Aggression, Violence, Evil, and Peace

Joseph de Rivera

Although aggression, violence, and evil are interrelated, contemporary research is so specialized that it is unusual to group them together, and this chapter is unique in considering them together with ideas and research on peace. Why place such disparate fields in the same chapter? In part, it is because we study aggression and violence in order to avoid the evil they occasion and achieve peace. However, if peace were simply the absence of violence it would not require separate treatment and if peace were a completely independent field, it would be better to make use of separate chapters. Typically, there are separate chapters on aggression and pro-social behavior. Here, however, we argue that the achievement of peace rests on an understanding of aggression, violence and evil, yet requires us to go beyond that material to include not only what is usually conceived as pro-social behavior but the use of aggression in a struggle with violence and evil. Hence, we must consider these topics in conjunction with one another. The attainment of peace requires us to have an understanding of aggression, and the pitfalls of violence and evil, as well as the various paths that may lead towards a peaceful world. We begin with aggression because, although often violent, aspects of aggression may be necessary for the achievement of peace. We consider three different ways in which aggression may be defined and four different theoretical approaches to its understanding. We will then sample the voluminous literature on forms of violence and ways in which it may be controlled.
Although many of these forms are clearly related to aggression, Gandhi observed that the worst form of violence is poverty. The “aggression” behind such violence is masked, because much poverty occurs because of unjust economic and political structures. Such violence may appear unambiguously evil, yet when we turn to examine evil we will find that a difficult moral judgment is involved. Further, though most contemporary judgment considers violence to be evil, much of our striving for peace and justice involves us in violence that we fail to acknowledge as evil. This is one of the facts that requires us to base any quest for peace (valued as good) on a thorough understanding of violence and evil. In this way, we will not be naive when we finally come to consider how peace may be attained. This consideration will involve us in the exploration of four paths towards peace: Peace through strength, through negotiation, through the structural changes required by justice, and through personal transformation. Finally, we shall consider how these paths may be integrated by the concept of a culture of peace.

AGGRESSION

Aggression often leads to a violence that is evil, but it may also be involved in the attainment of peace. The term has different meanings that focus our attention on different aspects of behavior and lead to the creation of different approaches to our understanding of aggression. We may distinguish at least three different definitions:

1. Aggression as behavior intended to hurt another, whether this intent is motivated emotionally (as by anger, pain, frustration, or fear) or instrumentally, a means to an end (as in punishing misbehavior or intimidating another to attain one’s end.) There are two caveats to this definition. First, the “intention” to hurt may be embedded in larger intentions that have quite different meanings. Although the definition succeeds in avoiding the inclusion of hurting that is
accidental or an unavoidable aspect of helping (as in washing a wound that needs to be cleaned) it does include behavior as disparate as a swat on the bottom to correct a child, and the dropping of a nuclear bomb to win a war. Second, the “other” who is hurt may be the self (as in suicide) and may or may not include animals.

2. Aggression as assertive, moving out, behavior that is aimed at getting what one desires (sometimes without regard for the wishes of others.)

3. Aggression as the assertion of dominance and removal of challenges to what one believes ought to exist.

If we work from the first definition we may view aggression as behavior that is clearly to be discouraged and socially controlled. However, the second definition is much more positive, at least in an individualistic culture, and we may want to support and even encourage such behavior, as long as it is balanced by a concern for others. The third definition raises a number of evaluative issues. It is morally “neutral” if one accepts challenges or power as a fact of life, but its very presumption of a power relationship between persons or groups may be viewed as morally repugnant. It is helpful to keep these alternative definitions in mind as we examine four major approaches to aggression: (1) A focus on aggression as learned behavior, (2) A focus on an emotional base for aggression, (3) A view of aggression as biologically based, (4) A view of aggression as embedded in conflict.
Social Learning Theory.

Focusing on aggression as behavior that results in personal injury or property destruction, Bandura (1973) has shown how people may learn such behavior by modeling the aggressive behavior of others (he does not consider the intention of the behavior.) Shown an adult striking a large inflatable “Bobo” doll, children learn the pattern of behavior. The pattern is then encouraged or inhibited by the results that follow. If the behavior is rewarded, the model is liked and chosen for emulation even when children are critical of the aggressive means that are used the amount of aggression increases; if it is punished it decreases. Models also function by suggesting the social acceptability of behavior, thus facilitating patterns of behavior that have already been learned.

When the direct punishment of aggression is itself aggressive, it models aggression at the same time it discourages it. Thus, although small amounts of non-abusive spanking can be beneficial in disciplining children between the ages of 2 and 6 (Lazelere, 1996) it is clear that the frequency of physical punishment is linearly related to the frequency of aggression towards siblings (as well as towards parents) across a wide range of ages (Lazelere, 1986). The modeling of aggression may occur in families, neighborhoods, or on TV, and in each of these cases numerous studies show that children exposed to aggressive models are more apt to engage in aggressive behavior. For example, children growing up in abusive families are apt to assault their own children (Silver, Dublin, & Lourie, 1969); higher rates of aggressive behavior occur in
neighborhoods where there is a sub-culture of violence that provides models and rewards aggressive behavior (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967); children exposed to a film depicting police violence show more violence during a subsequent game of floor hockey than children who had just watched an exciting film on bike racing (Josephson, 1987), the general aggressiveness of teenagers (as rated by teachers and classmates) is correlated to the amount of violence that they watched on TV when they were children (Turner, Hesse, & Peterson-Lewis, 1986), and both self-reported aggression and the seriousness of criminal arrests at age 30 is predicted by the violence level of the TV show persons watched at age 8 (as reported by their mothers 22 years earlier) (Eron, Huesmann, Lefkowitz, & Walder, 1972).

From the perspective of social learning theory, aggression is neither instinctive nor produced by frustration. It is a pattern of learned behavior that has been rewarded so that it is efficacious within a given society. Aggressive cultures assume that aggression is innate and natural, without realizing that there are other cultures where aggressive patterns of behavior do not occur, or occur with far less frequency. Of course, there are often emotional conditions that precede aggression. However, numerous studies have shown that loss, frustration, or anger only lead to aggression when an aggressive pattern of behavior has been learned and reinforced. For example, Nelson, Gelfand, and Hartmann (1969) involved children in competitive or noncompetitive play and then had them observe either an aggressive or a non-aggressive model. Those who had lost in competitive play were most prone to behave aggressively, but only when they were exposed to the aggressive model.

While we may certainly speak of aggression as a pattern of learned behavior, we may also conceptualize it as a more general social script, a program of how to act in problematic
social situations. Thus, Huesmann (1986) has proposed that children learn aggressive social
scripts by observing how others behave in life and on TV. Realistic violence by a perpetrator
with whom the child can identify is highly salient and easily leads to fantasy and rehearsal as a
way of solving problems. These aggressive scripts may be used in quite different circumstances.
Huesmann, focusing on the role of scripts in interpersonal violence, points out if an aggressive
script is rewarded a child learns to gain attention and get his or her ways by using such a script.
Amongst middle class peers, the use of aggressive scripts is likely to result in unpopularity and
poorer academic achievement. The resulting social isolation may lead to increased television
viewing, and an even greater reliance on the use of aggressive scripts, eventually producing a
person who habitually uses violence.

In the informational processing model proposed by Huesmann (1998), people use a
heuristic search process to retrieve a script that is relevant for their situation. The use of an
aggressive script will depend on how situational cues are interpreted, the availability of
aggressive scripts, the normative evaluation of such a script once it is activated, and the
interpretation of consequences. In regards to the last factor, he points out that if a child is beaten
for aggression, the child may feel disliked rather than interpret his or her behavior as
unprofitable.

Although most focus on the use of aggressive scripts by delinquents, the scripts are as
available for use in international conflicts as in bullying and gang wars. McCauley (2000) has
pointed out that while the least socialized are more involved in personal violence, it is the best
socialized who are often involved in the inter-group violence we shall examine when we
consider war. In fact, personal scripts are an aspect of the societal myths that we shall consider
when we deal with the concept of evil, and Schellenber (1996) points out that interpersonal
violence may be more influenced by the extent to which a society engages in war than the
reverse. Thus, Ember and Ember’s (1994) analysis of the relationship between war and
interpersonal violence in 186 societies, suggests that socialization for aggression and severity of
childhood punishment appear to be more a consequence rather than a cause of war, and it is this
socialization that is most directly related to interpersonal violence.

Aggressive scripts are available for use in any social conflict and the aggressive behavior
occurs in a context where it may be perceived to be justified. If it is perceived to be justified an
observer may be more apt to identify with the aggressor and, hence, more apt to model the
behavior. In the context of competition, the goal of winning may entail a willingness to hurt, and
this is easily conflated with a willingness to hurt in order to win. Paradoxically, the fact that
context affects the meaning that we give a behavior may be a strong argument for Bandura’s
behavioral definition of aggression as that which results in (rather than intends) harm. For it may
be argued that bomber pilots do not intend to hurt civilians and certainly any intention to harm is
embedded in the goal of carrying out a mission and attention is directed towards mundane means
(the pilot who carried the Hiroshima bomb was primarily concerned that the added weight might
prevent a safe take off).

There are many social forces that inhibit aggression and Bandura (1999) has extended his
earlier work by examining how aggression is more likely to occur when a person is morally
disengaged from the victim of the aggression. Such disengagement may occur by justifying the
aggression (for example, as required by a war against ruthless oppressors to preserve world
peace), by using euphemistic labels (as when the number of persons killed in a bombing raid is
termed a “population response”), or by using advantageous moral comparisons (as when a torturer contrasts an individual victim’s pain with the extensive random violence inflicted by the terrorist he is attempting to apprehend). It is facilitated by displacing responsibility for the damage that is done (as demonstrated in Milgrim’s, 1974, experiments), by diffusing responsibility (as shown in studies by Zimbardo, 1995), and by increasing the distance between persons and evidence of the pain they are inflicting (Kilham & Mann, 1974). Finally, moral disengagement occurs when dehumanization prevents empathic responsiveness (see Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975). Personally, I would argue that we witness the contrast between moral engagement and moral disengagement whenever we either empathize with the struggles of an ant or step on the nuisance.

**Aggression As Emotionally Based.**

While Bandura focuses on aggression as a learned pattern of behavior, Berkowitz (1993) emphasizes aggression as involving meaning and motivation. In Bandura’s work on the modeling of aggressive behavior, the meaning of the behavior, the intent to harm, is implicit and taken for granted. Berkowitz (1993) emphasizes that this meaning may be crucial, and this becomes apparent if we focus on aggressive ideas and emotions. If one man tackles another in a football game, we may see the skillful, determined act of an athlete in a game or we may see a deliberate attempt to injure another person. For Berkowitz, it is only in the latter case that the model may activate the aggressive thoughts and emotional reactions that may lead to aggressive behavior. Berkowitz points out that modeling is more apt to occur when there is an identification with the aggressor, and that aggression is more apt to occur when negative emotional states exist. Berkowitz distinguishes between instrumental aggression that occurs as a means of achieving
some planned end, and emotional aggression, grounded in passion and typically spontaneous and unplanned. Thus, the planned killing of a hired assassin is seen as quite different from the impulsive killing of a jealous spouse, the deliberate “taking out” of a star player as quite different from a blow thrown in temper.

Berkowitz tends to focus on emotional aggression which he sees as pushed out, impelled from within, although this impulsion can be influenced by external cues. He sees such aggression as having both a motoric component (to tighten jaw and fists, to strike out, etc) and an urge to hurt, injure, destroy. He makes two major points. First, he argues that the emotional state that underlies emotional aggression is not only anger, but all negative affect. Thus, he shows that the discomfort produced by heat, cold, noise, overcrowding, frustration and free floating annoyance, leads to the increased probability or strength of aggressive behavior. For example, when a student makes a mistake, other students behave more aggressively when they are in a hot room as opposed to a comfortable room (see Baron, 1977), students who could reward or punish other students use more punishments when they are in some pain, riots are more apt to occur hot spells (Baron & Ransberger, 1978), and domestic assaults when air pollution is high (Rotton & Frey, 1985). Also see Berkowitz (1982) and Anderson (1989).

Second, Berkowitz asserts that the emotional state consists of a network of feelings, ideas, memories and expressive motor reactions that are associated with one another so that the activation of one part of the net will activate other parts. Unpleasant memories will promote a negative mood and this will increase the probability of negative thoughts and aggressive behavior. An external cue that has an aggressive meaning (such as a weapon) may activate aggressive thoughts and, particularly if negative feelings are present, lead to an increased
probability of aggressive behavior. Thus, in the classic experiment by Berkowitz and LePage (1967), angered subjects delivered more shocks to their partner when guns were present in the room as opposed to badminton rackets. (For further findings see Turner, Simons, Berkowitz, & Frodi, 1977). Even more disturbing, Berkowitz argues that cues associated with pain, frustration and suffering, aversive stimuli in general, may activate negative affect and increase the probability of aggression. Thus, Berkowitz & Frodi (1979) showed that when women university students were angered and distracted, they were more punitive when the child they were supervising was “funny looking” and stuttered. Of course the activation of negative affect does not necessarily lead to aggression. Such behavior may be inhibited by either fear of punishment or empathic concerns, and a person may learn to respond with other behaviors. However, for Berkowitz aggressive behavior is a “natural” response to negative affect that will tend to occur whenever self-control is reduced so that a person is susceptible to the influence of negative moods or external stimulation.
Biological Theories.

From a biological perspective, many species of animals exhibit aggressive behavior and we may consider a good deal of aggressive behavior as instinctually based. To the extent this is so, there are constraints on the ease with which we can modify aggressive behavior. The concept of instinct can be approached from the view of contemporary evolutionary theory or from its original conception, as used by Freud.

Behavioral evolution. Rather than view aggressive behavior as a learned response, we may conceptualize aggression as the product of evolutionary processes, behavior patterns based on genetic influences that have persisted because they have been adaptive, helping members of a species survive in specific environments. Thus, we may find aggressive patterns of behavior programmed into the nervous system because the genes that served as the basis for these programs were selected by the reproduction of the organisms that possessed them. In its original conception, instinctual behavior was viewed as a sort of drive which, like hunger, was directed towards a goal, building if it were not satisfied and becoming less and less particular about the ideal goal object until it could be satisfied by something that would not ordinarily be chosen. However, it is difficult to imagine the goal of an aggressive drive because there are so many different functions for aggression. There is the aggression involved in predation, in the defense of the young, in the struggle between males for mates etc. It seems better to consider instinctual aggression as comprised of certain behavior patterns that are available to be released by
particular cues in the environment. We may then consider both internal and external factors that may influence these aggressive patterns, and how the patterns may have adaptive significance. For example, in most species males engage in more intra-species aggression than females (cite reference) and this aggression is involved in the competition to fertilize females. In some species the struggle for mates involves the establishment and defense of territory, and may function to spread members of a species out over territory, thus preserving food supplies.

When we examine the human species we find that societies vary widely in the amount of aggression. However, within any given society, males always appear more aggressive than females. Thus, observational studies find boys more aggressive than girls (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974); when they are given stories involving conflict, teenage males are more apt to offer more violent solutions (Archer & McDaniel, 1995); and violent crimes are more apt to be committed by men (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). However, there may not be significant gender differences in aggressiveness within domestic disputes. Within family aggression seems as prevalent in females as in males (see Straus & Gelles, 1990).

The sex differences in aggression that are found appear related to testosterone, which appears to influence both how the brain develops and some of the physiology underlying current behavior (Rubin, 1987). Prenatal exposure to testosterone appears to increase the amount of rough and tumble play in young females (see Meyer-Bahlburg & Ehrhardt, 1982). Boy’s reports of how aggressively they would respond to provocations are related to testosterone levels (Olweus, 1986). Prisoners with higher testosterone levels violate more prison rules, especially when overt confrontation is involved (Dabbs, Carr, Frady, & Riad, 1995). However, the exact relationship between testosterone and aggression is unclear, in part because behaving
aggressively appears to affect the release of testosterone and testosterone levels may be related more to dominance behavior than to aggression as intent to hurt. Mazur & Booth (1998) argue that testosterone both rises in response to a challenge to dominance and increases in winners and decreases in losers.

Alternatively, it can be argued that males gravitate towards violence because their bodies are better adopted for aggressive combat. The exercise of this advantage is a way for men to solve the existential problem posed by the fact they cannot bear children. That is, they can justify their existence by insisting on the necessity of violence and their preeminence in its exercise. (van Creveld, 2000) In humans, as in other animals, it is easy to imagine how aggressive behavior in a conflict between males could result in the reproductive advantage of stronger males and, hence that the genes of aggressive males would be more likely to be reproduced in specific environments. (Daly & Wilson, 1985). However, if we imagine early humans as existing in hunter-gatherer groups, it also seems clear that cooperative behavior within the group would also contribute to survival. Even when the sacrifices involved in such cooperation might result in a disadvantage for a particular individual and his or her genes, genes related to cooperative behavior might be preserved if the cooperation favored kin or others who reciprocated the cooperation, or if the penalty of not cooperation was high, or (in certain conditions) if the group itself benefited (See Wilson & Sober, 1994). It seems probable that the genetics favoring cooperative behavior may offset those favoring male in-group aggressiveness. However, it has been noted that boys evidence more intra-group cooperation than girls when their group is in competition (Shapira & Madsen, 1974). In his studies on the conflict between Hindus and Moslems, Kakar (1996) observes when boys and girls were asked to construct an “exciting”
scene with toys and dolls identifiable as Hindu or Muslim, the boys constructed scenes of violence whereas the girls made scenes of family life. Further, Thompson (1999) has pointed out that group selection may also have favored the selection of aggressive individuals who are willing to die for their group in combat against out-groups.

Freudian theory. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory is written from a biological perspective that is based on the older idea of instincts as drives or needs. The development of his thinking about aggression is complex and has been described and critiqued by Fromm (1973). Freud ultimately postulated an instinct towards self-destruction that was neutralized by a life instinct that directed the destructive tendency outward. The former was seen as a drive towards the destruction of life that was ultimately manifested in the death of the body, but could be used in the killing for food, its metabolic break down, the killing of rivals, warfare, and the aggression of the superego against the self as in guilt and depression. By contrast, the life or “erotic” instinct sought to preserve and unite and, alloyed with the death instinct, was involved in self-defense. (See Freud, 1923).

Taken literally, few would agree with Freud’s conceptualization. However, on a metaphoric level his theory allows a rather elegant statement of a viable theoretical position, best expressed in his letter to Einstein on the cause of war (Freud, 1932/1964). Working, in the manner of evolutionary biologists today, Freud assumes that early humans lived in small groups. He postulates that these groups were initially dominated by the compelling aggression of the strongest male. This dominance could eventually be overcome by an aggressive union of weaker males. However, such a union had to be maintained by the growth of law and feelings of unity.

As Freud (1932, p. 276) puts it, “Here, I believe we have all the essentials: violence overcome by
the transference of power to a larger unity, which is held together by emotional ties between its members” (p. 276). As Freud surveys history he is not encouraged by what he sees. While aggression within groups is contained by the laws of enforced by group union there is no way to contain aggression between groups. Some propose the ideal of a union between groups, but a mere ideal is not sufficient to overcome the aggressive drive of independent groups, and powerful groups are unwilling to grant sufficient power to a superordinate body.

Since they are instinctually based, Freud felt it would be useless to get rid of aggressive inclinations. However, he believed that anything that increased the emotional ties between people would work against war. He distinguished two sorts of emotional ties: those directed towards a shared loved object (as towards a loved authority), and common identifications (as with a nation). At the close of his letter, Freud addresses an interesting question. Given the tremendous force of the aggressive instinct, how can there be pacifists, such as himself and Einstein, who oppose war? While he eloquently gives many reasons against war, he remains true to his biological roots. He argues that he and Einstein are obliged to be against war for organic reasons. Culture itself has been evolving with a displacement of instinctual aims. The intellect is beginning to govern instinctual life, and aggressive impulses are increasingly becoming internalized, so that some humans are developing a constitutional intolerance towards war.

In any case, contemporary psychoanalysts, from both Freudian and Jungian traditions, stress that the mature person and society must acknowledge the presence of aggressive impulses and manage the ambivalence they see as inevitably present in human relationships (Bach & Goldberg, 1974/1983; Charny, 1982). A related view was expressed by William James (1911/1995) who, impressed by the attractiveness of war (the excitement, comradeship, self
sacrifice for a higher cause), suggested that humans needed a moral equivalent (a “war” against
disease, earthquakes, poverty) if they were ever to relinquish the satisfactions offered by war.

In spite of the apparent cogency of the above arguments, it should be noted that the
consensus of contemporary social scientists is that there is no instinctual press for war per se.
Thus, the group gathered at Seville to examine the problem declared, “It is scientifically
incorrect when people say that war cannot be ended because it is part of human nature”
(UNESCO, 1991, p. 10). The reasoning behind such a statement is well explicated by Fromm
(1973). He points out that war, like slavery, is a human institution. There is no evidence that
early hunter-gather groups engaged in warfare and there was no reason for them to do so because
there were no goods to plunder, no use for slaves, no territory to be defended. Far from being an
aspect of “primitive” man, warfare develops along with the development of civilization.
Agriculture and animal husbandry lead to surpluses and the development of specializations and
hierarchies of power that than become involved in the conquest of other peoples. Fromm points
out that there were and still are peaceful peoples, and evidence for a relatively high degree of
civilization in a number of matrilocal societies that existed before warfare began. Note, however,
that these facts do not preclude a possible instinctive base for the in-group biases that are so
prevalent whenever groups must share resources. The crucial role of culture interfaces with a
biological base for both cooperation and violence. Thus, although chimpanzees show a great deal
of cooperative behavior, Blanchard and Blanchard (2000) point out that chimpanzees also form
raiding parties and that this aggressiveness is inhibited when they are afraid.
Conflict Theory.

Rather than focuses on aggression as the response of individuals, we may examine the role it plays in the relations between people, as a way of winning conflicts, establishing dominance, or managing impression. Although this might be viewed as a sociological approach, it may be linked to both emotion and biology. In regards to emotion, de Rivera (1977, 1981) has proposed that anger is best regarded, as a response to a challenge to what a person asserts ought to exist. He argues that when persons become angry they are attempting to remove a challenge in a way that is analogous to an animal defending territory. Learned aggressive responses are recruited to serve this end. Considering aggression as an aspect of conflict is close to the biological perspective in that it considers the function of aggression in a specific environment, although the environment is a society rather than an ecology. In game theory, the choice of a competitive or mistrustful, rather than cooperative, strategy may be regarded as involving aggression in the sense that benefits to the self are sought without regard for the fact that the other is harmed. Research has shown how many situations seduce persons to play aggressively even when it is not in their best interest (See Deutsch, 1958; Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh, & Lipetz, 1959), and Wilson (1998) argues convincingly that the game theory used in the study of conflict may be enriched by utilizing the perspective of evolutionary biology.

Scheff (1999) asserts that emotional sequences play a crucial role in both interpersonal and inter-group conflict, and focuses on the roles of pride and shame as signals of solidarity and
alienation. He argues that if shame is acknowledged by referring to one’s insecurity, separateness, powerlessness, then connections of solidarity and trust can be built. However, shame is often unacknowledged. When overt, such unacknowledged shame involves painful feeling with little ideation and is often signaled by furtiveness. When it is bypassed, it involves rapid thoughts that occur with little feeling, and is accompanied by hostility or withdrawal from the other in ways that mask the shame. The unacknowledged shame feeds upon itself, becoming ashamed that one is ashamed, a panic state, or a humiliated fury. A typical pattern is to mask the shame with anger at the other and Scheff sees such shame-anger loops as at the heart of destructive conflicts. He suggests that they account for the need for vengeance (restoring a deflated ego) and are at the heart of deterrence strategy and the danger of appearing weak, the underlying unacknowledged shame being euphemistically treated as “face-saving” and “status competition.”

In their examination of conflicts between individuals, groups, and nations, Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994) describe how conflicts escalate in aggressiveness. This escalation often occurs in five different ways: Influence attempts move from light to heavy tactics, from persuasive attempts to threats and violence; issues proliferate from small to large so that parties become increasingly involved in the conflict and commit more resources to it; issues move from the specific to the general so that the relationship between parties deteriorate, motivation shifts from simply doing well for the self to winning and then to hurting the other, and participants may grow from few to many. Thus, the strength of the aggressive responses (from a harsh word to a physical threat), the generalization of the attack (from one aspect of behavior to a description of character), the extensity of the conflict (from a disagreement over one thing to disagreements
over many) all may increase.

Seeing aggression as an aspect of conflict reminds us that at least two parties are involved and aggression increases as the parties respond to one another. The light tactics used by one party may be met by heavier tactics and these may involve psychological justifications that may lead the conflict to generalize and may deepen the other parties involvement. Such conflict spirals often involve anger and blame, fear and perceived threat to one’s image, and may rapidly lead to increasingly aggressive responses. Fortunately, such conflicts often subside, de-escalating as forbearance wins, tempers cool and apologies are made. This is particularly true when the parties to the conflict have common interests and a history of cooperation.

However, conflicts that spiral and escalate may lead to structural changes that make it difficult for the conflict to subside. These involve psychological transformations. When groups are involved, there are changes in group and community dynamics. The psychological changes that occur involve the development of negative attitudes and beliefs about the other, the development of competitive and hostile goals, and the de-individuation and dehumanization discussed above. As both Jervis (1976) and White (1984) have described, an intensely negative image of the other begins to develop, the other becoming regarded as immoral, inhuman, evil. When groups are involved, they become polarized. They become increasingly extreme in hostile attitudes, develop norms that resist compromise, and contentious group goals that contribute to in-group solidarity at the expense of the out-group. They select militant leaders, become more liable to the problems of “groupthink” (Janis, 1983) and the development of militant subgroups. The entire community may become polarized as members are forced to choose sides and neutrality becomes impossible without one’s loyalty becoming questioned.
Although many may be ambivalent about aggression and feel that some situations require an aggressive response, and some may favor the use of violence to gain whatever is desired, probably most humans care about others and desire the security that comes from norms against the use of violence. However, what is considered to be violent often seems to depend on the side that is favored. Thus, Blumenthal, Kahn, Andrews, and Head (1972) found that persons tend to distinguish between the violence of those they dislike and the “justified force” of groups they favor. Further, the violence which we ordinarily consider is the direct violence involved in using force to injure, damage or destroy a person or to unjustly violate a person’s rights. We tend to overlook the indirect violence of structures that create hunger. Below, we consider the many forms of direct violence as it occurs between persons and within and between societies. However, we also consider the violence that is done when human beings are distorted and prevented from developing their potential whether this occurs from the crushing effects of poverty (Gandhi, 1961) or the misuse of psychotherapeutic drugs (Keen, 2000), or the indirect or structural violence described by Galtung (1969).
Personal Violence.

Violence often occurs in an interpersonal context, as in murder or bullying. We will first consider those men who are particularly prone to violent behavior, and then examine the arenas of family violence, rape, and school bullying.

Violent men. In the United States, about 90% of violent crimes between 1960 and 1980 were committed by men (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). Although this percentage is changing (it is now 83%) men are more apt to be involved in violence, and some appear to be particularly prone to violence. Thus, Berkowitz (1993) cites a number of studies that present evidence for a degree of consistency across situations and across time. For example, Farrington (1989) reports on a longitudinal study of 400 working class males that lived in a section of London. The study began at about age nine. The youths and their parents were periodically interviewed, teachers rated their behavior and court records were examined. Of the one hundred youths who were most aggressive at age nine, 14% had been convicted of a violent offense by age 21 as compared with 4% of the other boys.

Above, we noted that individuals may learn aggressive scripts. These appear to be much more prevalent in some sub-cultures, are available to groups, and promoted by negative affect. Thus, Dunning, Murphy, and Williams (1988) document how the British football hooligans, who “have an aggro” as they violently attacking strangers, are working class males who grow up in families where they witness, receive, and are coached in violence until many enjoy the skills and
thrills involved in its use. It should be noted that while several studies show how particular people are prone to violence over time, they also reveal the inaccuracy of prediction in that many people change to become more or less aggressive as they age. It must also be realized that initial marginal deviance can get amplified by the reactions of others so that greater problems develop (Caprara & Zimbardo, 1996; Haney, 1995).

Violence is frightening and many people seem to want to simply avoid it by locking up those prone to violence and throwing away the key. Thus, it is helpful to break the phenomena into manageable parts. When we consider how we should deal with violent persons, it seems very important to distinguish between different types and processes and to construct specific treatment methods for the types we distinguish.

What are the motivations behind violent crime? Above, we noted Berkowitz’s distinction between emotional and instrumental aggression and when we examine the experience of violent men we find complex configurations of factors. Using peer interviews of 69 men who had records for repeated violence, Toch (1969/1993) distinguished nine types of motivational processes: His most frequent classification (used to describe 28 cases) involved the promoting or defending of a self image which seemed to be constructed as a compensation for the fact that the person was not convinced of his own worth. By contrast, a different 10 cases involved the defending of the reputation of an assigned role experienced as a social obligation rather than an internal need. Other types involving a sort of self preservation or enhancement included: the removal of pressure by men feeling helpless panic or rage, the self defense of those convinced others are out to kill them, and the “norm-enforcer” who uses violence as a matter of principle. Toch contrasted all of the above types with 16 cases that involved a basic egocentrism that
evidenced a complete lack of empathy with others, who were simply seen as objects. Amongst these men he distinguished exploiters who used violence when others resist, bullies who took pleasure in using terror, “self indulgers” who simply felt the world ought to let them do whatever they want, and “catharters“ who rather arbitrarily attacked to relieve frustration, depression or boredom. While Toch demonstrates that his classification can be used with some reliability, it is clear that often more than one process is involved, and his main concern is to point out that violence should not be treated as homogeneous. He also points out that once a man has been involved in violence he may develop a habit of using violence. Violence creates its own needs and reinforces the very insecurities and egocentricity that was its source. We might add that the person may define the self in a way that makes violence more probable in the future.

Baumeister and Campbell (1999) distinguish three distinct processes that they believe may be involved in an intrinsic appeal to commit violent acts (as opposed to instrumental motives for either selfish or idealistic ends.) They differentiate sadism (the pleasure of inflicting suffering or terror involved in Toch’s bullying category) from violent thrill seeking. They argue that the former is an addictive process, while the latter is more the sporadic sensation seeking of the bored (and often drunk and impulsive). They estimate that sadism may develop in about 5% of persons who are repeatedly violent and may possibly be explained by Solomon’s (1980) opponent process theory, while violent thrill seeking is motivated by boredom combined with high sensation seeking and low impulse control (and more likely to occur under the influence of alcohol). Both processes are, of course, opposed by any guilt feelings an individual may have. The third process involves threatened egoism and, at first glance, appears related to Toch’s category of self-image promoting and defending. However, Toch views his category as involving
persons who are not convinced of their own worth, while Baumeister and Campbell feel that the process they are describing is more a reaction when a narcissistic view of the self is threatened. This disparity may involve some important distinctions, combined with some semantic and measurement issues. Baumeister, Smart, and Boden’s (1996) literature review seemed to show that aggressors tend to have favorable, even grandiose, views of the self, and Bushman & Baumeister’s (1998) laboratory study showed the highest aggression coming from the injured self esteem of insulted narcissists. However, the review article often involved the aggression of psychopaths and rapists (whom Toch would classify as egocentric) and narcissism also implies egocentricity. We may need to distinguish the inflated (and narcissistic) self esteem of the bully from the poor self esteem of other violent persons.

The above analyses are useful in understanding persons whose violence is not condoned by the society in which they live, but how may we understand the tolerated violence of leaders such as Hitler, Stalin, or Poi Pot, lieutenants such as Himmler or Goering, or the masses involved in publicly sponsored killings such as those that occurred in the Roman Coliseum or any number of blatant purges and massacres? While we may assume a certain amount of egocentricity, objectification and lack of empathy, there appear to be deeper motivational reasons, the sort of instinctual tendency for destruction postulated by Freud. An alternative is suggested by Fromm’s (1973) analysis of destructive character structure. Fromm distinguishes between a biologically adaptive aggression that humans share with other animals and a malignant aggression that is distinctly human and maladaptively destructive, a point discussed more fully below when we consider the nature of evil. He argues that the latter occurs in two forms: Spontaneous outbursts of destructive impulses occurring under certain conditions that promote vengeance, ecstatic
destructive rituals, or the worship of destruction, and the destructive traits that are bound in
certain character structures. Fromm points out that different societies are organized in ways that
promote certain syndromes of traits or character structures. Feudal societies requires different
personalities than capitalistic ones, cooperative societies promote different characters than
competitive ones. He argues certain situations tend to produce character structures that are
fundamentally destructive in that they are either sadistic or necrophilous.

Neither sadism nor necrophilia are necessarily sexual and Fromm is careful to distinguish
sadism from non-destructive forms of sexual pleasure. By sadism he means the passion to have
absolute control over another living being; he sees forcing another to endure pain or humiliation
as the manifestation of such control; and he uses case studies of Stalin and Himmler as his
examples. By necrophilia he means a passion to transform that which is alive into something
dead, to destroy for the sake of destruction; he presents a case study of Hitler as an example.
Fromm argues that necrophilia is connected to the worship of technique and the fusion of
technique and destructiveness seen in modern warfare and may be objectively measured and
related to political attitudes that favor military power and the repression of dissent (See
Maccoby, 1972).
Family violence. The violence occurring within families is often considered as two separate domains: child abuse, and “domestic violence” occurring between partners. Although there are obvious differences, it seems important to relate these two types of violence to each other, and to the general disruption of family management and the rather neglected topic of sibling abuse. For example, Patterson (1982) shows that the families of antisocial and abused children fail to provide consistent and effective discipline when children are aggressive, fail to monitor their whereabouts, and do not provide positive reinforcement for pro-social skills. He suggests that in such families, a problem child learns to be aggressive by attacking and dominating their siblings, and a sample of such children shows that they attack siblings at almost ten times the normal rate as well as being involved in hitting their fathers and mothers, and being hit by them, (Patterson, 1986).

One often thinks of child abuse as involving physical or sexual abuse. However, by far the most prevalent form of abuse involves neglect. Thus, Sedlak (1990) reports an incidence rate of 14.6 per 1,000 as contrasted with rates of 4.9 for physical and 2.1 for sexual abuse. Parental neglect usually occurs in situations of low family income and education, and often where there is a high level of stress and a lack of social support (Garbarino, 1991). In such situations there is probably less parental maturity, less knowledge about child development, and a greater degree of attachment disturbances. Further, mothers (and one presumes fathers also) may be quite depressed and this may well contribute to the neglect of children (See Pianta, Egeland, &
Erickson, 1989). Poverty and the lack of social support also appears to be a factor in both physical and sexual abuse.

In addition, Azar (1991) points out that in order to fully understand how abuse occurs we must look at the interpersonal dynamics that occur within the social context. Her investigations of abusive mothers reveal that they often misperceive a child’s behavior. If a three year old spills a glass of milk the mother may perceive willful disobedience and may lack the skills to cope with what she perceives as a challenge to her authority. Learned patterns of aggression occurring in a situation perceived as a struggle for dominance may account for a good deal of physical abuse. In any case, in their review of theories of child abuse, Azar, Povilaitis, Lauretti, and Pouquette (1998) argue that the best way to understand child abuse is to focus on how a parent interacts with a child in a social situation that is influenced by both societal and cultural factors. The interaction will be influenced by a child who may be more or less pleasing and difficult, by a mother who may have more or less parental and social skills, impulse control, ability to manage stress, by a context that may or may not provide helpful or aggressive models, be stressful or lend social support. To some extent this overall model for understanding may also be applicable to sexual abuse. However, sexual abuse seems less dependent on societal stress and more on personality factors such as high familial dependence, psychopathy, or pedophilic tendencies (Rist, 1979) or, more generally, as having its origin within perpetrators rather than in the interaction between perpetrator and victim (Haugaard, 1988).

Unfortunately, particularly when there is an absence of social support outside the family, there are times when the only way to prevent abuse is to remove a child and place it in foster care. While this sometimes helps, studies suggest that foster parents need more training and
support and should care for fewer children (Chamberlain, Moreland, & Reid, 1992).

Domestic abuse in the sense of partner abuse is often attributed to male “batterers”, and Bachman (1994) reports that Bureau of Justice statistics reveal that females experience over 10 times as many incidents of violence by intimates as males. However, it is unclear how much this data is biased by the failure of males to report being hit by their female partners. Cascardi, Langhinrichsen, and Vivian (1992) report more frequent and severe female injuries and more subsequent depression, and the U.S. Department of Justice (1995) reports about twice as many wives and girl friends killed by husbands and boyfriends as the converse (1500:700). However, telephone survey of 6,000 married or cohabiting couples (Straus & Gelles, 1990) found that as many females as males appeared to be involved in partner violence. and in as many cases of extreme violence (the superior physical strength of the males offset by the more frequent use of weapons by females). In a similar vein, surveys of lesbian couples have found as much or more violence as in heterosexual couples (Walderner-Haugrud, Gratch, & Magruder, 1997).

Regardless of the degree to which violence in perpetrated by males, it seems important to distinguish between different sorts of perpetrators. Holtzworth-Munroe (2000) distinguishes between three groups of men involved in marital violence: Those who only become violent within the family as a result of an inability to manage conflict escalation; those who have difficulty with trust issues and become overly dependent on their wives, resorting to violence when their needs are not met; and those who are anti-social and violent in all relationships. Clearly, the management of domestic abuse in each of these cases requires quite different strategies. In some cases couples therapy seems appropriate while in others it would simply prolong abuse. In some cases separation offers a solution. However, Hart (1992) reports that
about 75% of emergency room visits and calls to law enforcement, and 50% of the homicides, occur after separation. Intervention programs attempting to teach men anger management and conflict resolution skills in small groups, typically report a 53% to 83% success rate (Edleson, 1996). Although the lower percentages occur when there is a longer follow up time and when success is based on the reports of the victims or arrest rates, these rates are encouraging. However, the rates are based on men who complete the programs (which last from 10 to 36 sessions) and appear to ignore differences in different types of abusers. In one evaluation, of about 500 men who contacted the program, only 283 attended the first session and only 153 completed the sessions. Programs are also available for the treatment of aggressive women (See Leisring, Dowd, & Rosenbaum, in press), though these may face the same attendance problems as the men’s programs.
Rape. Estimation of the prevalence of rape depends a great deal on how rape is defined and how the statistics are collected (Muehlenhard, Powch, Phelps, & Giusti, 1992). For example, the national incidence of reported rape and attempted rape is about half that obtained by federal telephone surveys and about 1/20 of that obtained in anonymous surveys of college students using behaviorally specific scenarios (Koss, 1992). Since 1995, instances of reported rape (as defined by the FBI) have been gradually falling, although less than the rates of other violent crime. (In 1998 the incident rate was 34.4 per 100,000 as opposed to 6.3 for murder and 360.6 for battery). However, there are a number of different types of courtship rape (Shotland, 1992) that are largely unreported, and as sexual mores have changed and women more often find themselves in intimate settings (and often under the influence of alcohol), there may be an increasing amount of date rape in which a woman is subjected to unwanted sex by a male who may or may not be aware that his advances are truly unwanted. Although college age students are at an age with maximal risk it seems clear that a high percentage of women are sexually victimized. Thus, in a well designed study involving over 3,000 college women, 15% reported that they had experienced unwanted sexual penetration because a man had used physical force or given them alcohol or drugs, and an additional 12% reported having had to resist physical force (Koss, Gigycz, & Wisniewski, 1987). Probably few of these instances were reported and many may not even have been termed “rape” or recognized as such.

On one hand, the majority of men do not seem to find rape appealing. Thus, when Malamuth (1981) asked an anonymous sample of college males if they might be inclined to rape
a woman if they knew they could get away with it, 65% responded with a “not at all likely” (a 1 on a 5 point scale.) And about 75% of the 3,000 college males sampled by Koss and her colleagues reported having never engaged in instances of sexual aggression (including verbal coercion). On the other hand, 20% of Malamuth’s sample responded with a 3 or higher, and about 9% of the Koss sample indicated that they had used physical force, alcohol or authority to obtain or attempt to obtain sex. Further, the data suggests that an additional percentage of males seem unaware that their advances were truly unwanted.

Malamuth’s initial data established that students who indicated that they might be inclined to rape if they knew they could get away with it were more apt to believe the rape myth that women really enjoyed being raped, were more apt to evidence penile tumescence when they witnessed a rape scene, and were more apt to condone violence against women. After laboratory studies (Malamuth, 1983, 1984) established they were also more inclined to deliver painful shocks to women, Malamuth (1986) correlated his measures with the type of self report measures used by Koss. His data establish that a number of measures are higher in males who report they have engaged in sexual aggression. These include a measure of reported arousal to rape, penile tumescence while reading a rape story, sexual dominance, hostility towards women, acceptance of force in sexual relations, and prior sexual experience. While any single variable is only modestly correlated with reported aggression (the highest is a +.43 with tumescence), a combination of the variables yielded a multiple of +.67. Further, there where a number of important interactions between the variables and when these were included the multiple correlation was significantly greater, rising to +.86. It is interesting to note that 6% of the subjects, those who scored above the median on 5 variables, reported far more sexual aggression
than the remaining subjects and suggest a similarity with Groth’s (1979) interviews with convicted rapists.

What sorts of background factors contribute to the making of a rapist? Malamuth (1998) presents data that shows coercive sex is most apt to be perpetrated by males who have both an orientation towards impersonal sex (often related to a violent childhood) and a hostile masculinity (involving feelings of rejection and a desire to dominate women). To some extent these risk factors may be mitigated by the ability to empathize.

If the problem of sexual aggression was only a problem of restraining 6% of males it might be fairly easily addressed. Unfortunately, it seems clear that larger percentages are influenced by sub-cultural norms in some gangs, military units, sports teams, and fraternities which suggest that what seems like rape to some is merely normal masculine action. These norms encourage the objectification of women as sexual objects, and the reinforcement of rape myths (O’Toole, 1997). For example, Buchwald, Fletcher, and Roth (1993), Lenihan and Rawlins (1994), and Boswell and Spade (1996) have reported that fraternity men are more likely to be involved in sexual violence and that some fraternities constitute sub-cultures with norms that objectify women, and an environment where drinking parties, easy access to bedrooms, and fraternal secrecy almost assure sexual aggression. Fortunately, it appears that it may be possible to create intervention programs that decrease the acceptance of the rape myths that prevail in such subcultures (Flores & Hartlaub, 1998). However, although we have been examining rape as a form of personal violence, rape may also be used impersonally as an instrument of war (Copelon, 1995). Enloe (2000) has pointed out the different ways in which such militarized rape may be used to achieve political objectives, and how it may become institutionalized. The
brutality of such rape is particularly devastating to victims because they are often subsequently rejected by their own communities (Turshen, 2000).

**Bullying and malicious gossip.** A defining aspect of bullying is that the behavior occurs repeatedly so that there is a pattern of abuse and intimidation (Boulton & Underwood, 1992). So defined, Bernstein and Watson (1997) report that from 7% to 10% of U.S. school children are victimized by about another 7% of the children who are active bullies. Similar percentages are found in Great Britain (Atlas & Pepler, 1998), with prevalence highest in the middle school years. The average bully appears to have normal self-esteem (See Bernstein & Watson, 1997), and the average victim less self-perceived social competence as compared with other members of their peer group (Egan & Perry, 1998). There are a number of detrimental aspects to bullying. Those who are bullied feel unsafe at school and appear to be at risk for illness, failure, and depression (Wylie, 2000). The bullies begin to think they can get what they want by using power to dominate others, something that often fails to work in adult life (Oliver, Hoover, & Hazler, 1994). And typically the majority of children who witness the bullying feel fear and fail to intervene. They may be being trained to be ineffective bystanders. Fortunately, it is possible to train teachers, students and parents in ways to intervene and such training, involving the entire community, has proven effective in Scandinavia, where programs have reduced bullying by 50% (Olweus, 1991, 1993).
Community Violence.

Although it sometimes takes personal forms, there are types of violence whose nature is more communal than interpersonal. Among such forms are riots, gang extortion and warfare, and police violence.

Riots. There are three major problems involved in the study of riots. First, while murders and suicides are carefully recorded in the medical statistics of many nations, it is no one's job to record riots and the deaths that often result from them. Thus, Richardson (1960a) noted the difficulty of obtaining statistics on the number of deaths in riots as compared to either murders or wars. The investigator must often rely on private collections painfully put together by culling news reports. Such collections are illustrated by the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence (1968) collection of 484 racial disturbances in the United States between January, 1967-April 1968, Graham & Gurr’s (1969) more general collection covering major violence in the United States, and X’s (19 ) collection of civil disturbances in different nations between 19 and 19 . A second problem is definitional. The United States Riot Commission (1968) notes that the definition of civil disorder varies so widely that between 51 and 212 disorders was recorded by various agencies in the first 9 months of 1997. Using Richardson’s approach of counting deaths we might note that 12 of these involved deaths (2 with over 10 deaths). Gilje (1996, p.4) suggests that a riot involves a, “group of twelve or more people attempting to assert their will immediately through the use of force outside the normal bounds of law.” However such civil disorders might either be spontaneous or planned, and for many purposes it seems important to
distinguish those that occur as protests from those that take place in the midst of civil war or are sponsored by a government (as in genocidal operations). Finally, a problem is posed by the many different reasons for riots. There may be little in common between the 5,000 lynchings of blacks in the United States between 1882 and 1939 (Wertham, 1966), the dozens of racial “communal” riots during the early 20th century involving struggles over contested areas or employment (Janowitz, 1969), the spontaneous “commodity” riots of dissatisfied African Americans in the 60's (Couch, 1968), Stark’s (1972) “police” riot, and the “celebration” rampages of victorious sports fans (Dunning, Murphy, & Williams, 1986).

We may distinguish at least three theoretical approaches to riots. As in his understanding of aggression in general, Berkowitz links riots to frustration and general negative affect. And the occurrence of many riots do appear to be related to factors such as high temperature (Anderson & Anderson, 1998; Baron & Ransberger, 1978), a depressed economy, and the presence of aggression eliciting cues. However, such factors seem more contributory than causal. On a psychological level, what may be more fundamental is the “relative deprivation” theory stressed by Gurr (1970). By relative deprivation Gurr means the discrepancy between what one has and what one thinks one ought to have. It seems important to note (although Gurr is not completely clear about this) that “ought” implies not simply the expectancy that one will reach a goal but a judgment about what is just, what ought to be in a moral sense. In part a social comparison process, in the sense that one ought to have what others who are regarded as similar have, probably determines this. But “regarded as similar” depends on societal norms and many a group has suffered passively for years because they have accepted a definition of inferiority imposed by a more dominant group (See Moore, 1978).
What one ought to have also depends on what regards as one’s group and this identity is often shaped by leaders who mobilize group sentiment, a factor stressed by the third theoretical approach, the “collective action theory” advanced by Tilly (1978). Tilly stresses group interests, organized by a network of social connections and mobilized by leaders who emphasize group identity. Such leadership may depend on certain structural factors in the society. Smelser (1962) emphasizes the structural strain that occurs when there is a lack of communication, deprivation and normative differences. He argues that these are conducive to riots when leaders do nothing to relieve the strain, there are insufficient channels to express grievances, and there is sufficient communication among the aggrieved to develop a generalized hostile belief system. The hostile beliefs are released by a precipitating incident that mobilizes the group for action. Building on this idea, Palmer (1972, p.155) suggests that the basic conditions for a riot may be characterized by a high degree of tension in both the social system and the role systems of participants. This weakens identity until it is restored by participation in the riot.

When we examine the empirical data on riots we find some features that are accounted for by each of the above approaches. Lieberson and Silverman (1965) compared cities that did and did not experience racial riots between 1913 and 1963. They found three structural differences. Cities with fewer riots had more racially integrated police forces, more representative forms of local government (because of district rather than city wide elections of city council and school board members), and larger percentages of self-employed blacks in retail stores, restaurants, and taverns.

Numerous riots occurred in the black ghettos of U.S. cities in 1967 and the United States Riot Commission (1968) examined 164 of these disturbances occurring in 128 cities. To account
for these disturbances, the Commission stressed structural factors such as discriminatory police practices, unemployment and inadequate housing. However, while the Commission reported an increasingly violent social climate that was encouraged by militant groups, they found no evidence of “conspiracy” (an absence of mobilizing leadership). This is not to deny that there may have been the sort of underlying political motivation stressed by Upton (1989), a desire to register an impact in the absence of legitimate channels for protest. However, there was no organized militant leadership. There is some evidence for the relevance of relative deprivation rather than simple frustration in that a 1967 study by Fogelson and Hill (reported in Skolnick, 1969) found that three quarters of those arrested were employed and between half and three quarters in semi-skilled or skilled occupations. However, Spilerman (1976) was unable to find relationships between either the frequency or severity of riots and any of a number of measures of structural strain. In part this may be due to his sample of riots (the bulk of which were the U.S. commodity riots of 1967-68), but one would still expect his measures of social disorganization, relative deprivation and political representation to have some predictive power.

The failure of structural factors in predicting which cities would have the most commodity riots, together with difficulties in satisfactorily predicting which individuals would participate in them (McPhail, 1971), has led McPhail (1994) to abandon both structural strain and relative deprivation as predictors. Instead, he advocates extending Snyder’s (1979) work of examining the factors that affect the interpersonal processes that assemble a riot. Such an approach inquires into communication patterns and the motives of individuals as they assemble to engage in collective goals. McPhail argues that it is important to distinguish between collective goals that do not intend violence (although violence may result) and collective goals
that do intend violence (as is the case with England’s football hooligans). It would also seem wise to consider the group emotions that can occur when group members share attitudes and have a common sentience (See Smith & Crandell, 1984). Such group emotion may play a role in the generation of crowd violence in cases where police suppositions of violence may create a self-fulfilling prophecy of violence in sports fans (Stott & Reicher, 1998).

A nuanced account of the group emotions involved in riots is provided by Kakar’s (2000) description of the protracted communal clashes between Hindus and Moslems in Hyderabad, India. After a skillful delineation of economic, political, historical, demographic, social psychological and psychoanalytic accounts, he focuses on the psychological shifts that occur at the outbreak of violence. He notes that the character of rumors begins to change, from general threats to rumors that the body is threatened by previously benign substances, how the boundaries of individuals with peaceful religious identities and a basic sense of trust, become replaced by a transcendent communal identity with a propensity for anxiety and violence, how individual behavior becomes governed by a different sort of morality, and how a history of coexistence is replaced by a history of violence. Of course these shifts are perpetrated by demagogues and much of the violence is perpetrated by gangs of young toughs, but Kaker’s point is that the entire community is caught up in altered identities, and that certain norms are still in existence that enable people to return to their traditional religious identities and live in relative harmony after the violence subsides.
Gangs and gang warfare. Groups of youth can gather together nonviolently and prior to the late 1970's such groups in the US had little use of drugs and relatively little criminal involvement (Moore, 1990). However, as drugs and guns became available gangs became increasingly violent and involved in crime and struggles over territory. In 1996 there were about 31,000 gangs with approximately 846,000 members in the United States (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1998). Gangs are a problem in many other countries as well, particularly when social control disintegrates. In Guatemala, for example, the ending of military dictatorship and police control has produced a situation where officials have reported over 500 criminal gangs with about 80 thousand members (“Guatemala has 500 gangs,” 2001). It seems likely that gangs develop whenever societies fragment and lower class males lack access to legitimate sources of power and prestige. It might be interesting to study gangs as quasi-states. Certainly delinquent gangs involve symbols of identification for group membership, territorial claims, leadership power struggles, in-group protection, and out-group antagonism (Capozzoli & McVey, 2000).

When the Soviet Union collapsed, hundreds of violent groups emerged whom Volkov (2000, p 709) notes, “…intimidated, protected, gathered information, settled disputes, gave guaranties, enforced contracts and taxed.” He argues that these entrepreneurs of violence created organizations that were essentially, “violence-managing agencies.” The more successful gradually became legitimized by becoming involved in pro-social activities and absorbed in the process of state formation.
Hill, Howell, Hawkins, and Battin-Pearson (1999) notes four risk factors that predict adolescent involvement in gangs. On the community level these include poverty, high rates of mobility and dysfunctional norms. In fact, in his examination of drug use and delinquency in 1400 different neighborhoods of New York City, Chein was able to predict the amount of delinquency in a neighborhood with a multiple correlation of +.86 by using indices of socioeconomic squalor, youth density, industrial proximity, and number of broken families. Chein argued, and to some extent was able to prove, that drug use and delinquency was due to the inability of a community to enforce functional norms, that high crime neighborhoods had a state of anomie in Durkheim’s classic sense of the term (See de Rivera, 1986). This also seems true of Hill’s second risk factor, the structure of schools that fail to engage and monitor students. It should be noted that Hill’s other factors involve family characteristics, individual personality, and the choice of friends; and there are somewhat different risk factors in rural areas (Evans, Fitzgerald, Weigel, Chvilicek, 1999).

A crucial problem created by gang warfare (and by civil war in general) is the impact which violence has on children. Kostelny and Garbarino (2001) have pointed out that in some Chicago neighborhoods, 38% of elementary school children have seen a dead body outside and 21% have had someone threaten to shoot them. They have noted how repeated violence often leads to regression, a loss of trust, sense of futurelessness, and increased aggressive behavior. They propose a series of measures to counteract these affects including home visiting and early education programs, and specific violence prevention programs at both the elementary and middle school levels.

One might think that children who have suffered the sort of violence that occurs when
civil society has disintegrated, would themselves become violent. However, this is no necessarily so. What sort of moral character might develop in South Africa where, after the violence of Apartheid, children were subjected to criminal, domestic, and vigilante violence, often with a lack of clarity about the reasons for the violence? Dawes (1994) reports that the majority of children do not appear to have become violent or even to seek retaliation. In fact, many evidence an increased empathy. He points out that moral behavior is learned in a sociocultural context. People construct their identities and reputations as members of groups and learn moral conduct in settings that assign responsibility to the roles that people chose to play. Hence, children may learn that violence is called for in one situation but immoral in another. Although a culture may arise and lead some to assume violent roles, such violence is not automatically produced by being exposed to violence but is subject to the rhetoric and morality developed by a group in a situation.

Merely increasing the number of police in a high gang crime area does not seem to be effective, but a study by Fritsch, Caeti, and Taylor (1999) suggests that if the additional police focus on curfew and truancy enforcement it is possible to reduce gang related crime. However, many investigators argue that suppression is less effective than social interventions that offer centers of activity for at-risk youth before they become involved in gangs (Spergel & Grossman, 1997) and there is some evidence that such centers are effective alternatives (Thurman, Giacomazzi, Reisig, Mueller, 1996).
The use of violence in social control. Unfortunately, the process of maintaining social control often involves violence and far more violence that appears justifiable. In fact, it may be argued that punishment and the use of any violence, as opposed to an aggressive use of force and physical restraint, fails to deter violence and cannot be justified (Gilligan, 2000). When violence is used it may occur in the form of police violence in the streets, or violence within prisons in the form of torture or cruel and unusual punishment. In the United States, the reported instances of death from police violence are relatively low, about 300 deaths per year. It seems evident that laws and strong civilian control must demand a professional force that minimizes the use of violence, and that excellent training is crucial. Toch, Grant, and Galvin (1976) argue that the best way to achieve control over unacceptable police violence is to have peer review panels who review all arrest reports, tally deployed violence and work with those officers who exceed a predefined number of incidents. Such officers are helped to understand their behavior and create alternative approaches to handling the situations that provoked their violence. When their incidents decrease they themselves are enlisted to become members of the panel.

In the United States, an increasing number of persons are being imprisoned with the prison population in maximum-security prisons more than doubling from 1987 to 1997. There are now over 1.6 million persons in federal and state prisons, with inmates outnumbering guards 38 to 1 (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999). Note that this figure does not include persons in county and city jails. Much of this increase is due to nonviolent drug offenders and targets African American and Black men. As Haney and Zimbardo (1998) point out, the increased use
of imprisonment reflects a policy choice to imprison individual lawbreakers rather than to correct the social conditions that contribute to crime. There are troubling indications that the increased privatization of prisons is leading to abusive practices such as the increased use of stun belts and solitary confinement. Further, there is every indication that prisons are failing to rehabilitate a majority of those who are incarcerated. Thus, Beck and Shipley (1997) report that an estimated 62.5% of the prisoners released from 11 state prisons were rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three years of their release and 41.4% were returned to prison or jail. Many prisons appear dominated by gangs (Lerner, 1984), and violence and domination occurs between inmates and is often used by guards. Ekland-Olson (1986) reports an increase from 37 to 1,426 assaults on officers in Texas prisons from 1973 to 1984. It seems evident that most prisons are providing an environment that encourages the learning of violence rather than responsibility (Haney & Zimbardo, 1998).

There are managerial approaches that reduce violence (Reisig, 1998), vocational programs that offer structure and reduce assault rates (McCorkle, Miethe, & Drass, 1995) and educational programs that reduce violence and recidivism (Matthews & Pitts, 1998). However, neither governmental officials nor the American public seems willing to spend money on what is often seen as “coddling” prisoners. There appears to be a general attitude that favors punishment over rehabilitation, a general failure to distinguish between what might help different types of prisoners, and a general lack of compassion for those who find themselves in prison.

Torture is the most troublesome form of police violence and often leaves its victims crippled both physically and psychologically. This is particularly true when, as is often the case, the aim of the torture was not to obtain information but to intimidate and destroy a person so that
he or she could no longer function as a leader of resistance to those in authority. While victims differ widely in their post torture symptoms and some have demonstrated an incredible capacity to forgive and heal, many need both physical and psychological treatment (Goldfeld, Mollica, Pesavento, & Faraone, 1988; Roth, Lunde, Boysen, & Genefke, 1987). Elsass (1997) has described effective treatment methods, and the journal Torture is devoted to the prevention of torture and the rehabilitation of its victims.

As defined in the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture, torture involves the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, by or with the agreement of a public official, in order to obtain information or a confession, or to punish, intimidate or coerce. Perhaps the most evident indication of the extent of the problem is that by the year 2000 only 119 of the 188 member states had endorsed the rules against torture promulgated by the UN Convention.

Amnesty International (2000) has enumerated a 12-point program to eliminate torture. These include calling for every nation to officially condemn and enact laws against torture, refuse evidence obtained under torture, make the location of all prisoners known, allow prisoners to communicate, have all allegations of torture investigated by an authority independent of the prison system, have authorities clearly state their opposition to the use of torture, punish torturers and compensate victims. Such procedures are not in effect in numerous countries.
Societal Violence.

While community violence often reflects what is happening within a society there are forms of violence that occur throughout the society in which communities are embedded. These include the violence in its media, and the violence that occurs when the society is subjected to civil war or engages in war with another society.

Media violence. Above, we saw how aggressive behavior can be learned by following the models provided on film and TV. Hence, it is troubling to note that Hepburn (1997) reports that 57% of the TV programs, monitored at four different locations in the United States, contained some sort of violence while only 4% presented an anti-violence theme. American children are exposed to vast amounts of violence on TV with Signorelli, Gerber, and Morgan (1995) estimating that the average 12 year old has seen over a 100,000 acts of violence. There is little doubt that this sort of exposure contributes to violence (see Eron, Heusmann, Lefkowitz, & Walder, 1996). For example, Williams (1985) examined the effects of the introduction of television on the violence of children in a Canadian town that had previously lacked TV because of its location. Over a two-year period, they found an increase in observations and peer and teacher reports of both physical and verbal aggression. Evidence suggests that violence is most apt to be learned when an attractive perpetrator with whom the viewer can identify engages in justified and rewarded violence that fails to depict the harm suffered by the victim of the violence (Smith & Donnerstein, 1998).

Media violence appears to promote violence in a number of different ways (see Berry,
Giles, & Williams, 1999). Besides modeling violent behavior and weakening inhibitions about violence, it numbs or desensitizes reactions to violence (see Cline, Croft, & Courrier, 1973). For example, Thomas, Horton, Lippincott, and Drabman (1977) had some people watch a violent police show while others watched an exciting, nonviolent volleyball game. Those who had watched the violent show responded with less emotion when they subsequently saw an aggressive interaction between two preschool children. Similarly, Malamuth and Check (1981) showed that men who watched a violent sex film increased their acceptance of violence against women (as opposed to control groups who watched films without sex or violence, or explicit but nonviolent sex), and Linz, Donnerstein, and Penrod (1988) showed that exposure to a “slasher” film decreased empathy for rape victims. A careful discussion of some other effects of media violence may be found in Berkowitz (1993). Similar negative effects occur as a consequence of playing violent video games (Anderson & Bushman, 2001). Although the evidence for the danger of viewing violence is increasing, warnings against viewing such violence appear to be decreasing in the U. S. mass media. (Bushman & Anderson, 2001).
**Interstate warfare.** Richardson (1960a) began the statistical study of war when his concern for human life led him to define war in terms of human deaths rather than in terms of declarations, boundary settlements or historical significance. Setting 1,000 deaths as a lower limit, and the log of deaths as a scale of magnitude (thus 1,000 deaths is a magnitude 3 war), he argued that counting was the best antiseptic for prejudice and proceeded to count the wars between 1820 and 1945. His findings are sobering. First, there are many magnitude 6 wars (about a million deaths) that are not remembered and that most people never hear about because they lack much historical significance (e.g. the Taiping rebellion, the War in La Plata, the First Chinese Communist War [1927-36]). Second, we tend to overlook the bellicosity of ourselves and allies, and we forget that aggressors change so that we cannot possibly stop war by focusing on containing any given aggressor. Thus, England and France fought far more wars than Germany, Japan or Russia in the period examined by Richardson, Sweden (with no wars in the examined period) was once extremely warlike, and the nation responsible for most wars keeps changing in different periods. Third he found 188 magnitude 3 wars that had been almost completely overlooked and discovered that it was impossible for him to count smaller disturbances because (unlike murder statistics) it was nobody’s job to record them.

Richardson proposed a sort of molecular model of war that imagined nations as bumping up against each other, with some of these conflicts resulting in war. Those with more borders have a greater chance of collisions as do those with more energy (which may be conceived as moving more rapidly). In accord with such a model, he shows that the number of wars that a
nation fights correlates highly with its number of borders (he includes colonies in this count), and the number of wars breaking out in any given year follows a Poisson (chance) distribution. Factors we might think of as lessening the probability of war, such as common language or religion, do not. What does lessen the probability of war between peoples is the number of years in which they live under a common government. In fact, the probability of war breaking out decreases geometrically with each decade of common government).

Which disputes result in war? Besides the Richardson collection of wars, investigators can make use of Wright’s (1942/1965) collection of 278 major wars that occurred between 1480 and 1942, Singer & Small’s (1972) detailed collection of 93 wars between 1816 and 1965, and Cochman and Maoz (1984) collection of militarized interstate disputes. Wallace (1979) investigated 99 serious international disputes that occurred between 1815 and 1965. He reports that 26 resulted in war, and that in 23 of these cases the war was preceded by an arms race. (There were only 5 cases where an arms race did not lead to war, and we are probably fortunate that the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union proved to be in this category.)

When arms races occur there is an instability in the balance of power and the race accelerates exponentially in a way that Richardson (1960b) can describe with a simple pair of differential equations. Basically, this elegant mathematical model reveals that races occurs when a pair of nations are more afraid of each other than they are concerned with the cost to their own economy. A more complex model that deals with more than two nations or sides, and chaotic transitions is described by Behrens, Feichtinger, and Prskawetz (1997). Of course, Richardson’s model stresses deterministic factors, and Rapoport (1960) has pointed out how such an approach may be contrasted with an approach that involves strategic gaming over interests or struggles
involving different ideologies. Applying this latter approach, Smith, Sola, and Spagnolo (2000) demonstrate that in the conflict between Greece and Turkey, the amount each nation spends on arms does not depend on what the other is spending, but is a function of bureaucratic and political inertia. Current spending by the United States also appears to evidence this pattern. Subsequently, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has kept an ongoing account of wars that focuses on number of deaths. Their statistics reveal millions of largely overlooked deaths, with 10 magnitude 6 wars that have occurred since 1945 and about 30 wars going on in any given year. Over recent years the number of interstate wars has decreased while the number of intrastate (civil) wars has increased. There has also been an increasingly large percentage of civilian deaths, which now account for about 85% of the casualties. One ray of hope for decreasing interstate conflict is offered by statistics that demonstrate that fewer militarized disputes occur when nations have important trade relations and when nations are democracies (Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, & Russett, 1996). Under such conditions war is not in the interest of those in power. However, these statistics do not consider support for covert interference, as in the U.S. involvement in overthrowing the democratically elected governments of Guatemala and Chile, the number of reasonably democratic nations is not high, and the conditions for democracy may be difficult to achieve (See de Rivera, in press). Nevertheless, we are reminded that interstate war is not inevitable.
Civil war, ethnic violence, and genocide. While civil wars sometimes simply reflect a struggle for power within a dominant group, they often involve ethnic group interests or ideological differences which become involved in a struggle for power. Their complexity is nicely captured in a series of case studies that deal with the wars in Central America, Ireland, Israel, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka from a psychological point of view. In Ireland (Cairns & Darby, 1998), Sri Lanka (Rogers, Spencer, & Uyangoda, 1998), and many other nations, important ethnic groups have both inflicted and experienced the sort of prejudicial treatment so aptly demonstrated in Tajfel’s (1982) studies. Niens and Cairns (2001) have applied social identity theory to the understanding of ethnic conflict and have concluded that overcoming of the stereotypes that are involved requires contact situations in which people’s group memberships are more rather than less emphasized. However, the stereotypes that evolve are related to real differences in power and past injury so that much more than contact is required to deal with the mistrust and hatred. Some methods that are available will be discussed below when we consider techniques of negotiation.

Given the background of distrust it is difficult to create a national government that is responsive to the needs of the different groups. This has been particularly true in Africa, where colonial powers drew the boundaries of states and ignored traditional methods of dispute resolution between tribes. (In the latter regard, one hopeful sign is provided by the use of traditional methods in achieving a moratorium on the small arms trade in West Africa [Murray, 2000].) Instead of creating a pluralistic government, the different ethnic groups often vie for power with a winner takes all attitude. In considering these disputes it is important to note that
there are often many people within each group who are willing to treat the other group fairly, Unfortunately, in many disputes extremists tend to oppose efforts to take the interests of the other group into consideration. Rather than creating a common inter-group political front, the moderates appear constrained by their intra-group identity with their extremists so that rational compromises that would be in the interest of both groups are impossible to achieve. Once civil war has occurred the fabric of the society must be restored by processes of reconciliation. Lederach (1997) has emphasized the need for years of work in rebuilding trust in teams from different strata of the society. He shows that such reconciliation requires the assistance of third parties who can accompany disputants with an attitude of humility as they, both individuals and communities, wrestle with the problems of combining truth, justice and mercy.

While people in the United States tend to assume that nation-states are relatively homogenous meltdowns, Connor’s (1978) points out that only 12 of the 132 nation-states that existed in 1971 are largely homogeneous (Japan and Norway are examples), and in 39 the largest majority group had less than half the population. The nation-states that are the large political units of our contemporary world are fairly recent creations, the earliest perhaps being the Spain created in 1492. It may be argued that they are held together by emotional processes, that they are seeded about either an aristocratic group that incorporated different peoples into a relatively secularized state or a people who, often using religion to achieve unity, gradually developed into a state (Smith, 1994), and that there are at least two different sorts of emotional glue that may be used to hold a nation-state together (see de Rivera, in press).

Gurr (1996) has identified 268 politically significant national and minority peoples, about 18% of the world’s population, three fourths of whom experienced political disadvantages.
Almost 100 of these groups participated in violent conflict between 1945 and 1990. He argues that it is important to recognize the grievances of minorities, the fact that cultural identities are important aspects of human being, and that it is not always possible to assimilate a minority culture. One difficult problem is posed by the fact that conflicting parties often find it difficult to create a common historical narrative. An example of this is furnished by Rouhana and Bar-Tel (1998) in their balanced account of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Gurr shows that the mobilization of a people depends on collective grievances, the salience of group identity (often promoted by leadership), and the cohesiveness of the group (which depends on concentration, networks of communication and cooperating rather than competing leadership).

Gurr points out that strong, resource rich states have the power to either accommodate or suppress whereas the rulers of weaker states must either include others at a risk to their own dominance, spend resources on warfare, or grant autonomy or independence. National and minority peoples in modern industrial democracies face few political barriers and tend to use tactics of protest rather than rebellion. However, those in states with fewer economic resources face oppression and often engage in armed rebellion. Such rebellions are often supported or resisted by external powers. Fortunately, the cessation of the Cold War has led world powers to mediate rather than exacerbate such conflicts and a growing human rights movement favors such efforts.

In my own opinion, some of the most successful accommodations have involved a combination of redress of grievances, allowance of cultural autonomy, and suppression of terrorist elements. Along these lines, Gottlieb (1993) has argued that some conflicts may be managed by allowing people to have two identities, a formal national identity in addition to a
state identity. The national identity could control some language use in education, local law, marriage rites, etc., while the state identity could control currency, border defense, and other factors necessary for a nation-state to survive in a global economy. From the perspective of psychological theory such an arrangement makes sense because, as Brewer (1999) notes, it is quite possible to have a positive in-group identity that is independent of negative attitudes towards out-group members. Such in-group identities may be less threatened when clear boundaries between groups are recognized within the bounds of a common state.

In some nation-states, such as in Turkey 1915, Germany in the 30's, Iraq in the 80's, and Rwanda in the 90's, political decisions lead to genocide. Most students of genocide argue that genocides are not the inevitable results of ethnic differences. They point to the fact that often people have lived together peacefully for years, often with a considerable amount of intermarriage. The genocide occurs when leaders emphasize group identity, often in order to consolidate power or mobilize support in a power struggle. Yet the genocide is only possible when rapidly arousing fear and hatred. In the case of Rwanda, Smith (1998) argues that official hate propaganda combined with projective sexual envy, a belief in sorcery, authoritarianism, and a breakdown in traditional restraints and opportunities.

Staub (1989, 1998) has examined a number of genocides in an attempt to conceptualize the common processes involved in such atrocities. He argues that they occur under circumstances of material deprivation and social disorganization that frustrate basic human needs. In such circumstances, individuals feel helpless and increasingly rely on their group membership. The seeds of genocide are sown if the group develops a destructive ideology in which an enemy group is perceived to stand in the way of the fulfillment of a hopeful vision of
the future. The conditions for the genocide evolve as violence begins to occur and is justified by an increasing devaluation of the enemy group, a devaluation that may easily be mobilized for political purposes. While Staub emphasizes that genocide is the outcome of normal group processes, he notes that there appear to be cultural preconditions. These include prejudices that become part of a cultural background, an ideology of antagonism, and the lack of a pluralistic culture. In many cases there also appears to be a particularly strong respect for authority that has made it difficult to resist immoral orders and may have contributed to the threat and anxiety experienced when the authority was unable to fulfil basic needs.

The numerous wars that have occurred and are continuing to occur require reconciliation between hostile groups, and this is particularly true when these groups must continue to live together within the same society. The difficulties are immense, requiring a balance between needs for justice, the saving of face, and the support of sources of power who may be implicated by revelations of human rights abuses. Above all, as Lederach (1997) has observed, the relationship between groups must change so that out group members are no longer excluded from one’s moral framework, and this must occur at the grassroots as well as at the level of top leadership. Probably governmental initiative is required and certainly the most successful effort to date has been the South African government’s establishment of its Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Rather than attempting to punish those responsible for the torture and murders which occurred during the maintenance of apartheid, the commission was charged with establishing what happened, making known the fate of victims and providing them with the opportunity to relate their accounts and achieve some measure of reparation, facilitating the amnesty of offenders who made full disclosure, and recommending measures to prevent future
violations (de la Rey, 2001). Although justice was not achieved in the sense of adequate reparations, of punishment of the guilty, or even of an adequate admission of guilt or request for forgiveness, the public hearings held by the commission provided a forum that allowed a public acknowledgment of what had happened and the establishment of a common moral framework. In contrast to the situation in Argentina, where there is still no public recognition for the abuses under the military dictatorship, compensation, or condemnation of those involved in torture and disappearances, the South African public can speak of what occurred and move on with a new public identity and history.

Further, even in the absence of apology, Richardson (1999) has shown that it is possible for individuals to achieve at least a degree of forgiveness by being able to construct a narrative that can be told from the offender’s point of view, something obviously facilitated when those stories are publicly shared.

Terrorism. Terrorism may be distinguished from the guerilla tactics of rebels who are fighting a military opponent within their own territory. Terrorism involves random attacks on civilians as a means of gaining political ends and has been used by both states and revolutionaries. In the former case, a government that is engaged in a war attempts to destroy its opponent’s will to fight, or a despotic government maintains its power by creating an emotional climate of terror that prevents the organization needed for political opposition (de Rivera, 1993). In the latter case, groups without access to political power use terror to publicize their grievances, extort concessions, or overthrow a regime that is experienced as repressive. All cases involve the training for aggression and moral desensitization described in the section on aggression. However, terrorism is situated in historical circumstances that have interesting and largely
unexplored psychological aspects.

An example is provided by the September 11th attack on the United States. Most of the terrorists were from Saudi Arabia. Although the government is repressive in that there are no ways to express discontent, the United States supports the regime in exchange for access to oil. The alternative to the King would probably be an Islamic state rather than a secular democracy. Such a state is fundamentally religious and is conceived hierarchically rather than democratically. Vatikiotis (1986) notes that it is not based on the skepticism, experimentation and tolerance essential to pluralistic politics. It is based on a different psychology and its stability would require the cultivation of a different set of emotional relationships and customs (de Rivera, in press). Hence, we are dealing with the problems of psychological identity and the ambiguous role of religion that will be considered when we discuss the nature of evil. An examination of past attempts to deal with revolutionary terrorism suggests that the more successful have involved meeting the underlying needs which fuel the terrorism, as well as the suppression of terrorist elements.
Structural Violence.

The concept of structural violence has been articulated by Galtung (1969, 1975/1980, 1989, 1996) to capture how economic and political structures may place constraints on the human potential. It sees violence as present when humans are influenced in ways that diminish their potential, and points to the fact that this violence frequently occurs when social structures prevent the meeting of human needs. Galtung points out that most modern societies are organized hierarchically and that those on top often use their position in ways that exploit those below and prevents them from having the resources they need. The “topdogs” are in control of resource distribution and their decisions determine who has access to education, health care, and good jobs. Further, he argues that the topdogs maintain their power by a series of devices that work against the underdogs organizing a resistance. These include penetration by informers, the segmentation of information, marginalization, and fragmentation.

Theoretically, it should be possible to measure structural violence although it does not seem clear if one should focus on calculating loss of potential (at one point Galtung proposes loss of years of life expectancy), or the discrepancy between topdogs and underdogs, or the deprivation of chances of empowerment. To some extent, an approximation is furnished by the human poverty index (HPI) (United Nations Development Programme, 1999). This index uses the percentage of population dying before age 40, percentage underweight children (under age
5), percentage of population without access to potable water, percentage without health care, and percentage of illiterate adults. These five variables were selected in part because they reflect loss of potentials that could be resolved by public policies. However, in using the index to assess structural violence, it is important to note that certain groups within a nation may fare much better or worse than the majority. In the United States, Afro-Americans would score lower than the population at large. In Mexico, although the overall HPI is relatively high, statistics from the state of Chiapas, with good resources but a high indigenous population, suggest a considerable amount of structural violence.

It is important to realize that the hierarchies of power and privilege that exist within each society are connected to those in other societies in ways that support one another. The topdogs in a poor nation are often quite wealthy and well connected to the topdogs in other nations so they are positioned to use aid in ways that maintain their power. While Galtung does not deny that domestic problems may generate international conflict, he stresses that many domestic problems are exacerbated by the policies of exploitation of the elites in powerful countries. Further, the entire system, the hierarchies and the connections between them, completely masks the responsibility for the terrible violence that it occasions. As an example, consider the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Numerous civil wars have hindered development and humanitarian concern has focused on the incredible levels of violence. However, Nathan (2000) has pointed out that the violence is really a symptom of intrastate crisis that rests on structural conditions: authoritarian rule, weak national states that lack the capacity to manage normal conflict, the exclusion of minorities from governance, and economic deprivation. Under such conditions it is difficult to attain any degree of social justice, the rich live in guarded enclaves, riots are
commonplace, and criminal activity flourishes. Nathan argues that the international community should focus on building the skills and resources necessary for governance, the capacity of state structures to include minorities, and the promotion of economic growth rather than the imposition of economic policies that strengthen ruling hierarchies.

Typically, the causes of this intrastate crisis are seen in the historical legacy of colonialism and the cold war, the absence of good governance, and the lack of a positive environment for investment. However, Tandon (2000) points out that this view ignores the international structural violence that is also involved. External debt is crippling the economy of most of the African nations. To service the debt would require about 60% of the export revenue. Since this does not allow enough money for necessary imports of food, medicine, machinery, the debt increases each year. The debt burden creates a situation of scarce resources, a situation that fosters the destructive struggle for state power that characterizes African politics. Of course, one cause of the debt crisis is the corruption rampant in many African governments. However, this was obvious to the lenders many years ago. Why then did they actively encourage the loans?

Quite apart from the fact that a surplus of capital had to be invested somewhere, Tandon argues that the loans established a structure that required African nations to produce and export more and more raw materials in order to import less and less from the developed nations, a structure that enabled the rich natural resources of Africa to be exported at a fraction of the value they would have in a just economy. He argues that the poverty of Africa is created by the fact that the “free” market is not really free but dominated by monopolies that can demand agreements with African governments that are in the interests of elites and prevent the development of responsible nation states.
The nature of violence and its relationship to evil. While we have discussed both direct violence and the structural violence that can be attributed to greed and the fear of losing power, a considerable amount of violence on both the personal and state level is motivated by what can only be considered as “good” motives. As Butigan (1999, 13) points out, “Violence is often motivated by fear, unrestrained anger, or greed to increase domination or power over others. It can also be motivated by a desire for justice in the face of injustice: a longing to put things right, to overcome an imbalance of power, or end victimization or oppression.” This fact requires us to look at the nature of evil.

EVIL

While aggression and violence are largely matters of fact, evil involves a moral judgment. It is what is bad, and any who embrace it are in moral danger. What is meant by “evil”? Berkowitz (1999) argues that it is not simply the extreme end of what is “bad” but should be distinguished from mundane badness. He argues that there is a commonly shared prototype
for evil, that it reflects action that is not only morally wrong but reveals an excessive departure from social norms. The judgment of evil has to do with the helplessness of victims, the responsibility of the perpetrator, and the imbalance between the great wrong done to the victim and the relatively small gain of the perpetrator.

Staub (1999) argues that a conscious intention to destroy is not a necessary aspect of evil, and that the word is appropriately used to categorize the repetition of intensely harmful actions that are not commensurate with instigating conditions. He recognizes that the term communicates horror and, although he is opposed to romanticizing evil as mythic and incomprehensible, he considers that the concept of evil may be an useful way to mobilize pro-social group norms. As an example of evil and the need for the concept, Staub discusses the evil involved in bystanders allowing genocides to occur, and he points out that other nations stood by while the Rwandan genocide occurred. In fact, Stohl (1987) shows that nations are typically bystanders and that this is reflected in the minimal amount of news devoted to accounts of genocidal actions. The judgment that genocide is evil is reflected by the development of international norm against genocide, norms that may eventually be enforced by the establishment of a permanent international court to try war criminals.

Without the concept of evil it might be easy for people to ignore what is evil and avoid making judgments that need to be made. In this regard, Miller, Gordon, and Buddie, (1999) have evinced concern that situational explanations of criminal actions may result in persons condoning such actions. They demonstrate that when persons make judgments after situational explanations they have less unfavorable attitudes and punitive responses towards the perpetrator. However, the investigators do not show that the criminal action is condoned in any way and it
may be argued that it is the action rather than the person that should be considered evil. To consider a person or group as evil may evade an examination of the situational conditions.

Although psychologists are beginning to consider the concept of evil, they have not yet addressed it as an experience. For example, it seems clear that Berkowitz regards Hitler as evil and not as simply someone who exemplifies a prototype. Likewise Miller et. al appear to regard criminal acts as bad and not as simply construed as bad. That is, the concept of evil implies an objective judgment. Of course, some argue that values, what we perceive as good or bad, are really subjective and relative, simply what a person likes or wants. “Value” in this view is reduced to what someone is willing to pay. Yet we continue to experience value as existing apart from ourselves and as different from mere taste. As Heider (1958), suggests, value differs from what we want; rather it is characterized by what an objective order wants. That is we experience goodness and evil as objective in nature, as existing apart from our judgment of them, although we may recognize that our judgment may be faulty and may change with time. In the latter regard Rozin, Markwith, and Stoess (1997) point out that smoking has recently become moralized. That is, smoking is now regarded by many as “bad” in a moral sense, an object of disgust. Conversely, for many, homosexuality has become relatively normalized. It should be noted that the process of moralization or normalization involves emotional responses of disgust, horror, contempt, that help constitute the value that is perceived as objective.

Evil exists in relation to what is Good, and the latter is what is necessary for life, what is necessary for fertility, health, success getting food and outwitting enemies. In any society that is not completely secularized, Goodness clearly exists because humans exist and could not exist without it. Evil, however, is more problematic. While some persons and religions regard Evil as
essential and in primary opposition to the Good, others view it as secondary and existing because of the actions of humans, and still others as illusory, as only existing as an object of our perception. Likewise, the relationship between Good and Evil may be seen in different ways. Evil may be viewed as malevolent force or as ignorance, as repellant to Goodness or as the simple absence of Goodness. Thus, it may be symbolized as an active Devil or as darkness, as destructive choice or as the obstacles between humans and Goodness. Ricoeur (1967) points out that humans have symbolized evil in three quite different ways that reflect different experiences and conceptualizations, and Glazer (1986) has shown that representations of evil may be related to these symbols. As “stain,” evil is contagious and one may become contaminated by its impurity, quite without intention. The sort of magical thinking that is involved is illustrated by Rozin, Millman, and Nemeroff’s (1986) studies of how people are reluctant to drink juice that has come into contact with a sterilized roach, or wear the clean blouse of someone who is disliked. As “sin,” evil is a ruptured relationship with God, a departure from a path or missing of the mark, that may be affected by the actions of one’s people. As “guilt,” evil is a personal responsibility and occurs because of one’s intentions. In all cases, one is removed from Goodness and must be relived of the stain, sin, or guilt in order to reconnect with the source of life.

Heider (1991) argues that in some cultures, the basic moral conflict of life is more between order and disorder than between good and evil. Thus, in Indonesian and Japanese films, the dominant concern appears to be the restoration of order rather than the triumph of the good over the bad. This may be related to a cultural tendency to see persons as more socially embedded than having individual autonomy so that the “villain” is not inherently bad but more
an agent of disorder who is easily welcomed back into the fold once order is restored. However, the restoration of order may often involve the recognition of evil and its removal. Thus, Wessells and Monteiro (2001) describe how boys who have been forced to become child soldiers and engaged in unjustified killings participate in purification ceremonies so that they can be reintegrated into the community.

Every society, and certainly our own, appears to have myths about evil, perhaps because we humans seem to need to give meaning to our suffering.

In Western society, Ricoeur (1967) has distinguished four such myths that continue to influence our thinking: the Greek tragic and Platonic myths, and the Babylonian and Judaic creation myths. Each views the source of evil quite differently. In the tragic myth, the gods cause suffering by working through the weakness of humans (possessing humans in the manner contemporarily described by neo-Jungians such as Hillman, 1989). In fact, Gould (1990) points out that the “pathos” of tragedy meant a god-caused undeserved suffering and that this was what led Plato to ban tragedy from his ideal Republic. For Plato believed that persons were responsible for their own happiness and the Platonic myth portrays a Reality apart from the world we ordinarily perceive and persons as responsible for contacting this Reality. (To account for the catharsis of tragedy, Gould argues a sort of reversal of Lerner’s (1980) just world hypothesis: Because we cannot believe that our own suffering is unmerited, a part of us wants to believe in the possibility of unmerited suffering. The catharsis of tragedy is a cleansing from this irrational guilt.)

A related contrast is provided by the creation myths. In the Babylonian myth, the world is created in the process of a power struggle between the gods, violence is used to create the
order that prevents the agony of chaos, and humans must serve the state in order to prevent
chaos. By contrast, in the Judaic-Christian myth a God peacefully creates an essentially good
world with evil entering when people do what they are not supposed to do. Both of these myths
are operative in our contemporary society. On the one hand, Wink (1992) points out that much of
the violence portrayed on TV exemplifies the Babylonian myth. That is, there is a power struggle
between bad chaotic forces and good order and the good guys use violence to restore order.
Likewise the strategic policy of the (putatively Christian) United States is actually based on the
use of violence to maintain peace. On the other hand, the nation as a whole still subscribes to
Judaic-Christian ideals of justice and believes in the freedom to choose between good and evil.

The ambiguous role of religion. Taking Otto’s (1923) idea of the Holy, as a starting
point, Appleby (2000) argues that the sacred can either be the locus of violence as a sacred duty
or a militant nonviolence dedicated to peace. Defining religion as a response to a reality that is
perceived as sacred, he shows that it gives the authority to kill or to heal, and argues that
religious leadership determines which course is taken, appealing to religious identity to either
exploit or transcend ethnic animosities. On the one hand, Appleby shows how religion was an
important element in the destruction of Bosnia and the development of Islamic terrorism. He
distinguishes fundamentalism as a response to secularization (describing the terrorist violence
that developed in 2 of 10 such movements) from the ethnonationalistic use of religion (and often
violence) to unify a state, and discusses how both differ from cult violence. (Although Appleby
discusses the role played by fundamentalist religious ecstasy he fails to discuss its role in
impulse control.) On the other hand, he gives concrete examples of dozens of Ghandi like figures who have worked for peace, and discusses the role religious organizations have played in peace meditations. On the one hand, we see the disastrous involvement of religion in the genesis of the troubles in Northern Ireland. On the other, we learn how dozens of local peace groups helped build a civil consensus for the political accords that were finally achieved. Appleby convincingly demonstrates that religion is always a construction of a sacred past and has the potential to inculcate nonviolence as the religious norm. He argues that religious education should be devoted to this end and supported with the technical skills and material resources necessary to organize and negotiate, and form transnational networks.

The choice between good and evil is central to Fromm’s (1955, 1973) analysis of evil. He points out that human beings, as distinct from all other animals, are aware of themselves as apart from nature and others, aware of powerlessness, ignorance and death. This existential dilemma creates needs common to all humans. Fromm details five: A need for a frame of orientation and object of devotion that will elevate the individual beyond isolated existence and provide meaning; affective ties that root humans to one another; the establishment of a sense of unified identity; some sense of effectiveness; and sufficient stimulation and excitation. He argues that these needs must be met but that each can be met in either life enhancing or life destroying ways. The object of devotion can be an ideal or an idol, affective ties can be ones of love or sadomasochism, unity can be achieved by practicing an open religion or by losing the self in a trance state or a social role, effectiveness by creating or destroying, stimulation by active or passive excitation. It is these choices that Fromm sees as determining whether a society and individual will become good or evil.
While Fromm emphasizes the role of choice in determining how to meet basic needs, both Staub (1999) and Burton (1990) see evil as stemming from the frustration of basic needs such as security, identity, and connective ties to others, effectiveness, control, and autonomy. They regard such needs as demanding satisfaction and believe that if persons cannot fulfill them constructively they will engage in destructive behavior. The positive aspect of such an analysis lies in our understanding some of the conditions that promote destructive behavior in those who lack ways to fulfill basic needs and in encouraging those with power to consider the needs of others. However, the emphasis on need fulfillment appears to neglect the role of personal responsibility and the fact that a goodly amount of violence stems from greed. Hence, it postulates a liberal view of basic human goodness (if only needs were met by the state) as opposed to a conservative view that sees everyone as basically selfish (and needing the state to enforce law and order).

Fromm, Staub, and Burton begin their analyses with the needs of individuals. In contrast, Macmurray (1961) argues that humans only exist in relationships with others. He sees these relations as composed of two strands: A love (caring) for the other and a fear (concern) for the self. Although both strands are always present, one always dominates. When a caring for the other dominates the person is unified. However, any real or perceived hurt, betrayal, abandonment, causes the fear for the self to become dominate and when this occurs a person suffers dualistic splits (mind from body, reason from emotion, the practical from the ideal, the self from the other). At this point a person (or society) may either focus on individualism (“if the other doesn’t care for me I’d better care for myself”) or a conforming collectivism (“if I’m good then they will care for me”). Since people assume others are similar, the former leads to a
Hobbsian analysis (the need for a strong state to enforce contracts between basically selfish people) while the latter leads to Rousseau, Marx, and the idea that people are basically good and will agree about basic needs. For Macmurray, however, people must continually wrestle with the choice as to whether caring for the other or concern for the self will dominate action. In his view, self development only occurs, when acceptance, understanding, forbearance, forgiveness, leads to the restoration of the dominance of caring for the other. Then, a person’s unity is restored and, with it, the ability for genuine freedom and cooperation. Whether or not one agrees with Macmurray’s analysis it must be noted that he provides a sophisticated, comparative, account of values (See de Rivera, 1989).

How may we relate the behavior of aggression to values of good and evil? In an attempt to distinguish between a “good” aggressive audacity, necessary for human progress and implicit in the second definition of aggression given in the introduction to this chapter, and an aggression that intends to destroy, George Kelly (1965) proposes that it is hostility that is involved in the latter. He sees hostility as occurring when there is a threat to a person’s belief system, as an extortion of evidence, an attempt to maintain one’s beliefs and the way that one is living one’s life in the face of evidence that the beliefs are not true, the way of life not working. For an example we might consider the middle class Germans who became Nazi’s. Kelly might assert that they were not simply frustrated by inflation. Rather they saw their belief system, their commitment to the value of hard work and thrift, crumple as the savings from their hard work were wiped away by the inflation (See Moore, 1978). To try and maintain their belief system they cast about for excuses, extorted evidence, became hostile to Jews, in an attempt to maintain their investment in their way of life. It is important to note that Kelly does not see hostility as an
inevitable response to a threat to a belief system. There are alternatives. For Kelly, the
alternative was to allow the experience of tragedy, and it was this experience, rather than the
certainty that one’s beliefs were valid that was the basis of hope.

Kelly’s analysis is supported by aspects of Peck’s (1983) examination of the “group evil”
involved in the Mylai massacre. On one level, Peck points out that it is easier for groups to
commit atrocities because of the diffusion of responsibility involved in group specialization, and
in norms to cover up for other group members, particularly when people regress under stress, are
desensitized to suffering, and subjected to the normal narcissistic influences of group pride and
out group denigration. However, on a societal level, Peck argues that the group that killed
innocent villagers manifested a broader problem. The platoon involved contained men who had
been rejected from the broader society to do the dirty work that others did not want to see. The
war itself was an attempt to defend a narcissistic image of American perfection and, when the
situation in Vietnam presented evidence of the fallibility of the American world view, the
government was willing to destroy Vietnam rather than acknowledge this error. As a further
example of this unwillingness, he points out that the research that was recommended to prevent
future atrocities was rejected on the grounds that it might prove embarrassing.

The unwillingness to admit the tragic is an aspect of refusing to acknowledge evil, and
Macmurray (1944) argues that a major problem is posed by the fact that one may do what one
ought to do and yet still be involved in evil. As example, he personally felt that it was necessary
for Britain to use violence to combat Nazi Germany and, as a British citizen, he was morally
required to participate. However, thousands of innocent Germans were killed in the ensuing war
and his correct action did not absolve him from participating in that evil. Note that a person
holding such a point of view is protected from the sort of dissonance reduction that is involved when a person hurts another and then justifies the aggression by devaluing the other. This suggests that public ceremonies of atonement might protect a society from becoming involved in any more evil than necessary. Perhaps if Americans had the opportunity to mourn the deaths of all the Koreans and Chinese they killed in the Korean war there would have been less readiness to become involved in Viet Nam.

In any case it seems desirable to confront the evil that is both outside and within. Such a confrontation leads us to examine how it might be possible to create peace.

PEACE

By peace we do not mean the “negative” peace that is the absence of war but a “positive” peace” (Barash, 1991), that is the opposite of evil, not the absence of conflict but the resolution of conflict in creative rather than destructive ways. We may imagine different aspects to this peace: The personal peace of inner harmony and compassion, the communal peace that exists when social norms and institutions promote a concern for the welfare of others and the peaceful resolution of conflict, and the peace that results from an environment that allows people to satisfy their basic needs. At least four different paths to peace have been proposed and we shall examine the merits and problems of each. They are the paths of: strength, negotiation, justice, and personal transformation.
Peace Through Strength.

It is said that the sword is the olive leaf’s brother, and it seems self evident that weakness invites attack while strength discourages it. Bullies pick on the insecure, criminals flourish in the absence of police, and history is filled with one people expanding at the expense of another: the conquest of Quito by the Shiris, of the Shiris by the Incas, of the Incas by the Spanish, etc. Few would argue against the idea that some sort of strength is necessary for peace, and some, like Sumner (1911) would argue that peace is only attained by the imposition of order that occurs when states use their strength to expand their dominion. However, there are some problems with conventional interpretations of this path or with relying upon it to produce positive or even negative peace. Empirically, Singer and Small’s (1979) statistics, examining 59 recent wars, fail to show a significant relationship between strength and the probability of being attacked.
Consider three problems:

First, it is not clear how much strength is sufficient to provide a sense of security. Surveys repeatedly show that a majority of the American public feels secure against foreign attack and favor nuclear disarmament (Kay, 1998), and in 1997 United States military expenditures were 172% of all its possible enemies combined (Council Livable World Education Fund, 1998). However, the federal government that is responsible for defense continues to spend far more than appears necessary (Defense Monitor, 2000). In part the excess funding is due to economic pressure from the military-industrial complex (Fogarty, 2000), the need to maintain a weapons industry, and the desire to export weapons to maintain a favorable balance of trade, but to a large extent the extraordinary funding seems driven by an underlying insecurity that was not present before the beginning of the Cold War. There are several interesting aspects to this insecurity. For one thing it is unclear exactly what is being “defended.” It clearly is not simply U.S. territory or resources important to national interests. It is something much broader, whatever is seen as important to U.S. interests, or simply U.S. dominance. For another, those responsible for defense want to maintain more defense industry than seems necessary and appear to want overwhelming superiority so that no American lives will be lost. Finally, and perhaps most important, politicians appear to be afraid of losing elections if they are charged with being soft on defense, and it is true that whenever foreign policy issues are focal in an election, the Presidential candidate who is perceived as stronger wins the election {Insert reference}. Hence, in spite of a public who says it is secure and wants peace, it appears to feel insecure and to believe the Babylonian creation myth discussed above.

Second, if we assume the week will be attacked, the obvious converse is that the strong
will expand and attack. Hence, those who build strength become involved in using power to impose their will, and when this is resisted they attack. In fact, this is exactly what appears to be true of the United States.

Third, when two powers come into conflict with each other they each build strength so the other will not dominate them, and the resulting conflict is simply more deadly. History gives us Athens vs. Sparta, Rome vs. Carthage, The United States vs. The Soviet Union, and dozens of other examples, and we saw earlier that structural changes in conflict spirals often have disastrous outcomes. In the future we may witness a race to dominate space weaponry.

These problems have given rise to two quite different solutions: The development of nonviolent defense systems, and the strengthening of the United Nations so that it would begin to function as a world government with an international police force.

Nonviolent defense.

Nonviolent defense may not be as impracticable as one might imagine. There are effective nonviolent self-defense forms such as Aikido and Tai Chi, in which the defense maintains a calm center of gravity and takes advantage of the momentum of an attack and the fact that the attacker is likely to be unbalanced in order to gain control of the attack and turn it aside (Ueshiba, 1921). There are forms of community policing in which the community prevents violence by maintaining civilized norms (Wilson & Kelling, 1989), and Canada (1995) has called for the use of unarmed peace officers trained and organized by local colleges. Finally, there are many examples of the successful use of nonviolent resistance against dictatorial governments. Sharp (1973) has published the results of an historical survey that carefully examines the methods and dynamics of nonviolent action to influence political decisions. He
gives specific examples of 198 techniques that have been used ranging from public assemblies and marches, through boycotts and strikes, to noncooperation, civil disobedience, and the establishment of alternative structures of government, including successful uses against the Russian and British empires, the Nazi’s, Latin American dictators, and the Soviet Union.

Sharp is pragmatically oriented, has examined when such resistance has worked and when it has failed, analyzed the factors that make such resistance possible, and distinguished between situations conducive and in conducive to nonviolent resistance. Relative power is not as important as one might imagine. The contest is really one of wills and a central factor is the cohesiveness of the nonviolent group and the ability to maintain communications so that tactics can be adopted to the changing situation. The aggressor must weigh costs and gains. To the extent that the non-cooperation is successful gains are minimal unless the territory is being held for reasons of defense or resources. Costs include the money necessary to maintain military forces, labor and a bureaucracy, and the cost of internal and external public opinion. As long as resistance can be maintained there is a constant drain of resources that argues for negotiation. However, if geography permits the aggressor to forcibly replace populations he may succeed in achieving his goals. Even from the point of view of some nation-states, the organization of a civilian defense system may be the most viable way to defend national interests Sharp, 1990).

Although civilian defense may be an alternative to military might, it may be argued that any defense that is organized by the state will be used to maintain structural violence. Citizens give the state a monopoly of violence so that it may maintain order and curb crime. And it may be argued that a democratically run state succeeds in having adequate police control and adequate control over its police. However, from an anarchist standpoint, states, at least nation
states based on centralized power, commit far more violence than their citizens do. Hence, Martin (1984) argues that working with state systems will never abolish war because states themselves are the problem. His anarchist solution is to use grassroots strategies to build alternative institutions to the state and its existing bureaucracies. Such institutions would include worker-managed businesses, participatory community councils, the conversion of military production, and the replacement of military defense systems with social defense tactics. It does seems clear that small communities can encourage cooperation and participation and discourage violence. The question is whether it is possible to achieve coordination between such communities in the context of modern society so that a centralized hierarchal order would not be needed. An alternative solution is to develop some sort of a world state.

**Developing the United Nations.** To some extent we already have the rudiments of a democratic world police force. The United Nations forces have been engaged in over 50 missions. These have included the monitoring of elections, the provision of the international police presence needed after civil turmoil, the maintenance of buffer zones between former combatants, and armed interventions needed to prevent extensive civilian casualties.

Clearly the last case, armed interventions, is the most problematic form of intervention. Studies of the military interventions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti (Weiss, 1999) have attempted to assess the degree of the civilian costs incurred before intervention, the cost of military intervention, and the civilian benefits of the intervention. Weiss discusses the quandaries faced by those hoping to use military forces to achieve humanitarian assistance and recommends careful “conflict impact assessment” before attempting to use
military force in situations where a presence is not desired by both sides to the conflict.

Although many problems are posed by military intervention once armed conflict has erupted, it may be argued that to have the possibility of military intervention may be helpful in influencing decisions in the early stages of a conflict that threatens to degenerate into military struggle. This is the position taken by Jentleson (2000) in his analysis of the possibilities of preventative diplomacy. He argues that the parties to a conflict are often driven to military action by the uncertainty of a situation where the other side may strike first. In such situations diplomacy, with the possibility of intervention and rewards may be used to influence the calculus of whether to attack or negotiate. The participants in the volume edited by Jentleson present 10 cases where preventative diplomacy either succeeded in averting potential disaster (as in the Baltics and North Korea), or missed opportunities (as in Chechnya and Yugoslavia). They discuss the use, and failure to use, of intelligence, the strategy of using mixes of deterrents, inducements and reassurances, and the necessity for fast action.

Unfortunately, fast action is currently limited by the fact that there is no permanent UN military force so that each UN action requires the new recruitment of troops, equipment, and money from whatever nations are willing to donate (Holt, 1995). It would be easy to create a small standing force but the major powers are reluctant to set a precedent and begin an international force that could conceivably challenge their military preeminence. Since the United States has a veto power in the Security Council that must concur in the use of any UN forces, an interesting psychological problem is posed by why conservative representatives feel the need to maintain tight national control by blocking any permanent UN forces. This need for the maintenance of control is an interesting psychological problem that is also manifested in the
reluctance to endorse a nuclear test ban treaty or an international criminal court for war crimes.

The establishment of a budget is an important tool for the setting of priorities and the United States government has been criticized for allocating about $300 billion, or 50% of its discretionary budget, for military expenditures. Hence, it is interesting to imagine the items needed for a UN disarmament budget and to see how much money would be required. Renner (1995) has prepared such a budget, estimating expenditures for demining, the demobilization of troops, reparation of refugees, disarmament expenses, base closures, the conversion of military industry, peacekeeping operations, and an international court. In 1994, the world’s governments spent about $16 billion on these items, about 2% of their military expenditures, and far less than needed. Renner proposes that the needed funds could come from asking nations to contribute a percentage of their military budgets.

A more ambitious positive peace “budget” has been estimated by the World Games Institute (1997). Pointing out that it required about a third of a billion dollars to eradicate smallpox from the world, they estimate that over a ten year period, it would require about $2 billion to remove land mines, about $5 billion to eliminate illiteracy, $10 billion to provide safe drinking water, $19 billion to eliminate starvation and malnutrition, $21 billion to provide health care and control AIDS. When all such desirable projects are considered it would require the enormous sum of about $234 billion a year for ten years--about 30% of what the world’s governments spend on their military forces each year. Although we lack data on the public acceptance of such figures it is not difficult to imagine that most of the public, and even a majority of politicians, would prefer to see military expenditures used for pro-social endeavors. Such exercises raise interesting psychological questions along with the practical question of
whether it might be possible for candidates to develop political support for such a redirection of priorities (although any real attempt in such a direction might first depend on the public financing of campaigns).

Peace Through Negotiation.

Instead of regarding the other as an enemy it is often possible to search for mutual gains, and trade has often been an alternative to war. While “horse trading” has been known for millenniums there have been a number of advances in the tactics and strategies of negotiation. One promising approach that has been advanced by Fisher and Ury (1981) is “principled” negotiation. Rather than either strongly maintaining a bargaining position or softly compromising in order to maintain a valued relationship, they argue that one should search for the interests that underlie the bargaining positions. The negotiator than attempts to create a solution that meets the interests of both parties and attempts to find objective criteria that can be used to determine what is fair. They advise focusing on the problem and being insistent on meeting underlying interests, but flexible as to position and soft on the other as person, and give
examples of when not to negotiate and how to deal with unprincipled negotiators.

While principled negotiation is a practical approach that can often be used, it assumes that the conflict to be negotiated is essentially a conflict about interests. However, some conflicts involve past wounds, different values, and the very identities of the parties to the conflict. This is often true when ethnic conflicts are involved. The Israelis and Palestinians, for example do not simply have conflicting interests concerning security and sovereignty, but issues about the identity of the Jewish and Palestinian peoples. To deal with these sorts of conflicts, Burton (1990) has advanced a form of “transformative” negotiation in which the negotiating process deals with the sharing of underlying needs and identities as well as interests. Such negotiations require a deeper level of trust and, when successful, involve a transformation of identities so that definitions that reflect enmity or involve devaluations of the other are no longer aspects of identity. A discussion of such needs may be helpful in intractable conflicts. For example, Cross and Rosenthal (1999) randomly paired 20 Jewish and 20 Arab students to discuss the dispute over the control of Jerusalem., and contrasted different methods of negotiation. Participants who used a method in which they identified needs and fears about identity, recognition and security before they attempted to generate ideas for mutual satisfaction, became less pessimistic about the conflict and showed a more positive attitude change towards the other. In order to deal with the pain and shame of past injuries and the conflicts between identity needs, Rogers and Ryback (1984) and Kellman (1996) have used “problem-solving” workshops in which people may share underlying pains, fears, and needs. In the approach used by Rogers and Ryback, a facilitator models the role of respectfully listening and accepting the initial hostility expressed by both parties. Without the accepting presence of the mediator, the hostility would be responded to
defensively, but the authors write that after the mediator accepts the hostility, the underlying pain is expressed and this is responded to sympathetically. (This approach should be contrasted with the reframing of hostile statements in couples therapy, in order to avoid shame-hostility cycles, which is advocated by Scheff, 1999.)

Kellman’s workshops are carefully structured in ways that lead both parties to share their underlying needs. Since political leaders are usually hindered by the demands of their position and constituency, Kellman attempts to work with opinion leaders and those who may come into political power in the future. These workshops are quite effective in getting participants to understand and empathize with opposing views. However, the participants are then confronted with the problem of explaining their new tolerance to their compatriots in ways that avoid an accusation of being traitors. From my, outsider, perspective it appears that these sorts of workshops need to occur between the liberal and conservative parties within the opposing sides of a conflict. It would be fascinating to see the extent to which transformative negotiation could be used to arrive at creative solutions to the sort of classic problems that have divided political parties. One wonders, for example, if problem solving workshops could have avoided the enmity that erupted between Hamilton and Madison and preserved the Federalist ideal of avoiding political parties.

Of course, political parties are themselves a creative invention to manage conflict. However, both parties and the related idea of a division of power require a sophisticated public that understands ideas such as a loyal opposition, minority rights, and division of responsibility. The evidence suggests that many people have not developed an understanding of these ideas, and that they should be taught to a much greater extent than is now the case. {Insert reference}
Differences in values are usually expressed in the rhetoric of political parties and typically are debated by having opponents state their conflicting views and then rebut the views of their opponent as both attempt to create a rhetoric that will influence third parties and capture their support. However, Rapoport (1960) has advocated another strategy, which he believes, is more apt to produce creative solutions and minimize devaluation of the opponent. He suggests that each opponent should state the *others* point of view until the other agrees that it has been correctly presented. Then, rather than rebutting the others view, he advocates creating ways to *agree* with the other’s view, not by role playing the other side but by honestly finding points of agreement. He points out that any statement has a region of validity. Thus, if the other says, “11+2 is 1,” a person may respond by agreeing to the extent that one is referring to clock time. Preliminary studies (de Rivera, 1968) have shown that the technique is useable, and it would be interesting to see if it could be used to create acceptable public policies for divisive issues such as legalized abortion.

When a negotiation between parties can be arranged it is more successful than third party mediation. Jackson (2000) studied 295 conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 1995 and found 1,154 negotiation efforts, with 47% success (82% lasting more than 8 weeks), and 1,666 mediations, with 39.4% success (51.7% lasting). Of course, mediation is probably more often attempted when the level of hostility is high and interferes with negotiation, but it seems clear that third parties should first encourage direct negotiation. When hostility is high there are innovative approaches to conflict management that stress the use of third parties as go-betweens. Galtung and Tschudi (2001) argue that when emotions hinder the ability of conflicting parties to dialogue with one another, it is often possible to create better dialogue with neutral conflict
workers who can then work separately with the conflicting parties to create a solution that transcends deep differences. Patai (1973) points out that in Arabic cultures a mutually respected third party may be used to request solutions that conflicting parties can grant out of generosity and respect, without appearing to give in to the other party with whom they are in conflict, and Pedersen (2001) reminds conflict workers that collectivistic cultures may manage conflicts in ways that are substantially different from those favored in the West.

Negotiation is being increasingly used to settle civil disputes and, in the future it may be increasingly used in criminal cases. Zehr (1990) has convincingly argued that many crimes rupture human relationships and that it is these relationships that need to be repaired. Currently, crime is viewed as contrary to the state and the state punishes an offender (who is made into a “criminal,” who often attempts to avoid responsibility by offering a defense) and largely ignores the victim. Zehr suggests that, as an alternative, the state ask the victim if he or she would like to meet the offender and see what the offender could do to restore the human relationship between them. Studies of trial programs of such “restorative justice” have found that about 50% of victims want to meet the person who wronged them, that it is usually possible to negotiate a way to restore the human relationship, and that in such cases there is much less recidivism. Justice has been attained nonviolently, by restoration rather than retribution.
Peace Through Justice.

There are times when repressive forces are so strong that a completely unjust “peace” may exist for years. However, situations inevitably change and when opportunities for protest arise, rebellion and revolution occur, unfortunately often killing many who opposed the injustice that existed. Yet the path of peace through justice is much more than an attempt to stave off violent revolution. It is an attempt to achieve a positive peace, a fundamentally just world.

Justice is a complex topic. It can mean the rewarding of goodness, the retributive punishment of criminals, the just distribution of goods, or the procedural justice of a fair hearing or fair play. These justice concerns are interrelated and can be obtained in different ways. For example, people will put up with apparently unfair distributions as long as the procedure seems
fair (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and we have already noted that restorative rather than retributive justice is a more peaceful way of achieving criminal justice. Likewise distributive justice may be achieved in quite different ways. It may be achieved by distributing goods equally, or equitably in accordance with how much people have contributed, or by need. Which is a just distribution? Lerner (1975) has argued that the motive for justice develops from a personal contract with one’s self, and that the choice of what seems just will depend on the relationship between the people who are involved and whether the other is viewed as a person or as the occupant of a position. For example, when we are in an identity relationship, and empathize with the other as a person we will favor a justice of need. On the other hand, some of our desire for procedural justice may depend on concerns about our own group membership and status (Tyler & Lind, 1990).

In spite of the importance of justice it seems apparent to some of us that a good amount of injustice and structural violence exists. If there is a motive for justice why is it not stronger or more pervasive? Lerner (1980) has argued that a sort of paradox is involved. People want to believe that they live in a world that is fundamentally just. They are upset by injustice and will act to correct an unjust situation if they think that is possible. Unfortunately, however, if they do not think they can correct an injustice, they may maintain their belief that the world is just by devaluing the victims of injustice. Since the undeserving do not deserve good things and bad things happen to bad people “justice” prevails.

In a sense, perceiving this world as just is a sort of idealism that seems out of touch with the reality of injustice. A different way of living with injustice is the alienated practicality of those who see injustice as fundamental and cynically abandon any ideals. These solutions are an example of the splitting that, according to Macmurray (1961), occurs when a concern for the self
dominates our relations with others. By contrast, when caring dominates persons are able to live with the tension between the ideal of justice and the reality of injustice, managing it in the way Lewin (1942) characterized as high morale.

The conflict between those desiring justice and those resisting it by devaluating victims could be achieved by negotiation. However, peace through negotiation can only occur if parties are willing to negotiate and there are many situations in which people with property and power do not wish to negotiate, particularly when oppression and exploitation is involved. Hence, the building of structural peace often requires creating social strain and disequilibrium (Montiel, 2001). Attempts at organization are often met with violence, and this may result in counter violence. Even when the oppressed succeed in using counter violence, it often happens that the success only replaces one system of exploitation by another. Knowing these facts and facing injustice within the context of the British colonialism led Gandhi to create his method of nonviolent resistance.

By nonviolence, literally satyagraha or “truth power”) Gandhi (1961) did not mean either passivity or the use of socially acceptable nonviolent tactics to coerce his opponent to give in. He meant asserting the truth as one saw it while being open to the perceptions of opponents and their interests, treating them with respect and attempting to convince them; accepting suffering rather than inflicting it or giving in to injustice. Inherent in his approach is the unity of means and end, and the unity of all life. While some have argued that his methods were coercive, Burrowes (1996, chp.7) establishes that he always attempted to change the heart of his opponent and that any coercion that existed was a coercion for a negotiation that could satisfy the needs of both parties. Several of his nonviolent campaigns have been described and evaluated by
Bondurant (1965), a general history of nonviolent methods and the dynamics of how they influence political decisions has been presented by Sharp (1973), and the psychology of nonviolence, in both its positive and problematic aspects, has been discussed by Pelton (1974). A recent history of nonviolent social movements since 1970 may be found in the volume by Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher (1999), and Sutherland and Meyer (2000) have contrasted the role played by both nonviolence and violence in the struggle for freedom and social justice in Africa.

Gandhi inspired the use of dozens of nonviolent actions throughout the world, including the civil rights actions of Martin Luther King, but it is often argued that his strategy would only be effective in circumstances with as humane an opponent as the British Empire. This contention is disputed by Burrowes (1996), who like Gandhi, argues for nonviolence on principled grounds (in contrast to Sharp’s, 1990, more pragmatic approach. He reminds his readers that nonviolent protests were effective against Soviet troops in Poland and a number of South American dictators, and that when a violent approach was used in Kenya the “humane” British killed over 11,000 (in contrast to the relatively bloodless nonviolent struggle in Zambia). Further, Burroughs argues that a nonviolent strategy is necessary if one wishes to achieve a just peace without the use of the sort of hierarchical organization that results in the structural violence practiced by the state. He approaches nonviolence from the perspective of military strategy. As in von Clausewitz’s (1832/1976) analysis of war, Burroughs sees contests in terms of power and will and argues that nonviolence can always prevail by overcoming the opponent’s will. However, to maintain their own will, nonviolent practitioners must be creative and flexible, massing their forces to take advantage of their opponents weaknesses, willing to suffer losses but avoiding unfavorable circumstances. (In this regard he criticizes the Chinese protestors attempt to hold on
Peace Brigades International (PBI) provides an excellent example of current nonviolence in practice. This nonhierarchical organization furnishes unarmed volunteers who accompany human rights workers who are committed to nonviolence but have received death threats because of their work. Working in a nonpartisan way with government of the nation where atrocities are being committed, and backed by an international emergency response network that communicates with embassies throughout the world, PBI has been successful in the effort to open the political space essential for democracy. (See Mahony & Egeren, 1997). Building on such efforts, Hartsough and Duncan (2001) are attempting to organize a volunteer nonviolent global peace force that could be used in situations where unarmed peacekeepers could function as neutral observers.

Peace Through Personal Transformation.

Although each of the above paths towards peace have merit, it may be argued that to correctly follow any of them requires a sort of personal development that can only be called transformational. This is, perhaps, most clear in the person who commits to Gandhi’s path of nonviolent action and develops a willingness to suffer rather than inflict injury as he or she acts to further justice. However, it is also required in the negotiator who develops an ability to acknowledge shame and refuses to allow egoistic needs to interfere with the skillful conduct of a negotiation, or the practitioner of defense who remains centered and balanced in dealing with a situation of potential violence, the type of self required if we are to have a more peaceful world (de Rivera, 1989). Forming such a self constitutes another path towards peace that takes personal
transformation as its means. Rather than focusing on strength, negotiation or justice, it emphasizes the development of an inner peacefulness that may spread outward to influence the conduct of others. Following such a path is exemplified by people such as the American woman known as Peace Pilgrim (1982), and the Vietnamese monk Thich Nhat Hanh (1991).

Peace Pilgrim, who walked across the United States numerous times in a pilgrimage for peace, was completely committed to the idea that there was good in every person and that this goodness would respond to the love which she projected. Her honest and unpretentious manner, and the ways she handled the charge that she was naive, affected many whom she met, and earned a devoted following who have published her words and have freely distributed them to thousands who have found her philosophy a useful guide in leading a peaceful life. Thich Nhat Hanh, who helped thousands of refugees and has established a number of meditation centers, is completely committed to living in the sacredness of each moment and developing a compassion for all human being. They, along with dozens of other activists who have published accounts, and hundreds of less well known activists, have dedicated their lives to a practical living of nonviolence which they assume will influence the people around them and gradually create an atmosphere of peace that will affect the communities in which they live and, eventually, national policy. Although there are numerous anecdotal accounts of the sorts of effects they have generated, there has been little systematic study of their influence. One exception may be found in Sorokin’s (1954) classic work. Another is the study conducted by Dillbeck, Banus, Polanzi, and Landrith (1988) showing decreases in city crime rates following the introduction of meditation groups. While there are obvious methodological difficulties, it would seem worthwhile to study the presumed spread of peacefulness created by people who have committed
themselves to living in nonviolent ways.

The personal transformations involved in the development of nonviolence may either be examined in the context of character development or in contexts designed to use the imagination to promote the development of peaceful action.

**Character Development.** Although the public is only acquainted with a few well known peace activists, there are many persons who have risked or devoted their lives to working for peace and justice and one may ask how such commitment develops. Oliner and Oliner’s (1988) inquiry into the background of people who risked helping Jews during the Holocaust reveals a family background which combined both warmth and caring within the family with the welcoming of people from different groups into the family. Although not contradictory, Coles’ (1986) study of the moral development of children emphasizes the moral choices that occur in particular situations. Both these factors seem important in Hannon’s (1990) study of a sample of 21 Boston peace activists. He found that many had some sort of religious socialization that provided a moral basis that was challenged by radicalizing college experiences. He argues that an identity crisis that, in part, could be understood in terms of Erikson’s (1963) fifth stage, in which the adolescent seeks an ideology that can be affirmed by peers and define what is good and evil. However, in these activists the resolution of the crisis also involved a transition to Kohlberg’s (1973) post-conventional moral reasoning, and Fowler’s (1981) transition from conventional to individualistic/reflective faith. This was often influenced by one or more adults who served as a sort of sponsor to the new identity which usually also involved participation in a network of like minded peers. Hannon’s sample was small and limited but his analysis is suggestive. Colby & Damon, 1999) in their study of 28 moral exemplars, report that the exemplars did not begin as
exceptional people but became increasingly caring as their goals were transformed as they interacted with others. They found that the exemplars were characterized by an absence of conflict between selfish and moral goals. In accord with Macmurray’s (1951) conceptualization, the absence of the more typical split between self vs. other, coincided with a faith in the eventual triumph of Goodness for humanity.

**The use of imagination.** Elise Boulding (1988) has pointed out that action is guided by a vision of the future and that many people lack a vision of what a peaceful world would be like. (In fact, in my own experience, students find it much easier to imagine alien abductions than a peaceful world.) Accordingly, she has experimented with workshops in which people are asked to imagine a future world that is peaceful. She has found that such a world needs to be placed about 30 years in the future so that it seems possible yet not too remote. After imagining some of the details of a peaceful world (which often involve small cooperative work communities, natural beauty, music and art), participants are asked to imagine the steps that enabled such a world to come into being and, finally, to come up with a plan for the steps they might personally take. It is not yet clear whether participation in such workshops has a measurable effect on action.
Working from a neo-Jungian perspective, Watkins (1988) postulates that the imagination needed to work for peace is checked by a conflict with other aspects of the self. She asks persons to imagine the part of them that wants to work for peace and to construct a character to represent that part (Is it a man or a woman, rich or poor, how old, how dressed?). Similarly, persons create a character to represent the part of them that has other interests and things to do. Watkins postulates that it is the relationship between these characters that governs whether or not a person’s energy is available for peace work. Accordingly, she asks her subjects to imagine the two characters meeting each other and attempts to structure these meetings so that the two accept rather than reject one another. Preliminary evidence suggests that when a person is able to imagine a friendly meeting between these different parts of the self, the person is more likely to engage in actions that promote peace. Macy (1983) uses the imagination in still other ways in the workshops she has created to deal with the despair that she believes prevents many persons from taking action to stop the use of nuclear weapons. After exercises designed to help persons feel and express pain and despair, she involves participants in empowering exercises. For example, persons may be asked to imagine themselves before they were born, looking at earth and deciding to help. They choose a particular time to be born, a nation and family to be born into, a specific gender and personality, all so they could do a particular action for peace. Now it is time for them to remember why they made the choices they did. What are they here to do? Although Macy’s workshops have clear immediate effects, we lack data on how they affect long-term commitments.
The Development of Cultures of Peace.

Each of the four paths towards peace may be seen as ways to develop cultures of peace that could replace the cultures of violence that exist in many contemporary societies. Although such a goal is idealistic it is not unrealistic. Peaceful cultures have existed in the past, and there are small peaceful cultures that exist today. An examination of such cultures reveals a number of interesting characteristics. Bonta’s (1993) annotated bibliography describes over 60 traditional peoples and contemporary sub-cultures. Although they differ in many ways they all emphasize cooperative rather than competitive relationships, they dislike power and downplay individual recognition and wealth, have many ways to prevent and resolve conflict, value group harmony over abstract concepts of justice, and think of themselves as essentially peaceful.
Ross (1993), who has contrasted the extent of conflict in a sample of 90 pre-industrial societies, shows that the level of conflict is related to socialization practices. Cultures without much conflict tend to place a high value on children, are high in warmth and affection, and low in male gender identity conflict. These psycho-cultural roots of peace are orthogonal with the way a society is structured, and Ross shows that the extent to which aggression is directed out at external targets, rather than expressed within the society, depends on the extent to which their are strong cross-cutting interest ties within the society.

Turning to modern societies, the Peace Forum’s (2000) sophisticated index of the peacefulness of contemporary nations is based on measures of external and internal conflict, and measures of domestic justice. The index reveals the relative peacefulness of the developed but small nations such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Portugal, as contrasted with many of the less developed nations and the relative violence of the powerful permanent members of the Security Council (the United States ranks 51st among the 74 nations for which data is available). The people of these smaller nations may feel more secure because their life is more predictable. People can trust one another and their social institutions (Fogarty, 2000). They may find it easier to accept the need for the mutual obligations and responsibilities stressed by Hearn (1997).

Although powerful societies are often relatively violent, Boulding (2000) has described how there are always many peaceful elements mixed in with the violent components. In religion for example, there is the idea of a holy war, but also the image of the peaceful garden. And it may be noted that after the putatively Islamic terrorist attack on the United States, the President of Iran phoned the Pope to discuss the importance of Christian-Muslim dialogue (Catholic Free Press, 2001). Boulding argues that these peaceful elements make it possible to realistically
conceive of developing peaceful cultures in modern society.

How might we conceptualize what such cultures could be like? One way is to consider the transformations that would be involved in moving from the culture of violence to which many of us have become accustomed to a culture of peace. Adams and True (1997) have suggested that these transformations might be characterized as follows:

(1) The redefinition of power so that it was understood to involve joint problem solving and active nonviolence rather than the use of hierarchies that require violent domination.

(2) The mobilization of people and the attainment of solidarity by building relationships of understanding and trust between groups rather than having one group dominate another or by achieving solidarity by focusing on the defeat of a common enemy.

(3) The participation of all people in the decisions that affect their lives.

(4) The open sharing of information in the press and in civic society.

(5) The development and empowerment of the caring and nurturing qualities traditionally associated with the role of women.

(6) The development of a cooperative and sustainable (rather than exploitative) economy.

We may imagine a global culture of peace involving the above transformations along with an environment in which armaments were controlled and human rights were insured. Such a culture has been advocated by 20 Nobel Peace Laureates and promoted by UNESCO. To assist this development, the General Assembly of the United Nations has launched a decade of initiatives to achieve a culture of peace, and requested a progress report from the Secretary General (See Adams, 2000). Current research is attempting to develop indicators for the 8 aspects of such a culture so that it will be possible to assess progress towards its development.
Of course a global culture of peace both influences and is dependent upon the specific cultures of peace developed by different societies. Each nation has its own particular challenges and it seems clear that peace, like human rights, must be developed by a discourse between groups from within each society as these groups dialogue with groups from without (An-Na’im, 1992). The movement towards a culture of peace is the first social movement that includes nation states as well as people. However, progress towards its goal cannot depend on the initiative of those powerful states whose interest is in maintaining the status quo. Rather, the development of each of the components of cultures of peace will depend on the less powerful nations, and hundreds of grassroots initiatives by non-governmental organizations that are constructing the paths of peace described above. Each of these paths, along with an understanding of aggression, violence and evil, is critical to developing the aspects of peaceful culture:

International arms control and the maintenance of human rights require some system of international security. Given the current state of human development, this security must rest on the strength of some international authority that can take aggressive action when it is required, but whose violence is checked by a division of power and civilian control. Whenever that system of authority is reduced to the use of violent means this must be publicly acknowledged as an evil. Such an authority will only develop when the strengthening of emotional ties leads powerful nations to surrender their monopoly of violence. NATO and other regional forces are steps in this direction, and we may see a strengthening of UN Police Forces in an effort to control terrorism.

The challenges to achieving a consensus about international norms on terrorism involve
issues that must be aggressively negotiated. The path of negotiation, as well as an understanding of the structural changes that perpetrate conflict, is also involved in attempts to increase democratic participation, the sharing of information, and inter-group trust. The later rests on a mastery of transformative as well as principled negotiation. Such negotiation will be much easier if synergistic societal structures lead those who want power to meet the needs of those without it.

The transformation of hierarchies of power and the attainment of an equitable and sustainable economy require the development of justice by nonviolent action. The evil of structural violence can only be overcome by methods that make use of the creative use of aggression pioneered by Gandhi. This will require a learning of a different set of scripts and myths, heroes and heroines who overcome negative emotions and moral disengagement, the development of norms for intervening when violence occurs.

Gender equality and the development of the nurturance and caring that is required for domestic and civil peace will require personal transformations. This path will also be needed to develop the sense of security that constrains the desire for power of those in authority, to restrict the egoism that can hinder negotiation, and to develop the compassionate nonviolence needed to attain justice. These personal transformation need not depend solely on individual efforts. If a culture of peace develops, there will be ceremonies that remember all of the victims of war, a honoring of tragedy will replace claims of goodness, and signs will ask God to bless the world. These will help develop the sorts of persons required by the culture.