goodness. By inquiring into what this other requires of one (rather than what one's nation or group or activity requires, or following one's personal preferences), the person abandons the security furnished by idols and attempts to establish a sense of direction that is oriented to goodness or value yet open to what is required by one's specific circumstances.

With or without the framework of meaning provided by faith, there are circumstances that can be met only by the emotional relationship we call hope. The analysis of hope (Marcel, 1967; Brown, 1979) suggests that it is a crucial dynamic whenever there is a disparity between what

actually exists and what *ought* to be if goodness can really be said to exist. Under such conditions (whether there be an upsetting illness, the loss of a lover, joblessness, or a glaring unfairness in society), a person can only "hang in" and avoid the despair of giving up by focusing on one day at a time, the means rather than the end. This patient waiting (avoiding the tense demand for satisfaction) can occur only with the emotional relationship of hope. Such hope requires the person to establish a positive reliance on some "other" (one's body, a friend, God, the ultimate goodness of persons) so that the person can sustain his or her commitment to the task at hand. Such hope (as opposed to a fanciful hope that is really denial) is always grounded in some piece of concrete evidence (a doctor's reassurance, the fact of a friend's action, an example of successful political action) and enables the person to sustain a vision of the future and empowers him or her to endure suffering and have the buoyancy to act, to maintain the ideal in the face of the gap between the ideal and the real. Thus, the arbitrariness of an awful reality does not dominate the person and obscure the vision of goodness, and the person is free to enjoy what is available.

Faith and hope are not the only alternatives to the meaninglessness of despair; there is also joy. In the relationship of joy, we find ourselves meeting the *presence* of an other (Lindsay-Hartz, 1981). That is, rather than perceiving the other from any of our ordinary perspectives (as someone we like or dislike, would be useful to us in some way, is interesting or boring, and so on), we see the other in all of his or her uniqueness (whether the other be a person, a tree, a new baby, or whatever). In Buber's (1970) sense, we find ourselves in an I-thou encounter. The joy of this communion affirms the existence of meaningfulness, the person's own wholeness is restored (Reichenberg, 1939), and there is an impulse to celebrate the fact of life. Thus, the relationship of joy and the celebration it makes possible serve as a basis for the unification of persons in the celebration of community.

Interrelations Among Relationship Dimensions

On the concrete level we may visualize the interaction of the dimensions in any private or public ceremony. The analysis of joy, for example, suggests that our own secular society may be paying a heavy price for its relative neglect of ritual and ceremony. Without the joyful celebration of ourselves as a people (of our being), we can achieve unity only by creating a common enemy (belonging together against Communism). Hence, much of the nation's development, from educational assistance through highway construction, is funded in the name of defense. We cannot afford not to have an enemy, because it is the only way everyone

can belong and reach a consensus. Unfortunately, this means of assuring consensus also ensures that the arms race will continue.

Many cultures have rights of atonement to ensure that the individual and the group are recognized as fully human. On New Year's Day in Sri Lanka, for example, each villager goes to his or her parents and elder siblings and asks for forgiveness for whatever hurts, intended or unintended, he or she may have occasioned. Genuine forgiveness is encouraged by the fact that the person asking for forgiveness lies face down on the floor at the feet of the elder, who offers forgiveness and gives the person a small gift. Thus, the slate of ill will is wiped clean. A similar custom exists among some Jewish groups, who ask relatives and close friends for forgiveness on Yom Kippur.

Yom Kippur is an important example, because it is a day of atonement for an entire people, who ask, as a people, for forgiveness for whatever wrongs they may have committed. Our society has no such ceremony. Are the American people so pure that they cause no hurts, intended or otherwise, throughout the world? When we as people fail to ask for forgiveness, we perpetuate a myth among some citizens that America is holy, we alienate other citizens who see the evil that has been done, we divide the enthusiasts from the cynics, and we create a motive for everyone to rationalize evil and thereby reduce dissonance. With no public atonement, the individual citizen with any moral sensibility must either believe his country is doing nothing but good, or disavow responsibility for the government's actions, or suffer unwarranted personal guilt, or become cynical and fail to take the responsibility that, as a member of the society, one really does bear.

On an abstract level, we may represent the three different dimensions of relationship as the three dimensions of a cube (see Figure 5.1). The eight emotions affecting belonging are shown on the upper surfaces of the cube, while the emotions affecting social recognition are shown on the front surfaces, and those affecting being are on the sides. The emotions within each cube are structurally similar. Those that involve a transformation of how the other is valued are shown in the top half of the figure; those that transform the value of the self are in the bottom half. The positive emotions are forward, the negative to the rear, those involving extension are to the left, and those involving contraction are to the right. The matrix precisely describes 24 different emotional relationships. While there are more than 24 such relationships, it is probably possible to place any emotion in one of the eight cubes. Dahl and Stengal (1978), working with 372 emotion terms, showed that two-thirds of the terms were unequivocally related to a specific one of the eight positions on the matrix. Therefore, it seems probable that the great majority of emotions

may be regarded as personal relationships in the sense developed in this chapter.

While the dimensions of belonging, social recognition, and being are dimensions of our relationship with an other, they are also dimensions of our own identity, for we are part of the self-other dyad. Hence, they are clearly coordinate with the three "selves" described by James (1950). His "material" self (our body, loved ones, home, any special clothes or possessions that are distinctively ours) has to do with the dimension of belonging. His "social" self (ourselves in the eyes of others) is the self of social recognition. His "spiritual" self (the self that wills, thinks, feels,




Figure 5.1 Matrix of emotions. Adapted from *A structural theory of the emotions*. New York: International Universities Press, 1977.

and acts—the “soul”) relates to the dimension of being. Our emotional relationships determine who we are.

EMOTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND EMOTIONAL PHENOMENA

If I am correct in viewing emotions as relationships between person and other, how can we account for the subjective feeling of emotion, or the patterns of physiological responses or facial expressions that have evolved, or the motivational consequences of emotion? While definitive answers require further research, the general approach to these questions seems clear.

The “subjective feeling” of emotion is simply our embodied awareness of the emotional relationship we are in. That is, the qualitative feel of an emotion (the fact that affection, fondness, and tenderness are all somewhat different feelings and, of course, are strikingly different from the feelings of anger and fear) is *not* primarily related to subtle nuances in physiological response patterns or facial expressions or situational contexts (though subtle differences may be present). Rather, the qualitative feeling is a reflection of the entire way in which the lived body has been transformed *in relation to the other*.

Likewise, we recognize the emotion in another person because of the way in which he or she has been transformed in relation to us (or some other). Fear is not felt or recognized primarily because of an increased heart rate, raised, pulled-together brows, or a context of possible danger; it is felt and recognized primarily by the fact that the person's whole body pulls back from the other, or by the person withdrawing from facing a problem, or by the person perceiving the danger to be closer than it actually is (Werner & Wapner, 1955). The elated person does not feel “high” primarily because adrenaline is released, because he or she is grinning, or because there is good news at hand. While all of this may be true, the feeling of being high is due to the fact that the person is “high” in his relationship with others. Thus, students who have just received As set a horizon line higher (Wapner et al., 1957). The elation occurs because a fantasy has come true and one is momentarily living in the upper (fantasy) level of the life space (Lewin, 1935). The elated person is so busy telling others about the wonderful wish come true that he or she is “ungrounded” and cannot hear a thing the other may be saying (Lindsay-Hartz, 1981).

Of course, emotions entail physiological responses and facial expressions, and many other significant changes, in posture (Bull, 1951) and in cognition (Bower, 1983). But the structural theory sees all of these as aspects of the emotional relationship with the other. It is this system of relationships that is the product of evolution, and our lives depend on

it. The relatively fixed patterns of behavior we have inherited (Ekman, 1980; Izard, 1978) and any tendencies to be reactive or placid (Freedman, 1979) are but the tip of the iceberg. Our bodies contain the other, are built to be in relationship to the other; our relationships are embodied in us; we are a part of many social units.

If we viewed emotion simply as an internal dynamic, operating to motivate the organism in its relations with the environment, then emotion would play a relatively minor role in human behavior. As Chein (1972) demonstrated, most of our behavior is determined by the activities to which we commit ourselves, and, as Barker (1968) showed, most of our activities are regulated by behavior settings. Thus, intentional action and the environment, rather than emotion, account for the great bulk of our behavior. We know that in humans there are few specific connections between emotion and motivated behavior. Anger, for example, often does not lead to aggression, and aggression is often the result of normative influences (such as a draft notice) that have nothing to do with anger. Thus, emotion is reduced to the production of “expressive” behavior and to the rather tenuous effects it may have on observers.

If the structural theory is correct in viewing emotion as emotional relationship, however, then the full relevance of emotion for human action becomes apparent (Hebb & Thompson, 1954). Fear, for example—or any other emotion—is part of a change in our entire relationship with the other. This fear may not ordinarily be felt or be unconscious in the analytic sense, yet may, as a relationship, underlie whole patterns of social behavior and influence crucial decisions. In his analysis of the power structure of an American city, Hunter (1953) noted the pervasiveness of fear within the community's leadership. He observed that the community power structure had the capacity to address the issues of racism and poverty that were plaguing the city, but they chose not to. Nor did they open the policymaking machinery to the public. Said Hunter: “The leaders are afraid to have political questions raised without their consent. . . . Opening the channels of communication . . . may bring undesirable elements into the policy-making situation” (p. 225). Clearly, such fear is crucial in understanding the perpetuation of injustice in our society, yet it rarely involves massive surges of adrenaline, dramatic facial expressions, or running away. Rather, it involves a concern for the self rather than for the other, a withdrawal from facing the other and an attention to protecting the self (in this particular case, by sabotaging a new political party in the city). The *major* motivational effect of fear, or any other emotion, stems from the values established by the emotional relationship.

According to the structural theory, we are always in *some* emotional relationship with others, and the specific relationship we choose affects

A full description of such structures would require more space and include a discussion of how the person perceives his or her situation, how the body-world relationship is transformed, how the person is "instructed" to act, and how the emotional relationship functions interpersonally. These descriptions are based on a method of interviewing and theory construction called "conceptual encounter" (de Rivera, 1981).

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