Love, Fear, and Justice: Transforming Selves for the New World

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Two current models of the self are contrasted. The limitations of these (egocentric autonomous and sociocentric organic) models generate five problems for a comprehensive approach to justice. An alternative model is presented that views the self as an agent who is dependent on others and is motivated by both love for the other and fear for the self. This alternative model has three advantages: The two current models can be derived from it; it resolves the problems created by their limitations; it provides a concrete vision of how we must develop ourselves if we wish to obtain a just world.

KEY WORDS: self; caring; fear; justice; morality; emotions.

INTRODUCTION

We live in a new world of immense promise and difficulty. Our technological advances give us the means to feed, clothe, and shelter billions of new human beings, to prolong health, to offer immeasurable opportunities for adventure, pleasure, meaningful work—joy and serenity for all. Yet we have hunger, homelessness, torture, and war. The very technology that has freed us has also led to economic conditions that splinter our communities, widen the gap between wealthy and poor, and is currently destroying entire cultures and our natural environment. Our new world requires new behavior, yet we persist in old patterns.

To eliminate world hunger, insure adequate water supplies, and home the homeless, would require the expenditure of at least $38 billion dollars and a degree of world cooperation and organization that taxes the imagination. Yet

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the governments of the world manage to spend that amount every 2 weeks on military expenditures. Rather than testing the innovative procedures for conflict resolution described by Rogers and Ryback (1984), the most powerful nation in the world is engaged in testing new nuclear weapons. If our new world is to survive, if it is to even approximate a degree of justice, it will require new people.

New People? How could such a thing be possible? What is meant by such an idea. Surely not a new species. Is it an idle metaphor for new behavior? No, I am referring to the fact that there is a growing consensus that the "self" is constructed as a person develops; that individuals in different cultures construct radically different types of selves, that the type of people described by Western psychology—relatively autonomous, self-bounded individuals who are primarily motivated by self-interest—is a somewhat misleading description of one possible people; and that it is quite possible to conceive of radically different sorts of persons than the ones produced by our current cultural forms (Geertz, 1979). In this paper I attempt to construct a functional model of the new people that are required by our new world.

By a "functional" model I mean a model that will not only provide a vision of the people we must become but will make clear what is involved in becoming such a people so that each of us can act in a way that will promote a just world rather than deny the injustice and suffering that exists. A good model may enable the ordinary person to achieve feats that seem unusual and even extraordinary. Thus, Austin (1974) demonstrated that while the average person cannot juggle nor easily discover how to juggle, if a person is given a good model of juggling, he or she may learn to juggle in minutes! The feat is difficult because most people have an incorrect model; they imagine that the balls travel in a circle, whereas in the most feasible sort of juggling they actually do not. Although becoming new people is a good deal more complex than juggling, both require an adequate model of the processes and products involved. (It is, of course, not sufficient. One must also practice.)

The model I propose is based on the ideas of a contemporary philosopher, the late John Macmurray, and attempts to relate these ideas to some of the recent empirical work of psychologists and anthropologists who are interested in the self, justice, and moral development. I attempt to articulate a model of personhood that not only describes what persons are like but also what persons might be. Such a model is an attempt to provide a vision of the sort of people we must become and at least the broad outlines of what we need to do to get from here to there.

Such an attempt is an admittedly speculative endeavor. It seeks to integrate the thinking of many different groups of investigators, attempts to transcend important cultural differences, assumes certain values, and calls for unfamiliar research paradigms. It involves many assumptions and while there
is evidence for some of these assumptions, others lack any empirical base whatever. It makes speculative jumps. It is, necessarily, a heuristic rather than an empirical model. I hope that it will be convincing for at least a few readers, a valuable stimulus for many others, and thought provoking for all. Its ultimate worth lies in whether it can serve as a guide for the research needed to help us become the people we must become if we are to survive in a just world.

Before describing this model it will be helpful to sketch our current conceptions of the self. In one sense, there are as many different selves as there are cultural constructions, and abstract models of the self oversimplify and run the danger of obscuring important and interesting distinctions. However, simplification is useful to the extent that it reveals important details that might otherwise be overlooked in the tangled mass of difference, and it seems apparent that there are two major varieties of people that have been described: the relatively autonomous individual so familiar to contemporary Western liberal culture, and the contrasting affiliative, "familial" self that describes many traditional and Eastern peoples (Roland, 1988). A parallel contrast has been made within Western culture between genders, with the dominant male conception of the self characterized by such terms as "individualism" and "concern for the principles of justice" and the dominant female conception of self characterized by such terms as "affiliation" and "caring" (Noddings, 1984). Finally, within any given person a motive for autonomy and separateness has been contrasted to a motive for homonony and intimacy (Angyal, 1941; Selman and Yeates, 1981). In the next section of this paper I examine these contrasting views of the self. Although I shall present caricatures rather than portraits I hope that the reader can recognize these views and sense that while one view may feel more "natural," neither is sufficient for today's world.

**TWO CURRENT MODELS OF THE SELF**

I begin by contrasting Western psychology's description of people with the descriptions of the people of China, India, and Japan. Then we contrast two different descriptions of the self within Western civilization. Finally, we shall see how these different people inhabit each of us. At the close of each of these sections I show how the contrasting descriptions pose problems for a comprehensive approach to justice and require an alternative view of the self.

**The Self in Different Cultures**

For those of us living in a culture that is imbued with "autonomous individualism," that emphasizes self-control, separation, and independence, it may
be difficult to grasp the inherently social character of the self (Lykes, 1985). Yet, the cross-cultural evidence cannot be denied: Each culture constitutes the self somewhat differently. Many have different conceptions of the self and most do not conceive persons to be autonomous individuals (cf. Geertz, 1979; Heelas and Lock, 1981; Sampson, 1989).

After surveying a number of different societies' ideas about the self, Schweder and LeVine (1984) propose two major alternative conceptualizations of the relationship between individual and society, "creations of the collective imagination" of different peoples. The world view which most Westerners live they call the "ego-centric contractual." They argue that it is cultivated by child-rearing practices that teach the importance of privacy and choice, the rights to a body, mind, and space of one's own. In such a view, society is imagined to be created to serve the interests of autonomous persons who are imagined to be inviolate individuals. They contrast this view with the "sociocentric organic" where individuals are not abstracted from the social roles they play, do not develop "character" but, rather, are expected to perform the obligations required by the part which they play in the organic whole of the society. In such societies, selves do not have abstracted attributes (such as honesty or worth) but are context-dependent and conceived as parts of an organic whole rather than as social individuals. Hence, individual interests are less valued and are subordinated to the good of the collective. People define themselves in terms of the groups to which they belong and their obligations to these groups. Justice does not exist as an abstract entity that transcends any given social situation and is guaranteed by the will of God. Instead, duties are prescribed and virtue resides in the performance of these duties and the acceptance of whatever sacrifices may be demanded.

The conception of person as an autonomous, separate, independent being is so ingrained in our culture that we have a difficult time imagining the sense of personhood in cultures where the self is primarily seen as part of a group, subject to many obligations and duties that allow little room for personal freedom and choice. Yet the very word for human being in Japanese (nin gen) implies a group rather than an individual, meaning literally "between" (or among) people. In Japan, as in most cultures other than our own, children sleep with their mothers, are constantly carried by them, are never left alone to cry. Rather than encouraging children to make choices and to ask for what they want, Japanese mothers seek to anticipate their child's needs so that the child does not have to cry or ask for its needs to be met. Congruently, children are taught to empathize with the needs of others rather than to get in touch with their own. The difference is illustrated by a Japanese psychologist who, after 3 months in the United States caught himself in the process of adjustment, saying to himself, "What do I want," what do I want? (Roland, 1988).
Most Westerners take personal pronouns for granted. We say, "I would like some"; "Would you like some?"; "Would you pass me the butter?". Such personal pronouns are rarely used in Japanese. They are unnecessary because the verb ending that is used indicates whether the speaker is higher or lower in status relative to the listener. I literally does not exist apart from my relationship with you and the I that is me with you is not identical to the I that I am with some other. There is no word for "self" in the Western meaning of an individual person. One may refer to jibun—one's own wishes as opposed to the desire of the group—but these wishes only exist in a specific situation and one is expected to cede one's own wishes to the needs of the group. Disagreements are not resolved by a reference to what is fair but with a concern for hierarchical obligations and the maintenance of harmony in the group (Kidder, 1984).

Similarly, in India, Roland (1988) described the existence of a "familial" rather than an individual self. One conceives of oneself primarily in terms of a being who is a part of a family. One does not have the "right" to be concerned about one's own wishes. One is not "free." Rather one has the moral obligation to be concerned about the welfare of the family. Choices are often made for one and are based primarily on family needs. People with a familial self do not have an identity in the Western sense: an identity based on personal choices of what career to follow, whom to marry, what principles to commit oneself to. Since they are not forming an identity, they do not feel the need to maintain consistency in their behavior across different situations as the morally developed Westerners do (Blasi and Oresick, 1985). Rather, morality is based on one's obligations to others. Maintaining harmony is much more important than consistency to principles.

Although Roland (1988) describes the people of India and Japan as having selves whose boundaries are more porous then Westerners, Hsu (1971) describes the self boundary as more inclusive. He described the self of Chinese and Japanese people as including intimate others. That is, an indigenous psychology would not take the self (as understood by a Westerner) as its unit of analysis. The equivalent unit would be the jen, the people to whom one is intimately connected. The most basic needs and emotions are those of the jen, not the individual.

Thus, if one's brother or sister wins an honor or commits a crime a Westener may feel some degree of pride or shame but there is little reflection on one's own self, whereas in China (and India and Japan) one's own self is completely implicated. Since no person should act independently of the family the entire family has won honor or disgrace.

In a related vein, Munro (1977) describes the Chinese concept of human being as essentially social in nature. There is no essential unique individual nature and no concept of a private realm of thought and belief that is inde-
ependent of behavior. Rather, individuals are completely malleable, shaped by the configuration of social forces that make them egoistic or caring. Hence, it is the government's responsibility to insure social conditions that promote concern for other people.

It should be noted that neither the Western nor Eastern conception of the self completely excludes the other. With all its emphasis on the assertion of self-interest and individual autonomy, the right to pursue individual happiness and the duty to uphold one's principles, Western individualism still recognizes altruism as an individual motive. With all its emphasis on empathy with others, familial obligations, the welfare of the group, and the value of maintaining group harmony, Eastern familialism still recognizes the existence of self-interests and the need for some privacy, the worth of some nonconformity. Nevertheless, it would be a serious error to underestimate the profound differences present in these alternate conceptions of self and the ways these differences influence how people experience themselves and what they hold as values. Contrast, for example, a value endorsed in the West, getting in touch with one's own needs and autonomously asserting one's self, with Murase's (1982) description of sunao as a central Japanese value. The latter includes being accepting and obedient, trustingly dependent, free from any self-centeredness and opposition, and internally free from conflict, preconception, and hardness.

Although each of the above selves have apparent virtues, they also have limitations. The Western self, free to use the energy that is inherent in people acting in self-interest, can encourage innovation and the creation of new meaning, but is apt to lack sufficient connection to others and be subject to the sort of alienation described by Fromm (1955). Further, because of the intense conflict between individual interests, a nation such as the United States may find it difficult to achieve political consensus unless it fosters a common enemy (de Rivera, 1968). The Eastern self has the security inherent in being a part of a meaningful whole but lacks the freedom to individuate. Because of the stress on group harmony, a nation such as Japan may sometimes achieve political consensus by masking internal conflict and intimidating oppositional forces (Buruma, 1988). In our shrinking globe these two contrasting systems must deal with one another. Since the values and principles are quite different it is going to be difficult to construct a world government that can insure international justice. Already, one can sense a tension between the economic systems of the United States and Japan, and we are presently witnessing the difficulty China is having maintaining its identity as it tries to be open to the West.

In the last half of this paper we shall see that an alternative view of the self may be able to relate these two cultural systems. Now, however, we must examine our current Western conceptualization more closely.
The Self Within Western Civilization

Within our contemporary Western liberal culture, the dominant conception of the self is to some extent challenged by an opposing conception that is often described from either a feminist or a Marxist perspective. Since these opposing conceptions both come from within the general framework of Western thought, they each assume the existence of an individual self but describe this self quite differently, in ways that parallel the difference between Western and Eastern conceptualizations.

These different conceptions have become apparent as a result of three quite separate lines of inquiry: descriptions of psychological boundaries, moral development, and political practices and beliefs. Below I briefly describe the opposing Western conceptions of self from each of these three points of view.

Focusing on psychological boundaries, Sampson (1988) described the dominant Western conceptualization of self as a "self-contained individualism" that emphasizes a sharply drawn boundary between what is self and what is other than self. In this conception mature persons are governed by forces internal to this boundary and each person is seen as an entity that is clearly separate from other persons and groups and should be self-reliant. People are free only when they act autonomously from their own desires or internal standards; persons are responsible only when their behavior is under their own control. Sampson (1989) points out that this conception of people as individuals, who have the right to do whatever they wish with their life and who own possessions, abilities, and achievements as private items, occurred historically when people became detached from the interdependent ties that had formerly bound them to their community and its goals. The detachment from others set people free to determine their own identity.

Without our own society, a sharp contrast has been provided for this dominant conceptualization by the feminist perspective which stresses the importance of relationships rather than individuality, and emphasizes the ways people are connected to one another rather than the ways they are separated by boundaries. For example, Lykes (1985), asserts that while the dominant view sees relationships between two autonomous self-contained entities, relationships might better be described as actually constituting the person so that the self is viewed as an ensemble of social relations. In a related vein, Noddings (1984) describes the felt goodness of caring and how a care-giver may be totally engrossed in the one who is cared for. There may be a complete displacement of motivation such that there is a complete attention on the needs of the other.

When we contrast these selves, certain benefits and limitations may be seen. On the one hand, the mature self-contained individual is sure who he or she is, is self-reliant, confident, and aware of responsibility to self and to those who are perceived as dependent upon the self. On the other hand, the very
boundaries that define the self so clearly also appear to hinder feelings of connection so that there is often a lack of sympathetic identification with others and the person may have rather narrow self-interests. Given the combination of a relatively strong sense of agency and a relatively weak sense of empathy we would expect self-contained individuals to prefer equity rather than need as a principle of allocation. Montada and Schneider’s data (1989) would lead us to predict that they will tend to justify their own privilege and minimize the disadvantages of those less fortunate than themselves.

Conversely, the mature ensembled self is aware of how he or she is connected to others. And since the attributes of the self are partly determined by the community, these attributes are less viewed as private possessions than as available for use on behalf of the common good. This capacity for empathy will lead such a person to prefer need as a principle for the allocation of resources. However, to the extent that the self is simply viewed as part of an organic whole it is in danger of losing its integrity in a merger with the whole. Consider Hoffman’s (1989) definition of empathy as, “an affective response that is more appropriate to another’s situation than to one’s own.” He has in mind a bystander watching a victim. But the permeable ego boundary that is implied will also lead the person to empathize with others rather than have an affective response appropriate to his or her own situation. The person may easily lose, submerge, or never form his or her own identity. To some extent, the first self is a stereotypical male personality; the second, a stereotypical female personality. In fact, Eagly (1987) suggests that the male gender role is “agentive,” with qualities such as self-assertion, task-mindedness, and a dominance while the female role is “communal,” with qualities such as selflessness, concern for others, and interpersonal sensitivity. Dinnerstein (1976) suggests that each of these selves is only half of a full human being.

*Turning now to the perspective of moral development*, Sandel (1982) describes the dominant, liberal, view of the self as a moral subject in Kant’s ethics and in Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice. He points out that its essential characteristic is the capacity to freely choose ends. That is, the person is seen primarily as an active, autonomous, willing agent who has an identity that exists independently from any of the ends that are chosen. Such an autonomous subject has the radical freedom to choose whatever ends, goods, values that he or she wills to choose. Each subject has the freedom to choose a different set of interest, and these may be either egotistic or altruistic in nature. However, as we have noted, the boundary of the self is fixed in advance. That is, a person is defined as a chooser rather than by the choices he or she makes. Its identity is independent from the ends or values that are chosen. In such a conception, the person is not shaped by its response to values that exist apart from the self.

When we attempt to construct a moral system for this self we cannot refer to concrete values located apart from the self. In fact, there are no
objective values that may be discovered by the self. Apart from the self (which has objective value as an agent of free choice), values only accrue to objects and ends because some self has chosen these objects or ends. Since only the self has value in its own right, the only reasonable course of action is to insist on the right of individual choice (rather than on the goodness or value of what is chosen) and on some abstract principle of justice for all selves. Hence, Rawls' (1971) position that a person should be able to choose whatever is in his or her self-interest as long as that choice benefits rather than harms the general interest.\footnote{Kantian morality emphasizes the dignity of the individual self and the duty of persons to follow the moral imperative of respecting the freedom of others. However, the individual must be free not only from the coercion of others but also from the desires of the self. Otherwise his or her choices would be conditioned by these desires and the person would lack the detachment necessary to freely reason and choose for the self, independent from one’s circumstances.}

By contrast, Sandel (1982) suggests that, in fact, our identity is tied to our aims and attachments. We are members of a particular family, nation, or people and owe allegiances that are over and above whatever ends are voluntarily chosen. This alternative conceptualization conceives of the self as obligated by the enduring attachments that define the self. Attachments constitute the self. Hence, in consulting one’s preferences in order to make a choice one must assess their suitability for the self. Such a self must ask not only what it wants but who it is.

The distinction between the “individualistic” self of Kant or Rawls and the “attached” self of Sandel is reflected in the current debate in moral reasoning over the relative importance of abstract principles of justice and concrete acts of caring.

It may be recalled that Kohlberg (1976) describes three major stages in the development of moral reasoning. Preconventional reasoning about a moral dilemma speaks simply of the pragmatic rewards and punishment that may occur if one acts in certain ways. Conventional reasoning speaks of the necessity of considering the opinions of others, of conforming to norms so that society can be maintained. Postconventional reasoning speaks of a principled morality that transcends societal norms by considering abstract principles such as personal integrity and justice. This scheme has been challenged by studies conducted by Gilligan (1982, 1987). Listening to the voices of women rather than men, she found that a greater emphasis was placed on concrete caring rather than abstract principles of justice. Because such reasoning was concrete and concerned with the needs of others it tended to be coded as “conventional” in Kohlberg’s scheme and thus relegated to an inferior position in the developmental hierarchy.

In order to give a proper place for the moral reasoning of care, Gilligan proposes that concerns of care and concerns of justice are two different
frameworks, orientations, or perspectives that can alternate as figure and
ground. The caring perspective is concerned with maintaining attachments,
preventing abandonment, not neglecting the needs of others. The justice
perspective is concerned with maintaining equality, preventing oppression, not
acting unfairly. The first perspective deals with issues of caring, with how to
respond to needs—how to hear them, understand them, enter into the worlds
of others—with avoiding detachment in the sense of indifference and turning
from someone in need. The second perspective deals with issues of relative
power, and how to judge the claims of the self against the claims of others,
with establishing grounds for agreement by detaching oneself in the sense of
standing back and appealing to general principles so that one does not act un-
fairly. Empirically, studies suggest that some people feel at home in using both
perspectives but that a majority of women are more inclined to use a caring
perspective while a majority of men use a justice perspective (Gilligan, 1987).

Many people seem to feel completely at home in one or the other of
these perspectives. The self of Kant and Rawls has a clear concept of duty,
clear principles of justice, a clear concern with the rights of all people and
their freedom to choose their own life. There can be a nice no-nonsense quality
to treating the self and others with complete fairness. However, this self can
also be a bit cold and lack a feeling for what is good for particular people in
specific circumstances. In order to maintain a sense of impartial fairness, the
person must exercise a good deal of self-control and the self must stand back
from its own desires, which may be regarded with some distrust. In order to
maintain its identity as a free agent the self must not get so committed to
another person or project that loyalty or involvement might blind personal judg-
mint or threaten freedom of choice. In contrast, the “attached” self supported
by Sandel and Gilligan has the virtue of being able to care for, and be emotion-
ally connected to, particular other people and projects. Its morality is well
represented by Noddings (1984), and includes a nice sense of warm concrete
caring for those to whom one is attached. However, there appear to be limita-
tions to this self too. There is a natural favoritism towards people and projects
we care for, and those who are outside of this circle of warmth are bound to
be neglected. Without abstract principles of justice, members of outgroups may
even be treated unfairly.

The limitations of these two selves become particularly apparent in situa-
tions where abstract principles clash with concrete caring. Thus, a Christian
Science Monitor columnist (Kidder, 1987) considered the ethical dilemma for
Colonel North’s secretary. Ought she to have followed the nation’s laws or her
loyalty to her boss? Shredding top-secret documents and smuggling papers out
of the White House are clearly illegal and violate constitutional principles but
the colonel was clearly admired, “for his professional integrity and beliefs, his
personal commitment to this country and his ability to be a friend, when one
is needed." In this situation, how are principles of justice and principles of caring to be related?

From the third viewpoint, the political perspective, Munro (1977) points out that liberal individualism presumes that the dominant needs and values of people exist independently of society. A social system simply responds more or less adequately to the requirements of individuals in their pursuit of happiness. In this vein, people are seen as having a private realm of consciousness, beliefs, and thought that does not affect others and should be immune from public interference. That is, there is a "natural" person who not only has the right to a private domain that may not be intruded upon by social agents but also has the inalienable right to pursue his or her life, liberty, and happiness. There is a shadow side to this individualism, however, and it is the belief that people are basically self-regarding, and that there is a fundamental conflict between the sexual and aggressive needs of the individual and the requirements of society. Hence, within this conceptualization there is a limit to any person's capacity for caring for others, and a limit as well to what education and "socialization" can accomplish.

By contrast, the Marxist view of people clearly views human nature as dependent on the changing nature of social relationships, its reality inhering in "the ensemble of social relations" that is involved in the production of goods. From this perspective, the conceptualization of people as selfish, pleasure calculators operating primarily for their own self-interest is not an accurate description of the nature of human beings but is, rather, a portrait of the bourgeois class in a capitalistic society. Nevertheless, there are some natural needs: to express one's individuality in what one produces, to care for others, to do both mental and manual work. These needs would be realized and could be met if one could change the social system so that it were not dominated by the private interests of a ruling class. Hence, if we would consider what is for the common good of humanity rather than the self-interest of those who possess a lot of private property we would create a collectivized society and an ideal environment for human needs to be actualized.

Which view of the self will maximize our freedom? In practice, both views tend to lead to a strong centralized state that is not conducive to maximum freedom. The individualist, acting primarily to satisfy his or her own desires, will have to suppose that others will also choose to be out for themselves. In order to avoid destructive competition, people will have to create social contracts that limit individual aggressions. On the political level this will result in a Hobbesian state—a strong central authority that will enforce these laws and to which individuals will submit in order to gain a mutual security.

The collectivist, working for the good of the whole, will suppose that others are also naturally good. Like Rousseau, he or she may suppose that it is society that distorts us and leads us away from this natural goodness. To
reform society, a strong centralized state must establish a decent social order that will enable people to work for the good of the whole. While in theory, the state should then fade away (leaving naturally good anarchists), in fact the state becomes ever more present in its effort to establish an ideal order. Further, since there is an assumption of a common good, one should be able to discern it, and there is likely to be a suppression of those who fail to see it.

What happens when individualist and collectivist must work together in a common world? Rapaport (1960) has imagined a constructive debate between the two. The individualist challenges the collectivist to allow free thought; the collectivist challenges the individualist to provide for people’s longing to identify with productive cooperative enterprises. But it is difficult for the two to really join forces. There is a fundamental conceptual problem here. As Buber (1965, p. 200) observed, “Individualism understands only a part of man, collectivism understands man only as a part.” We shall attempt to resolve this problem by a third view of the self, but first we must examine the tension within the self itself.

Motives Within the Self

Within the Western self there are two motives that many psychologists have contrasted: one for independence, separateness, autonomy; the other for attachment, intimacy, homonomy. For example Angyal (1941) has described personal development in terms of two trends: increasing autonomy as the self expands its sphere of independence and control over the environment, and increasing homonomy as the self becomes part of meaningful enterprises that are larger than the self. Selman and Yeates (1987) contrasted the need for autonomy and agency that is involved in self–other differentiation, with the need for intimacy and sharing that is involved in self–other integration. Benne (1988) described “the dialectic of the human heart” as its desire to be alone and free alternates with its desire to affiliate with others. Leaper (1989) listed equivalent contrasts used by over 40 psychological theorists to describe, “The yin and yang of psychosocial development.”

Although these contrasting motives may complement each other and work together to produce a whole person, they may also come into sharp conflict. The two tendencies are often associated with many familiar oppositions. Thus, independence is usually associated with means–end thinking, affiliation with a feeling for the harmony of the whole; autonomy implies hard-headed, pragmatic realism whereas, “homonomy” suggests tender-hearted idealism; the desire for independence may lead a person to become isolated and unconnected to others, whereas the desire for affiliation may lead a person to conform to, or even identify with, the wishes of others and thereby lose or not develop a sense of
individual needs. An impulse of aggressive self-assertion may clash with the
needs to submit to the requirements of relationship.

Sometimes these two aspects of the self are presented as paradoxical com-
plements. Thus, Damon (1983) presents socialization as the process of estab-
lishing connection, and individuation as the process of developing unique
personal identity. While he recognizes that the two processes are sometimes in
opposition, he sees them as functioning together, with individuation serving to
differentiate and socialization to integrate the individual into society. Hence,
social development is based on the fact that, "we are both social and individual
beings, connected with others in a multitude of ways, as well as ultimately
alone in the world" (p. 1). However, it is not clear how the processes are related.
When is individuation in opposition to socialization and when is it complemen-
tary? What is the whole of which the two are complementing parts?

Often, we as persons may feel the tension between our desire for inde-
pendence and affiliation, our own needs and the needs of others, our desire to
be realistic and our ideals, our aggressive impulses and our loving concern.
These tensions may even develop into splits between reason and passion, duty
and spontaneity, mind and body, ideal and real. What should be a psychic whole
has somehow become divided.

One division that poses a fundamental problem for the attainment of just-
ice occurs when real events violate our ideal expectancies and people attempt
to maintain their vision that the world is a fundamentally just place. Thus, in
a number of different studies Lerner (1980) has demonstrated that when one
person sees that another is unavoidably hurt, he or she is apt to devalue the
misfortunate other. To explain these findings, he postulates that people have a
need to believe in a just world. Confronted with an apparently innocent victim
whom they cannot help, they maintain their belief system by disliking the victim
or believing that the victim must be guilty of some wrongdoing or made some
mistake, that led to the suffering.

Some people appear to have a particularly strong or rigid belief that the
world is a just place and they may be especially likely to devalue victims. But
all people appear to have some belief that a sort of justice prevails in that they
suspect good things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad
people. At least when fortune or misfortune happens to them they begin to feel
good or bad about themselves, and this is often manifested in their optimism
or pessimism about the future. And most religious systems promise eventual
justice, either by judgment or via the consequences of rebirth.

What does happen when a person experiences real injustice? Some inter-
views I have conducted suggest that some people deny the experience of in-
justice by devaluing the victim in the manner described by Lerner, thus
restoring the appearance of justice. Others feel personally guilty, restoring the
moral order by accepting responsibility for the incident in spite of the fact that
there is nothing that they could have apparently done. In either case such people maintain their belief that the real world is just (ideal) by distorting reality so that they avoid experiencing the tension between real and ideal. However, other people appear to give up their faith in a world that is fundamentally just. They seem to pull back from the world, afraid of risking any emotional involvement. It is as though they lose some sort of faith in the inherent goodness of things in the real world.

Such people do not abandon the ideal of justice. Rather they seem to live in a sort of private world where things are ideal. In this private world the ideal of justice is still maintained and they do not distort reality by devaluing victims or feeling guilty. However, they refuse to let themselves be involved in the real world of injustice. Hence, they too reject the tension between real and ideal and fail to commit themselves to restore justice to the world. We shall return to this distinction between “realists” who distort reality and “idealists” who refuse to become involved in reality after we examine an alternative model for the self.

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF THE SELF

To overcome the limitations of the one view of personhood, which sees an individual self, a self-contained entity, and the other view of self, which sees people as parts of families, tribes, or other organic wholes, I propose a third possibility: that we conceive persons as agents who exist in relationship to other agents. This alternative conceptualization has been clearly articulated by Macmurray (1957, 1961). It has three major advantages over either of the views we have considered. (i) It is more inclusive and can account for the two other views of self as reflections of specifiable motivational dynamics, thus unifying different empirical findings. (ii) It can resolve the problems for justice created by the limitations of the two other views of the self. (iii) It may help us understand how we personally may promote a just world rather than deny the injustice and suffering that exists. I provide a brief sketch of this model of the self, show how it can account for the two views of self we have already considered, and then describe the alternative possibilities that it reveals.

The Basic Model

Macmurray argues that it is a mistake to define human being by our capacity to think, know, and engage in reflective thought. It is a mistake because this conception obscures the fact that thought, while a solitary activity, presupposes social communication; it suggests, in addition, that knowing may
be divorced from action, and reflection divorced from emotion. A better definition of human being focuses on our freedom to act, our capacity to take one of the many possible futures we can imagine and transform this imagined future into one factual past. By focusing on action as the essential aspect of our being, we heal the split between mind and body because both knowing and feeling, purposeful intention and motivating emotion, are inherent in any human action. Further, since action necessarily affects things outside of ourselves, things or persons other than ourself, we avoid the solipsism of solitary minds.

Stressing agency and the possibility of freedom may seem congruent with the idea of an autonomous self but, in fact, once the person is conceived as an agent of action rather than a thinker of thoughts we become aware that a person can only exist in a relationship with other agents. Stressing relationship may seem congruent with the idea of a collective self but, in fact, since the actions of agents involve choices that determine meaning, these agents are not simply parts whose meaning is determined by the whole organic society. There is no I without a you, no self without an other, no identity apart from relationship. However, there is an identity within the context of relationships. One has needs and makes choices, but one's choices affect relationships. Just as the infant cannot meet its own needs but must depend on the actions of a parent, the adult cannot meet his or her most important needs—for food, recognition, love—without the action of others. Our personal existence as well as our negotiated identity is, in fact, completely dependent upon our relationship with others. Our first cognition is a knowing of an agency that meets our needs. Our world begins as a personal world and our reliance on attachment to others persists throughout our life. The unit of analyses of the personal is not an individual but a dyad.

Because personal needs can only be met by the actions of others and our personal existence depends on how others treat us, persons as agents in relationships are bound to have an underlying fear of abandonment, rejection, and of their needs not being met. This fear for ourselves is not, of course, necessarily or even ordinarily experienced as a felt emotion. Rather it is inherent in personal existence as an essential motivational strand that is present at all times. It is implied in the infant's need for security (Stroufe and Waters, 1977) and it is present in the adult in the form of our being concerned for ourselves and what will happen to us if our own needs for security are not met.

Attachments, however, are not only based on our need for security. Rather, there is also an inherent interest in the other that is intrinsic in the dyadic formation. On one level this responsiveness to the other is inherent in the reciprocity between infants and care-givers. Thus, Brazelton (1976) described how films reveal that infants approach their mothers in a smooth rhythmic series of approaches and withdrawals that remind one of a swan's mating dance, Trevarthen (1977) showed how 2-month-old infants reach a
mutual adjustment of expressions and gestures with their mothers. There is a manifest delight in this mutuality that seems to be an expression of love for the other and is manifested in sharing behavior as well as the expression of affection. On another level, as Hoffman (1989) pointed out, the infant has a capacity for empathy for others that develops into a whole range of emotions that are responsive to others. Finally, to the extent that our needs are met by others—as they care for us, give us affection or recognition, play or converse with us, work for us or provide work—we may develop a fondness and caring for them and a concern for their needs.

Thus, responsiveness to others is also an essential motivational strand that is inherent in personal existence. Like our fear for ourselves, our love for others is not always going to be present as a felt emotion. However, it is always present as an underlying motivational force that directs our behavior. In this sense “love” for the other is synonymous with “faith” that we are cared for and may be related to Erickson’s “basic trust.”

It is important to note that love, as so conceived, includes a knowing of the other as a basic cognitive component. Although it has a strong motivational thrust it is not an emotion in the subjective sense. Elsewhere, I have shown how any instance of the emotion of love and fear (or any other emotion) may be used in the service of either love, as an underlying motivational concern for the other, or fear, as an underlying motivational concern for the self (de Rivera, 1989). For example, one may feel the emotion of fear as one goes to help another out of love, or feel an emotion of love when one is really afraid of being alone.

Macmurray postulates that at any point in time one of the two basic motivational strands will be dominant so that its polarity will determine the direction of the relationship. Thus, behavior may be primarily oriented toward our concern/fear for ourselves or our caring/love for the other. However, the other motivational strand will also necessarily be present. Though subordinated, it will be contained within the action, providing a complementary motivation. For example, when love is dominant, the subordinated fear is present in the maintenance of the boundary that preserves self-differentiation, or in realistic concerns for the safety of the other. This duality of motivation is not only inherent in the attachment bond between infant and mother, it continues in our adult relationships as we simultaneously care about others and are concerned for ourselves. Although we do not need to be lovable for our business associates, we do need to be respected and in order to fully be ourselves, we need to be accepted by our friends.

Attachment begins with the dominance of love (the infant responding to the voice of the mother and showing delight in their relationship), and fear becomes dominant whenever primary expectations are not met. For example, an infant who has received adequate care learns to expect that it will be nursed,
receive attention, and have its demands met. When it is weaned, or displaced, or denied by the will of the other, its world is thrown into chaos and fear for the self becomes dominant. Likewise, when an adult is hurt by a friend, betrayed by a lover, encounters unexpected failure, or faces unexpected death, the self feels unloved and fear motivation becomes dominant. This tendency is so strong that we may postulate that whenever our primary expectations are not met, our concern for ourself begins to dominate our care for the other.

This dominance of concern for oneself is not bad. In fact, Macmurray's model presumes that separation and autonomy do not fully develop in the course of the child's secure exploration of the world but occur only as the child is "weaned" by the parent refusing to meet certain expectations. That is, fear for the self must occasionally dominate if the person is to fully develop. However, if a secure attachment is not present, fear remains dominant and is manifested in the insecure behaviors described by Ainsworth et al. (1978). In adults, too, whenever fear dominates, the person is necessarily concerned with possible consequences for the self so that he or she is guarded and behavior is defensive. To the extent that fear remains dominant there is a split between an actual world that is perceived to not meet one's expectations and an ideal, imagined world where one's needs are fully met. This split between actual and ideal begins to divide body and mind, emotion and reason, what one actually does feel and what one ought to feel. A person who was once whole and integrated, at least in infancy, has become divided.

**Deriving the Other Views of the Self**

As a child leaves the relative security of the family, he or she often meets indifference, cruelty, and hostility so that a concern/fear for the self necessarily becomes dominant. In fact, in our own culture we almost take its dominance for granted so that many motivational theories assume a primary concern for the self and even try to derive all motivation from self-interest. In contrast, Macmurray's model asserts that this sort of individualism is derived from the dominance of fear. That is, when fear for the self becomes dominant over concern for the other and a person becomes concerned that his or her needs are not going to be met, a person (or culture) may adopt an individualistic strategy. Essentially, such a strategy involves a decision not to trust others to meet one's own needs. In such circumstances the person must look out for him- or herself. The person will insist that he or she is independent and has no need to be cared for. He or she will believe that one ought to be pragmatic and self-suf-

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In the case of unexpected failure or death, it is the "world" or "God" who has failed to care for us in the manner we expect. That is, our failure is not simply a "fact"; there is an implicit personal "other" who has betrayed us.
icient. We are not speaking here of a genuine self-love or self-respect but of a defense against abandonment, an underlying fear that the other does not really love the self. Since one must take care of oneself, one must seek power over others and control over the self. A culture that adopts this strategy will appear as much of Western civilization appears. It will value independence and insist on self-interest as the primary motivation of all people. It will imagine isolated individuals who will negotiate contracts with other isolated individuals in order to meet individual needs, and there will be an underlying fear of what other people might do in the absence of law. It will imagine a principled morality that stresses duty rather than caring and is suspicious of desire and emotion as forces that get in the way of reasoned choice.

Just as the egocentric autonomous self may be derived as a type of self that is coping with the dominance of fear so, too, may the sociocentric organic self. If primary expectations have not been confirmed and the self becomes afraid it is not loved, there is an alternative to perceiving the other as unloving and adopting the strategy of taking care of the self. One may, instead, perceive the self as unlovable and adopt a strategy of being good so that the self will be loved. Thus, rather than aggressively looking out for oneself, one may elect to submissively please the other. By conforming to what the other person wants, one may be able to make the self lovable and then one’s needs will be met. By becoming a part of a whole one feels needed rather than worthless.

It seems evident that the second strategy for coping with fear, the submission of individual needs to keep the self a part of a whole, leads to the second type of self we have considered. Within Western culture it is reflected in the affiliative self who pleases others in order to maintain good relations; in the conformism that haunts collectivism; and in political repression for the “good of the whole.” In Eastern culture it is implicit in the dependence of familial selves who do not consider personal needs in order to maintain family and group harmony. It is reflected in the concern for situational requirements rather than consistency of identity, and the stress on correct manners rather than principled morality. (Although in Japanese culture it may be that “weaning” does not fully occur so that the conformity of the familial self is not motivated by a fear of being unlovable but, rather, reflects a more basic absence of separation and a fear of being different.)

Thus, when fear for the self is dominant over love for the other it may be manifested in two quite different ways. When it leads a person to mistrust the nurturance of others it leads to the aggressive individualism with which we are so acquainted. When it leads a person to mistrust the worth of the self it leads to the submissive conformism and lack of individuality so prevalent in collectivist movements and Eastern cultures. In both cases the dominance of fear is the basis for the tensions and splits we have observed within persons and cultures.
The strategy of individualism leads to a narrow pragmatic realism that stresses that all persons are separate entities, alike in that each is motivated by a set of self-interests. There are no objective values apart from self-interest and idealism is either an idle sentimentality or a mask for power exercised on the behalf of self-interest. Hence, morality must be based on the right of each individual to freely choose whatever seems good for the self. Politically, in order to insure cooperation and prevent excessive aggression, people surrender power to a state which insures that contracts are enforced and laws are obeyed. There is no real role for emotions in such a strategy. Reason rather than sentiment is important, and emotions are either biological forces or subjective factors that distort judgment.

The strategy of conformism leads to an idealism that sees people as parts of a whole. It is this whole that has objective values rather than any of its parts, and people are valuable only as parts. The harmony of this whole is good. What really exists is the life of the group, or the needs of others, the platonic world of the ideal, or the afterlife. The mundane world and the individual's desires are set aside as less important. Hence, to be moral is to conform to the manners that make harmony possible. Feelings are important insofar as they help a person become attuned to group harmony, emotions are acceptable as long as they are private affairs that do not disrupt this harmony.

Although both individualism and collectivism may be characterized in the above manner, the reader may have noted that the models were more caricatures than portraits. In part this is because most people alternate to some degree between the two selves. In part it is because we have omitted the underlying love that is always present, and because there are times when this love is dominant over fear.

The Third Self

We have seen that the two models of the self with which we are most familiar may be understood as two different strategies for coping with our human condition when fear for ourselves dominates concern for the other. There is an apparent alternative. To the extent that our caring for the other dominates our concern for ourself, an entirely different self may be conceived. This third alternative is not as alien as might be imagined. In fact, it is present in most people and in both individualist and collectivist cultures. It probably comes closest to describing the self in any loving family and whenever a person is being creative.

What is this self like?

1. Since caring for the other is dominant, the ego recedes and the person is able to cooperate in the way described by Lewis (1944). In such cooperation
the self is not cooperating in order to meet individual needs or to be liked by
the other. Rather, the person’s boundaries have opened to form a “we” self so
that the person’s own needs are met by the dyad’s successes; gains are joint
gains and the person is free to care about what happens to the we rather than
the ego.

2. With the subordination of fear, defensiveness vanishes so that the per-
son is able to help others in the manner described by Rogers (1961, pp. 50-57).
That is, the person is able to fully accept and understand others for who they
are rather than make judgments about their behavior. And the person is able
to be genuine, to be aware of feelings and to unambiguously communicate them.

3. The containment of fear also makes it possible for the person to fully
“surrender” control so that he or she may fully experience another person, a
novel idea, or a work of art in the way described by Wolff (1964).

4. The dominance of love for the other means that the person’s caring
for the other is more important than concerns for the self. Hence, the person
can care for the other whether the other is a person, a project, or a work of
art. As Mayeroff (1972) observed, such caring helps the other develop. If the
other is a person, growth is nurtured without self-imposition; a project is com-
pleted with task- rather than ego-involvement; an artist’s work is spontaneous
rather than contrived. Paradoxically, this caring for other is also the path
towards self-actualization. That is, a person’s potential is necessarily realized
when the self is involved in caring for what is other than self.

5. The concern for the other can be used in negotiations over conflicting
positions. In such negotiations the person neither insists on his or her own
position, dominating the other, nor submits to the other in order to preserve a
good relationship but negotiates in the manner advocated by Fischer and Ury
(1981). That is, he or she looks beyond positions to the interests that underlie
the positions, seeking to create solutions that benefit both parties, and using
standards that are fair to both.

6. To the extent that love is dominant, the self is unified without the tensions
and splits that occur when concern for the self is not contained. Emotion is al-
lowed and it is reasonable emotion, appropriate to the situation. Likewise, per-
ception and thinking are not divorced from feeling. “Energy,” in Lowen’s (1976)
sense of the terms, flows freely so that the person is empowered to be respon-
sible. If intimacy is appropriate it will occur. If the self needs to be presented,
the presentation will be an honest rather than a pretended claim to identity. The
person will want to do both what he or she feels like doing and what ought to
be done so that action will be both spontaneous and moral (Cohn, 1968).

7. The subordination of fear, by caring for what is other than the self, allows a close relationship between fantasy and action, an interpretation of what
Kurt Lewin termed the levels of unreality and reality. The person is able to
move back and forth between what is ideal and what is real. Thus, the person

can both reference ideals (on the level of unreality) and plan actions (in future reality) and, thereby, is empowered to form the world according to his or her wishes. Contrariwise, the wishful thinking that occurs when a person remains on the level of unreality, and the narrow realism that occurs when a person remains on the level of reality without imagining ideals, are manifestations of the split caused by the dominance of fear. This split prevents meaningful action (see Barker et al., 1941, p. 211; de Rivera, 1976, pp. 511-517).

It should be noted that the third self is not without fear. It has a clear place for realistic fear. Realistic fear occurs whenever concerns for the self and its needs are present but subordinated by caring for the other. It would be unrealistic to have no concerns for the self, to pretend that all people are nice, to ignore the existence of evil. The model simply calls for fear to be subordinated to care so that as one copes with sociopaths, cheaters, unjust power, cynicism, and apathy one is not so overwhelmed that one becomes primarily concerned with oneself.

Of course there will be occasions when primary expectations will not be met. One will be hurt and fear will become dominant. In such circumstances people will think that their dominant fear is realistic and they will begin to hold on to power or comply, inappropriately, with the wishes of others. Then they will again be split. However, we shall see that it is always possible to restore the dominance of care and to return to wholeness.

We have considered three quite different selves. The first two of these are dominated by fear for the self, the third by love for the other. Some of the characteristics of each of these selves are summarized in Table 1. Describing these different selves in a way that enables us to relate them to each other and to the changing aspects of our own self is made possible by a unique model that conceives of persons as agents who only exist in relation to others. Let us see how this model can help resolve the problems for justice posed by the limitations of the ordinary conceptions of self, and how it may help us understand how to personally develop a self that will promote a just world.

RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF WORLD JUSTICE

We have identified five problems: (i) The difficulty of achieving international agreement about morality and justice when there are so many differen-

4Of course I have, necessarily, presented a very abridged and simplified account of part of Macmurray's philosophy. Skilled in both Kant and Marx, he presents a general philosophy that deals with pragmatics, esthetics, and religion, contrasts standard logic with dialectics and his own "containment" logic, and shows how his approach formally relates the thought of individualists such as Kant and Hobbes to the thought of collectivists such as Plato, Rousseau, and Marx. Of particular interest is his presentation of philosophy as an empirical religion.
### Table I. The Three Selves of Persons in Relation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individualist</th>
<th>Collectivist</th>
<th>Mutualist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant motivation</td>
<td>Fear for self</td>
<td>Fear for self</td>
<td>Care for other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Use power to look out for self</td>
<td>Comply to secure other's caring</td>
<td>Cooperate out of care for other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture for the self</td>
<td>Egocentric-contractual</td>
<td>Sociocentric-organic</td>
<td>Communitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality based on:</td>
<td>Duty to principles</td>
<td>Obligation to family</td>
<td>Love for other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resulting in:</td>
<td>Self-integrity</td>
<td>Group harmony</td>
<td>Freedom in community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological boundaries</td>
<td>Self-contained</td>
<td>Part of whole</td>
<td>Self-related to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Connection</td>
<td>Mutual caring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual rights</td>
<td>Good of community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured by</td>
<td>Justice, reason, and law</td>
<td>Caring, feeling, and “manners”</td>
<td>Unity transforming fear into love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political system</td>
<td>Protects individual rights</td>
<td>Secures the collective good</td>
<td>Insures justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Pragmatic realism</td>
<td>Contemplative idealism</td>
<td>Action to transform real to ideal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences between the autonomous self of egocentric cultures and the familial self of sociocentric cultures; (ii) the difficulty in adjusting self boundaries so that self-integrity is maintained while interconnection is insured and distributional justice is achieved; (iii) the difficulty in relating the individualistic self’s principles of justice to the caring affiliation of the attached self; (iv) the difficulty in achieving a political system that will intend justice rather than simply support individualistic interests and yet will not stifle dissent and deviancy for the collective good; and (v) the difficulty in maintaining a productive tension between the ideal and the real so that we will respond to injustice with corrective action. We consider each in turn.

### Relating Cultural Systems

When we contrast the moral styles of egocentric and sociocentric cultures it seems clear that the alternative patterns of behavior largely correspond to two different ways of coping with a dominant fear for the self. In the egocentric contractual, persons are isolated individuals who must look out for themselves. Hence, they are afraid of the power of others and, in the manner described by Hobbes, must contract a State whose power guarantees the security of all its
members. Fearful of basing morality on "subjective" feeling, they turn to principles of duty (as articulated by Kant) or of justice (as articulated by Rawls). In the sociocentric organic, people are parts of their group. Hence they fear standing out from the group and are concerned with the opinions of others. Rather than a system of principles and ethics, they observe a system of etiquette or manners that guarantees group harmony and a place for all members of the group. In the first arrangement, persons are isolated and afraid of one another. In the second, people do not make choices as individuals because they must continually be a member of the group, obligated to meet group demands.

However, these two descriptions focus on the negative characteristics of the two types of societies. Every society must be based on caring for others as well as fear for the self and, to the extent this caring is present, it is clearly reflected in cultural ideals. To some extent, these ideals reflect somewhat different virtues. Thus, persons in egocentric contractual societies may emphasize the ideal of loving one's neighbor, being sincere so that one's real feelings are reflected in one's presentations, creativity, having the integrity to act in accord with one's values, and the triumph of goodness over evil. Persons in sociocentric organic societies may emphasize loyalty to one's group, having the discipline to play one's role correctly, acceptance, fulfilling one's obligations in the face of adversity, and the maintenance of balance and harmony.

Egocentric societies tend to emphasize the reality of individual desires and feelings and view group consensus as an ideal, whereas sociocentric societies emphasize the reality of group customs and consensus and view individual feelings as relatively unimportant facts that ideally would conform to group needs. However, if our conceptualization is correct, both types of societies should recognize a common ideal: the unity of "real" and "ideal" that occurs with a successful integration of individual feelings and groups needs. Thus, Becker (1968), advances the Western ideal of achieving, "maximum individuality within maximum community" (p. 251). And Kumagai (1981) translates the Japanese ideal of sunao as "authentic in intent and cooperative in spirit." Disagreeing with the usual translation of sunao as "conforming" she states, "sunao specifically assumes cooperation to be an act of affirmation of self" (p. 261).

Such integration can only occur within a society to the extent that caring for others dominates fearing for the self. Otherwise people in the society fear for themselves and are reduced to behaving in their narrow self-interest at the expense of the community or conforming to the needs of the community at the expense of their personal life. We may, therefore, describe a third alternative for how individuals may relate to society. They may form a true community in which each person's care—for others who are personally known—is stronger than each person's concern for self (Macmurray, 1961; Kirkpatrick, 1986). On the one hand, this third alternative exists only as an ideal, for it requires persons
to subordinate self-concern to caring, to have faith that they are cared for rather than to demand security. On the other hand, it is the reality of many loving families and, perhaps, of some towns and a few cultures. And it may stand as the ideal for people in all societies.

Although cultures may approach and articulate this ideal in many different ways, we postulate that it represents a universal truth. If we are correct, our different ways of handling fear divide us far more than the different ways in which we express the unity that occurs when love dominates fear.

**Self Boundaries**

When we examine the problem of how to maintain both self-integrity and connection to others we are struck with the apparent contradiction between the need to maintain boundaries that separate and define the self and the need to open these boundaries so that we can identify with others. However, it is clear that this way of viewing the problem is really a way of contrasting the two different selves that are experienced when fear is dominant. The isolated, autonomous self with fixed self boundaries is the "masculine" defense of the person who feels that he or she cannot depend on others. When a person is using this defense, he or she will only be able to form contracts with others, will be incapable of intimacy, and will lack the motivation to care about the welfare of others and to work to secure justice for them. The merged self whose identity only exists as a part of a whole is the "feminine" defense of the person who conforms to the needs of others so that he or she can depend on them. When this defense is used, the person will be sensitive to the needs of the whole but will lose self-identity or only maintain that identity in a private, unshared realm. However, when fear for the self is subordinated to caring for the other the paradox is resolved. Each person is free to be him- or herself.

There are times when such a self is only sustained by faith, but often the caring self is accepted, respected, loved by the other. In such conditions, the interests of the self are freely shared and cared for by the other. While the underlying fear maintains self-boundaries it is subordinated to a concern for the welfare of the other. Connection and self-integrity are maintained not by complementarity but by each person caring for the other so that mutuality exists.

Of course, mutuality is easier to conceive than to achieve. Often fear for the self has to be recognized, felt, confronted, or quieted, in order for caring to emerge. Skills need to be learned: how to listen, how to assert, how to forgive. People must learn to trust and to be trustworthy. My point is not that mutuality is an easy solution but that it is the only solution.
And it is not an unrealistic ideal. In fact, the development of mutuality is clearly evidenced in Selman and Yeates (1987) accounts of pair therapy where troubled youngsters are encouraged to meet with each other with the assistance of a therapist. At the beginning of therapy the children may jockey for power or fail to assert themselves, and the less developed strategies the investigators describe correspond to the individualistic and conformist fear orientations. However, in the process of therapy children are helped to develop affective boundaries (experiencing feelings as their own rather than projecting ambivalent feelings onto the other member of the pair) and to experience shared feelings that connect the pair with one another. Thus, the children clearly develop both autonomy and intimacy. Although Selman and Yeates refer to this as the development of processes, the model of the self presented here sees both autonomy and intimacy as dependent on the motivational dynamics of love and fear. That is, we would have to predict that the stage of mutuality (which the authors describe quite clearly) is only reached when concern for each other is dominant over fear for the self. As they themselves emphasize, mutuality appears to develop largely as the result of shared experiences that are based on a common history that enable the children to feel safe enough to be vulnerable and share themselves. From the transcript they present it is clear that such sharing is dependent on their partner’s interest, acceptance, and support. And it is clear how easily this openness disappears when fear becomes dominant because of the occurrence of minor failures.

It might be objected that a fully developed person does not need to be cared for by others and that it is necessary to love, respect, and accept the self before one can love others. Such an objection is misdirected. It is true that the need to be loved in an addictive sense is a sign that fear for the self is dominant, that one is feeling unlovable. In fact, our model asserts that to the extent a person knows that he or she is lovable, acceptable, worthy of respect, that person’s concern for others will dominate over fear for the self. However, both the development and the realization of that caring motivation is dependent on the mutuality that exists in the community of caring others. We are all dependent on the caring of others, and it is difficult to imagine how full self-realization could occur apart from the community of caring others. Friendship and love can only be fully realized with others. The artist, philosopher, or scientist may not create for an audience (and certainly not out of fear for an audience’s opinion), but he or she is still dependent on an audience who cares for the work.

Mutual caring is also a crucial factor in deciding questions about distributinal justice and how to integrate concerns for equality, equity, and need. Rawls
integrates these concerns with his proposal that unequal distribution is only justified when the extra talent that is rewarded (equity) results in an increase in production that can be distributed on the basis of need (so that the least rewarded are more fortunate than they would be without the unequal distribution). His proposal is manifestly fair and can be theoretically derived on the basis of enlightened self-interest. In practice, however, self-interested individuals do not adhere to the proposal because it is not in their best interest. Although Hoffman (1989) hopes that empathy might overcome such egoism, it does not seem likely that an examination of historical cases would offer much support for this hope. Far too frequently, people who are in a privileged position are manifestly afraid of losing that position and the domination of this fear over their concern for others prevents the empathy that is so needed. On the other hand it seems likely that people who think in terms of mutual care would, in practice, observe Rawl’s principle. It would be interesting to test this idea empirically.

Relating Justice to Caring

When the dominance of fear is manifested in an individualistic self, people will be afraid of the subjectivity of feelings. In part this is because they believe each person’s feelings will reflect only their own interests. Hence, they will base morality on reason and appeal to principles of justice that will treat everyone alike. Unfortunately, this appeal of abstract principles will leave many people unmotivated to strive for justice for anyone except themselves and the strict attempt to apply principles will demand a rigidity that may lack an attunement to the requirements of particular situations.

When the dominance of fear is manifested in an “attached” self people will attempt to base morality on feelings because they themselves will feel good when they are being caring toward others. However, what “feels good” may prove too egocentric and be based on what is good for one’s own group but not for others so that favoritism prevails over fairness.

Ideally, there is no discrepancy between the spontaneity of feeling and the morality of reason, but this unity of affect, thought, and action, can only occur when love for the other dominates over fear for the self. Moral development in Fingarette’s (1967) sense of acceptance for an increased range of responsibility, or Blasi and Oresick’s (1985) sense of a concern for consistency between action and the values to which a person is committed, or the Japanese sense of a wholehearted dedication to achieving one’s obligations (see

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5 R. P. Wolff (1977) criticized Rawls for basing his entire theory on the question of surplus distribution. He pointed out that meaningful work also has value, and this is neglected by a theory that simply looks at how to distribute surplus.
Benedict’s, 1946, description of *makoto*), all require an integration of reason and emotion and, hence, the primacy of caring for what is other than the self.

What then is the relation between justice and caring? In one important sense, caring is primary; it is the foundation of personal relationships and morality. Thus, Youniss (1981, 1987) has shown how moral development grows out of the mutual respect and cooperation that occurs when friends work together and build a shared sense of understanding. And, as Gilligan (1982) has shown, persons who care about one another may be deeply moral without the aid of general abstract principles. In a similar vein, Radke-Yarrow and Zahn-Waxler (1986) summarized the results of a number of studies showing that children who are given the responsibility to care for younger siblings or pets are more apt to be altruistic towards others.

Because of this primacy of caring, when persons are in direct personal relationships, so that they can know and care for one another, it might seem there is little need for impersonal principles of justice. In fact, however, mutual caring *presumes* that a sort of equality or fairness is maintained. If one person continually freeloads, he or she obviously is not caring and we begin to suspect the person’s integrity (and the self-worth of the one who is letting him/her freeload). Conversely, if one person is so generous that he or she insists on doing all the giving and does not allow the other to give in return we begin to realize the relationship is not equal and suspect that a type of domination is occurring.

One might object that a concern for equality is not a matter of justice but of caring for the self. However, there are several advantages to thinking about equality in terms of justice. First, while one does not have the right to demand that another cares for oneself, one does have the right to demand that the other treat one with equality. Second, when one assesses whether or not a relationship is equal one engages in a process of reasoning that is quite different from the spontaneous emotional movement that is involved in caring for someone. In assessing the relationship, one is stepping back from it and using reason to make an impersonal judgment. Third, it is helpful for people to separate their legitimate concern for equality from their insecurity about being cared for. It may be confusing to think in terms of caring for oneself because one may begin to wonder if one is caring for oneself rather than those one loves. People begin to worry if they are caring too much or not enough, and this distracts them from simply caring for each other and assessing if the relationship is equal.

In spite of the importance of justice in direct relationships, a personal relationship that was based only on justice would be a meager affair. Justice is a necessary but subordinate underpinning. Personal relationships are ideally defined by caring and this caring involves a feeling for the other and a personal knowing of the other and the self.
Yet one cannot be in personal relation with millions of others with whom one is economically interconnected. One is only in indirect relationships with these others. In the case of these indirect, economic, relationships, the roles of caring and justice are reversed. Caring is a necessary underpinning but is insufficient for moral behavior. Morality also requires the intending of justice.

Why should this be so? For one thing, if caring were dominant it would lead one to favor one’s own group. Justice is necessary to insure equality. For another, in the absence of a personal relationship, caring will only generate sympathy and, as Montada and Schneider (1989) show, sympathy will not lead to action. Without the intending of justice caring will degenerate into sentimentality.

To summarize, when one is dealing with direct personal relationships, Gilligan’s perspective of caring must be primary and justice is necessarily subordinate. However, when one is dealing with indirect relationships, the perspective of justice must be primary, though necessarily based on considerations of care.

Most important, it should be noted that whereas Kohlberg and Gilligan are concerned with describing moral reasoning, we are concerned with moral action. In order to act in a caring manner or to insure justice, one must not only perceive and reason, one must also be motivated to act. Blasi (1980) has suggested that a reasoned judgment of moral responsibility will lead to just action if being a just person is part of an individual’s core definition, if a person lays claim to that identity. He argues that when this is true, just action will be dynamically supported by the tendency to self-consistency. However, the analysis presented here suggests that this is only one aspect of the motivational dynamics that is involved (though it may be a particularly important aspect for males in contemporary Western culture). Why should a person choose to define him- or herself as just in the first place? In our analysis the motivation for just action is built into our identity as persons whenever our care dominates our fear. We argue that if a person decides to commit him- or herself to being a caring and just person, what he or she is doing is committing the self to work toward having caring dominate self-concern. To the extent the person is successful, there will be a unity between the person’s feeling and thinking, and the needs of the other will be considered. However, when it is not possible for the person to be in a direct, caring, relation with the other, he or she must intend justice by dealing with indirect, economic relations. Thus, the establishment of justice must necessarily lead us to a consideration of political systems and political action.

National Politics, Citizen Responsibility, and the Nature of Self

When we turn to the problem of establishing a political system that will intend justice rather than defend self-interest or stifle dissent, it is essential to
understand the motivation that underlies our support for the nation state. To the extent that fear is dominant we will establish and support a nation in order to protect ourself against the power of others or to secure a place of belonging for ourselves. To the extent that our caring for others is dominant we will establish and support a state in order to provide for justice.

On the one hand, when love is dominant the state is merely a means for securing justice among people who cannot care for one another because they do not have the opportunity to know one another. We owe respect and loyalty to our fellow persons and not to the authority of the state (a dangerous idolatry). In actual fact, the state and laws are often used to secure privilege rather than justice. As caring people we are morally obligated to see to it that laws intend justice, and morally obligated to disobey unjust laws. On the other hand, a system of law and the apparatus of the state is necessary to insure justice for people who are indirectly related through economic exchange. Hence, as long as we consider ourselves citizens, we are morally obligated to support the system of law in general even when we disobey a particular law. (Hence, Gandhi and King’s acceptance of imprisonment for their civil disobedience.) Further, since the system of law we now have is not sufficient to deal with the present state of international interdependence, we are morally obligated to support the establishment of international law that will insure greater international justice.

When we examine how nations behave it is clear that they, like individuals, may act justly or unjustly. However, in the case of nations, or other organizations, behavior is usually the outcome of a group decision-making process. Examination of these group dynamics reveals the same perceptions that are important in personal decisions. Some people within the group will see the issue in terms of group or national security. Motivated primarily by a fear for their own group or nation, conceiving of the world realistically, as a jungle governed only by considerations of power, they evaluate policy only in terms of its perceived impact on personal, group, or national power. Others will perceive the issue “ideally” in terms of how the world ought to be. One’s own nation is “good.” Promises ought to be kept, human rights ought to be respected, and people should not act violently, at least other groups or nations should not be breaking promises, violating rights, and behave violently. The failure to consider the concrete circumstances of others, and the denial of how one’s own group benefits from current power arrangements, betrays the fact that below the surface of these normative concerns there is the fear of a disruption of status quo security. Still others are genuinely concerned about how their group’s or nation’s policy affects other people in the concrete circumstances of these other lives. Considerations of their own power are seen in a larger context, one that imagines the needs of others.

Unfortunately, the norms that govern discussions of national policy do not encourage discussions that are formulated in terms of caring. That is, with
the exception of natural calamities that obviously require emergency relief, policy makers are reluctant to argue that a proposed policy would help or hurt members of an outgroup. For example, an examination of the meetings that led the United States to enter the Korean war and to cross the 38th parallel fail to reveal any consideration of what would be good for the Korean people (de Rivera, 1968). Nor does there appear to have been consideration for the welfare of the Vietnamese people when the United States undermined the Buddhist peace initiatives that might have led to an early settlement of that conflict. Similarly, there does not appear to have been any expression of concern within the current administration over its policy to dispose of hazardous waste in third-world nations (Christrup, 1989).

If a person were to make an argument in terms of the welfare of others, he or she would appear to be a naive liberal bleeding heart whose loyalty was suspect. Hence, a person who is really concerned for others must argue in terms of long-range ("enlightened") self, group, or national interest. Such arguments are usually not as convincing as arguments based on immediate power concerns. (Arguments for justice are heard to some extent in legislative bodies where it is recognized that a representative may have a large number of constituents who care about people in particular other nations. However, even in these circumstances arguments are usually phrased in terms of ultimate national security interests.)

When policy makers deal with domestic policy there are some forces oriented toward justice because some of the policy makers may belong to or be identified with domestic groups and, hence, can argue in terms of what is good for their group as a part of the larger group or nation. However, this cannot be done in the case of foreign policy or policy dealing with ethnic groups that are not represented in the government. Hence, a nation's foreign policy is apt to be extremely unjust. Of course, colonialism is an example of such injustice, as is fascist and communist expansion, and the policies of current world powers such as the United States. Thus, the best predictor of the amount of foreign aid that the United States gives to foreign countries is not the economic need of the other nation, nor the extent to which the nation is democratic but rather the size of the other nation's military establishment! The United States is not atypical in its lack of concern for justice. In fact, Stohl (1987) points out that nation states in general do not intervene in other nations to prevent genocide or to promote justice.

Clearly, the governments of nation states will not act in a just manner unless they are pressured to do so by their citizens. Since each person is, in fact, economically interrelated to millions of others, both within and without his or her own country, if a person is committed to caring for others he or she must (from a moral viewpoint) become involved in the political struggle for more justice in the nation's domestic and foreign policy. Yet, there are many caring persons who are not politically involved, either because they think of
themselves as nonpolitical or they cannot see what good their efforts would do. Either they do not see their responsibility or they are denying their power. Let us analyze each of these factors in turn.

From an objective standpoint the citizens of a democracy are responsible for the behavior of their government. They personally benefit from the exploitation of third-world workers and world resources (Amin, 1974), and they personally pay the taxes that support the oppressive military operations that maintain this exploitation. (Since Archbishop Romero’s letter to the President of the United States imploring him to stop sending money to the government of El Salvador, the United States has sent over 4 billion dollars of “aid.”) No money can be spent without congressional appropriations, and most citizens over the age of 18 are responsible for electing a congressional representative and for communicating their desires to that representative. In a sense, for 40 years the general public has allowed its fear of communism to dominate its concern for others.

However, responsibility is not an inherent attribute of individuals. In fact, Fingarette (1967) has argued that persons are not responsible for their behavior until they choose to become responsible. A person may or may not accept responsibility for the welfare of people he or she is personally involved with, let alone for people who will never be seen. Responsibility occurs when parents, friends, and society in general hold people responsible and act as though they are responsible, thus encouraging most people to accept responsibility for how their behavior affects others. Hence, the norms of a society greatly influence the amount of responsibility its members actually accept. In the case of our own society (contemporary North American and Western European) there appears to be a norm that one should care about those with whom one is in personal relationships, but that caring about justice for people in general is optional. As Lerner (1987) states, “The commonly held view is that, by and large, most people want to be decent and to treat others fairly, but we all live in a world where we must look out for our own interests and protect those who depend upon us” (p. 109).

This norm is, of course, related to the dominance of fear and the way in which our society conceives of the self. Earlier, we noted Sampson’s (1988, 1989) point that our current society thinks of the self in terms of a liberal individualistic framework that conceives of the self as sharply differentiated from others, as a “self-contained individualism.” It seems clear that those who conceive of the self as “an agent in relationship to others” will be more likely to accept responsibility for behavior that affects others. Conversely, to the extent that societal norms can be shifted so that people are held responsible for how their actions affect the larger social (and physical) environment, people will accept more responsibility and will begin to shift their concept of the self toward a mutualism.
Even today, within our society, there are large numbers of people who exhibit mutualism outside of the family context. Thus, Lykes (1985) shows that many people exhibit a "social individuality" that appears to be based on an understanding of the self as interdependent on others. To demonstrate the difference between such persons and the more typical "autonomous individual," she devised a test of social apperception that utilized TAT pictures of collections of people who could be perceived either as an aggregation of autonomous individuals or as a collectivity. Stories were scored for the degree to which differentiated individuals participated in an integrated collective action and for a capacity to experience multiple points of views. Later, subjects were given a series of hypothetical moral dilemmas. They were scored as socially responsible to the extent that they identified and actively engaged the larger social context in which the dilemma was embedded. (An example would be acknowledging that others might be hurt by an individual's act of cheating.) Lykes' data show that there is a significant relationship between social apperception and social responsibility. That is, some persons seem more aware of how people can participate in collectivities and these persons are more apt to accept social responsibility. Such awareness is related to educational level and to the extent to which an individual had actively participated in collective group activity (such as the activity of a union, or a neighborhood, community or political group).

By using the term "social individuality" [italics mine], Lykes is clearly attempting to distinguish the self of a person who is in a caring relationship to others from the sort of "group self" that is characteristic of a conformist way of being. In this regard, it is interesting to note that persons scoring high on Lykes's measures, and engaged in responsible collective action as well, were more apt to cherish time alone and to mention the need for having time for themselves. Clearly, then, Lykes (and I assume Sampson as well) is attempting to describe an individual who is connected to others, a self that is based on the dominance of care over fear, and not simply a person who is a part of a whole.

The acceptance of responsibility is also dependent on a sense of power, on a sense that one can influence the political process. It is hardly surprising that the average citizen of a society that cultivates autonomous individuality does not perceive responsibility for the political events that affect domestic and international justice. Thinking individualistically, he or she cannot imagine how one could possibly have the power to affect political events. To the extent that a person can empathize with others, he or she can only imaging helping through charities or personal acts of kindness. Hence, less than 50% of citizens in the United States even bother to vote in a presidential election, let alone to vote for their congressional representatives or to communicate with their representatives about issues that will affect the lives of millions of people they will never see.
Of course, the registration procedures in the United States do not encourage people to vote, and educational procedures often fail to convey the necessity for ordinary citizens to lobby congress. However, these very procedures reflect the fear of those who are in power, and their distrust of the masses and collective action. This fear is abetted by those who rationalize their failure to vote or lobby by saying that they see no difference between the candidates, or do not know enough, or do not think their vote will make enough difference to be worth casting. Such reasoning is a good example of the intellectualized idealism that retains one’s purity through withholding involvement in the reality of the political process.

A person’s understanding of the self is also related to despair and burnout. If a person with autonomous individualism does accept responsibility for the injustices of political reality, he or she is apt to become overwhelmed with that responsibility. Brought up on the doctrine that the self ought to be able to independently control the environment, he or she will very likely become exhausted in the attempt to independently affect events that can only be effected by collective action. The person with an understanding of mutuality understands that while he or she bears a responsibility to influence political events, he or she is as dependent on others to fulfill this need as to fulfill other more personal needs.

Since most people lack a sense of political power, it is too painful for them to realize how they are connected with others who are being injured. Since there is little awareness of the fear that isolates them from the community of human beings and contributes to their sense of powerlessness, a vicious cycle is established: One does not accept responsibility for what one cannot influence and it is too distressing to sympathetically empathize with those one cannot help. Lacking empathy, or fleeing from the distress it engenders, one has no motive to care and accept responsibility for others. This enables fear for the self to remain dominant over caring for the other and reinforces the isolation of the autonomous self.

In spite of these impediments to acting for justice, it is encouraging to see how many people do participate in political actions designed to achieve justice. To take just one example, Bread for the World, a lobbying group that works through churches “offering” letters to congress, has more than 40,000 members. If those who are committed to justice work to change the norms of society so that people see each other as socially interdependent individuals and hold each other to be politically responsible beings, we may ultimately achieve a more just world.

Integrating Real and Ideal

People appear to have difficulty maintaining a productive tension between the ideal of a just world and the real world in which injustice occurs. Certainly
there would be a lot less injustice in the world if most people acted to prevent it or to offer restoration, yet people often seem to give lip service to justice rather than to act in its behalf. Often they seem to deny injustice, to not see it, or to distance themselves from it by not letting themselves get involved. I want to show how we can understand these failures to respond to injustice as manifestations of the selves that are dominated by fear, how a creative response involves the self that is dominated by caring for the other, and how this latter self may emerge in the most trying of circumstances.

When people are presented with instances of suffering they may or may not be moved to help by the particular emotions that are aroused. Batson et al. (1983) have presented data showing that it is possible to measure two quite different sorts of emotional responses. We might term these empathetic distress and empathic sympathy. In the case of the former, the person feels alarmed, upset, worried, disturbed over the other’s pain, and is primarily motivated to avoid his or her personal distress. If there is an easy way to help the other, the person may be moved to help, but with the motivation of decreasing his or her own distress. In the terms of our motivational analysis, fear for the self is dominant over concern for the other. Hence, if there is no easy way to help, a person will simply escape the situation by leaving and not thinking about the victim and the injustice that was involved. On the other hand, to the extent that empathic sympathy is present, the person will be moved to help for the sake of the other. In our terms, concern for the other is dominant over concern for the self. In confirmation with this line of thought, Eisenberg et al. (1989) have shown that when people watch a videotape of a distressed mother and her children, an increase in heart rate (associated with personal distress) is related to lower levels of helping while increases in facial expressions of sadness for the other are related to higher levels of helpfulness.

In the studies conducted by Batson et al. (1983) and Eisenberg et al. (1989), subjects are usually offered a way in which they can help the suffering other. Often, however, there is no readily apparent way in which to help or to restore justice. Such situations appear to involve a considerable amount of tension. The world is not as it ought to be. When this tension is expressed in the form of moral outrage or existential guilt, it appears to provide a motive for action that is designed to restore justice (Montada and Schneider, 1989). The presence of such emotions are obvious examples of caring for the other and may be contrasted with emotions which arise when a concern for the self is dominant: namely, fear that one may be trapped in a similar position, or satisfaction that one is not. As noted earlier, when the latter emotions are present, tension is often resolved by devaluing the victim so that injustice is not perceived (Lerner, 1980) or tension is avoided by withholding involvement in the real world by living in a private ideal world whose "oughts" are not imposed on the real world.
It seems to me that experiences of injustice involve exactly the sort of invalidation of primary expectancy that leads to the dominance of fear for the self. In fact, the expression "loss of entitlement" is an excellent way to capture the sort of psychological situation where there is bound to be a loss of trust in the other. Hence, it should be possible to use the three types of strategies we have described to understand the different responses that may be observed to injustice.

When devaluation of the victim occurs, I suspect it has less to do with a belief in an ideally just world than with a belief in a world that one can control to protect one's self. That is, when a loss of entitlement has led to the dominance of fear for the self and a person has adopted the autonomous strategy of independently caring for the self, the person must maintain the illusion that he or she can control the world in order to protect the self. Devaluing the victim is a way of maintaining this illusion that one has pragmatic independent control over the world. One's self determines what is just, and if someone gets hurt they clearly are a fool, made a mistake, or are immoral (unlike one's self). If this is so, then it seems likely that "survivor guilt" is a sort of empathetic mirror image of this strategy. That is, in survivor guilt the person blames the self rather than the victim—but toward the same end of assuming a world that can be controlled.

Such attempts to control the world so that justice for oneself may be assured may be contrasted with the second tension-reducing strategy—withdrawal from the real world. An example will help to illustrate this point. A college student who interviewed for a job told the truth about herself, including material that she knew might make her appear to be a less than perfect candidate. She felt that she was, in fact, quite well qualified for the job, but lost the job to a student who lied about her background. Sicken by this injustice she became disillusioned, no longer felt that the world was just and withdrew in disgust. Again, we may presume that the injustice let fear for the self become dominant. However in this case, I believe that loss of faith in the inherent goodness of the actual world is analogous to feeling that the self is unlovable. Hence, the person adopts the strategy of giving up the claims of the self in the actual world. I believe that in such cases the person is withdrawing from the "real" world to an inner ideal world where a belief in justice can be maintained. That is, the person does have the idea of justice and insists that it "should" ideally exist, but declines emotional involvement with the actual world where it obviously does not exist. Such persons appear to maintain a conventional morality, but at the price of withdrawing from insisting on its applicability to the real world. Thus, Lewin (1942, p. 194) describes how many adolescents insist on ideals to such an extent that they cannot deal with the real world and the actions necessary to move it toward a more ideal state. In
our terms the person is "idealistic" rather than "pragmatic," but, like the controlling pragmatist, is basically dominated by fear.

Whenever a person meets injustice and cannot respond, our model predicts that fear for self will dominate over faith in justice and the ability to care for others. However, it is always possible for a person to transform the experience by reinstating the dominance of love. When this happens the person recaptures his or her faith in the basic goodness of the self and the fundamental possibility of justice in the world. He or she transcends the injustice. Often this seems to occur when the person manages to forgive the source of the injustice. There are numerous case of this. Perhaps the most dramatic one with which I am familiar is that of Aldolfo Pérez Esquivel, the 1980 winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, an Argentinean leader who is dedicated to helping the poor by nonviolent action. A strong proponent of human rights throughout South America and the coordinator of the Service for Peace and Justice, he was imprisoned for his efforts by the military dictatorship and tortured. Here is classic injustice—the returning of evil for good, and Pérez-Esquivel must have had times of self-doubt and despair. He reports (Pérez-Esquivel, 1983, p. 23) that the hardest thing to bear was having to hear cries of his comrades as they were being beaten. However, he managed to transcend a fearful way of being. His writing suggests that he was able to do this by keeping some internal serenity by means of prayer and by witnessing the faith of others in the graffiti scribbled on the walls of his cell. His faith restored his capacity to allow love to dominate fear. When I met Esquivel in 1988, I was prepared to face the psychic scars that one might expect in a person who has been the victim of torture—a tenseness, defensiveness, or withdrawal. Instead, I found the most open person I have ever had the privilege of meeting—a man who was incredibly powerful because of this capacity for vulnerability. In such cases, and they are not that rare, people speak of forgiveness, grace, faith—concepts a bit unfamiliar to most psychologists. In the terms of our analyses, the third strategy had been used—and a transformation of relationship had allowed the love pole to regain its dominance so that injustice was defeated, transcended, rather than denied, and the person was, and is, still fully involved with ideals intact in a real world.

Although I have chosen an extreme example as an illustration, it is my contention that these sorts of dynamics often happen in real lives and have simply not been much investigated by psychology. To recapitulate: Whenever there is an occurrence of a personally experienced injustice to which no adequate response seems possible, concern for the self becomes dominant. The person then uses one of the three strategies we have outlined: (i) Devaluing the victim (which may be the self) in order to maintain an illusion of independent control; (ii) withdrawing from involvement in the real world to preserve the purity of an ideal world in which justice exists; (iii) forgiving the perpetrator of the injustice, thereby restoring the primary faith that justice can exist in the real world.
In this regard it may be noted that religious beliefs and practices can be used to support any of the three strategies. For example: One can pray in an attempt to control what happens in the real world; or one can pray to be accepted in an ideal heaven where justice will ultimately be rewarded; or one can pray for the capacity to forgive and the strength to aid the establishment of heaven on earth. In the first two, fear-motivated strategies, "faith" means a sort of fear-motivated belief. In the third, faith means an openness to experience, a knowledge of one's ultimate worth, an acceptance of some Otherness that cannot be controlled and yet somehow helps things grow.

CONCLUSION

The new self that our world needs is incipient in all of us. It is a self whose concern for others subordinates fear for oneself. Such a self can only survive in families, networks, or communities of people who mutually care for one another. In such situations people may be able to have the will to mold political systems that will intend justice for those with whom we are economically interdependent. It is not easy to keep love dominant because fear surfaces whenever we (or others with whom we identify) fail to get what we are entitled to receive and we cannot imagine how to act. However, with the support of others (or the aid of prayer) it is possible to restore the dominance of care and the possibility of justice. Although the means of doing this will have to be the subject of another paper (see, for example, Kohlberg and Higgins, 1987; Macy, 1983) I hope that the reader will be able to imagine some of the many possibilities for research on how we may achieve this self that can act for justice.

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