THE LANGUAGE
OF EMOTIONS
CONCEPTUALIZATION, EXPRESSION,
AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

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Emotion talk(s): The role of perspective in the construction of emotions

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1. Introduction

The relationship between language and emotion can be viewed from two angles. First, language, in a broad sense, can be viewed as being done emotive. Taking this angle, it is commonly assumed that people, at least on occasions, have emotions, and that these emotions as quasi-agents impact in a variety of ways on the communicative situation. This can take place extra-linguistically (e.g. by facial expressions, body postures, proximity, and the like), in terms of suprasegmental and prosodic features, and in terms of linguistic (lexical and syntactic) forms. A recent collection of articles in a special issue of the Journal of Pragmatics (Caffi & Janney 1994; see also Fiehler 1990, Bamberg & Reilly in press, and most of the other contributions to this volume) testifies to this research orientation. Although research along this line of reasoning focuses primarily on the expression of emotions, i.e. the behavioral act of expressing affect in communication, it nevertheless relies heavily on (often culturally privileged - see Besnier 1994) notions of what emotions are and how they function in private and public settings.

A second tack on the relationship between language and emotion is to view emotions from the starting point of language, how language forms reflect or construct what is commonly taken as an emotion. This orientation is somewhat different from the above which views language (understood here in the broadest sense) and (the expression of) emotions as two concurrent, parallel systems in use, in as far as it is more exploratory and open with respect to how emotions are made sense of in different languages as well as in different language games. At the same time, this tack is more constrained, and in that sense more closed, when it comes to considerations regarding the notion of language and its role in exploring psychological entities such as thoughts, intentions, or emotions.
It is this second orientation that I will take up in this chapter. First, I will,
in an admittedly rather eclectic fashion, discuss two approaches that use
language as a starting point to explore emotions (section 2). In some sense
this linguistic-constructivist orientation is similar to the one commonly
termed social-constructionism (e.g. Edwards & Potter 1991; Harré & Gillet
1994; and also Bodor this volume). However, for the purpose of docu-
menting and highlighting the active role of language in this construction
process, I have chosen the former term.

In section 3, I will summarize some of my own findings, bringing me in
the last section of this contribution to some more methodological and theo-
retical considerations with regard to the relationship of language and emo-
tions.

2. Language as a tool to explore emotions

2.1. Anna Wierzbicka's "universal semantics"

In numerous articles, chapters, and books Wierzbicka has explicated her
theoretical stance on how to analyze emotions. Emotions to her are a
semantic domain (1995: 235), to be investigated in a semantic metalan-
guage, i.e. in terms of indefinables or primitives (semantic universals)
that are shared by all human languages. These universals are of a conceptual
nature and comprise elements such as feel, want, say, think, know, good,
bad, and so on (1992: 236; 1994: 140; 1995: 236). It is Wierzbicka's de-
clared aim "to explore human emotions (or any other conceptual domain)
from a universal, language-independent perspective" (1995: 236).

In her comparative study of language-dependent conceptualizations, Wi-
erzbicka is able to document that "every language imposes its own clas-
ification upon human emotional experiences, and English words such as
anger or sadness are cultural artifacts of the English language, not culture-
free analytical tools" (1992: 456; 1995: 236). Her analyses are good (and
clear) examples for exactly this point, and her main argument is forcefully
directed against most psychological theorizing within the James-Langer-tra-
dition that starts from the assumption that emotions are bodily experienced
feeling states, each categorically distinct, and built up in a clearly ordered
sequence of events (see for recent critiques of this kind of theorizing from
within psychology, though from quite different directions, Campos,

However, apart from her critique of the ethnocentric universalism of
traditional emotion theories, it is questionable whether the search for a uni-
versal understanding of emotions can contribute to a better understanding of
what emotions mean to the people who speak different languages and who
"belong" to different cultures. Unfortunately, it remains unclear as to how
"language imposes its own classification upon human emotional expe-
rience" (1995: 236), i.e. how the experiencer in actual settings transforms
"the culture-independent psychology of human cognition and emotion" (1995: 233)
into language- and culture-specific concepts of "how-to-think" and
"how-to-feel", and how these more specific concepts turn themselves
into situated emotion talk in which participants are held accountable, and
where blame is attributed. In spite of the seemingly challenging puzzle of
figuring out the "real" set of semantic universals (one that really holds for
all emotion terms in all languages), one remains wondering whether Wier-
zbicka's rather undertheorized view of the cognition-language
relationship has anything to contribute to how people in actual discourse
settings talk - particularly in situations when they feel the need to implicate
one's own (or somebody else's) feelings or emotions - overtly by use of
emotion terms, or covertly by use of other linguistic means. Although not
coined to apply to Wierzbicka's approach specifically, White's critical
characterization of most semantic approaches to emotions holds water in
this case as well; in essence, they all are "narrowly lexical (and ultimately
limited by the absence of contextual and performative information)" (White

2.2. Rom Harré's "emotionology"

Harré's suggestion to study "the way people use their emotion vocabulary,
in commenting upon, describing, and reprimanding people for emotional
displays and feelings" (Harré & Gillet 1994: 148) is in many ways similar
to Wierzbicka's approach. In aiming to pull out of the uses of the emotion
vocabulary (of a given culture at a given time) the underlying "theory of
emotion", Harré & Gillet follow Stearns & Stearns' (1988) theory of "emo-
tionology". In contrast to the universal orientation of Wierzbicka, an emo-
tionology is a very local theory (and taxonomy), which is said to consist of
four general features. These features need close attention if an emotion is to
be identified and labeled correctly: (1) a felt bodily disturbance, (2) a
characteristic display, (3) the expression of a judgement, and (4) a particu-
lar illocutionary force.

In taking the work of Lutz (1988) on the Ifaluk emotionology as an ex-
ample, Harré & Gillet document that emotion words function to fashion
so to speak - emotional acts. This is not meant to imply that emotionologies
are the same as emotion display systems; but describing a person as angry,
or in terms of the Ifaluk as doing *metagu* ('behaving inappropriately'), passes a judgement onto the person talked about, and implicates this person with regard to the performance of a particular illocutionary act. As such, emotion words do the job of orienting toward a particular "positioning" (usually of those who are characterized by these terms) within social encounters.

Thus, while at first sight Harré's suggestion to study emotion terms as part of a (decontextualized) lexicon sounds very much like Wierzbicka's study of word reference, his proposal to study the emotion vocabulary of a certain group of people promises a whole lot more. If references to emotions - in the realm of texts - position people with regard to one another (morally, aesthetically, and prudentially), they function as indexes to how emotions in discourse situations are displayed, that is what emotions mean as discursive acts. Thus, employing emotionologies for the study of emotions as discursive acts orients us toward the study of language use in discourse situations.

3. A "linguistic-constructivist" approach to emotions

3.1. References to emotions as indexes

Before presenting some of my own research on emotion talk, let me reiterate the constraining assumptions for this approach: my original interest was and is emotion talk, or more precisely talk about emotions. Traditionally, we do not employ talk about topics such as rock formations or thunderstorms to investigate or explore such (natural) phenomena in themselves. Only if we try to explore what experiences with (natural) objects mean to common people, we may be interested in people's personal accounts. Thus, one of the guiding assumptions for my investigations is that references to emotions are indexes for how a person wants to be understood. And as such, the same emotion term might mean different things in different contexts; and similarly, in particular contexts, other language forms might have the same "meaning" as emotion terms. Consequently, exploring the range of possible meanings of emotion terms - in the sense of what they are used for - is at the core of the following investigations.

3.2. References to emotions in third-person accounts

My interest in the use of references to emotions (and to other "inner states") originated within a broader study of children's and adults' abilities to tell a 24-paged picture book (Frog, Where Are You). The main task in this study consisted of creating the (pictorially presented) characters linguistically, and relating them in terms of their actions across time and space in the form of a cohesive/coherent narrative. One of the first insights regarding the use of references to emotions that came out of this project (reported in Bamberg 1987, 1991) was that such references did not necessarily "originate" from the pictures: narrators of the picture story - often - chose to override a pictorially presented facial expression of one of the characters with a reference to the "opposite" emotion. For instance, a boy, whose face was obviously expressing anger, and who was linguistically referred to as angry when the picture was presented as a single, isolated picture, was referred to as happy (by the same subject three minutes later) when referring to this picture in the narrating activity of establishing the Frog, Where Are You? story (see Bamberg 1991 for further discussion).

References to emotions that were ascribed to the prot- or antagonists in the picture book narrations served two listener-orientations: first, in the sense that they seemed to refer to "internal states", they momentarily brought the flow of events to a halt. As such, these references marked the narrator's stepping out of the event line of the plot, and presented an evaluative stance or perspective with regard to the event under consideration. Second, these references typically occurred at episode boundaries, i.e. at the beginning or at the end of event sequences that were presented in a linguistically bounded fashion. As such, references to emotions served the function to "transfix" two conjoined episodes, thereby contributing to the episodic flow of the narrative whole.

From these observations I concluded that references to emotions in this kind of narrative activity are not referential in the same sense as establishing a character or temporal and spatial reference points in narrative discourse. Rather, they frame narrative units (episodes), and in this function "they are pervasive qualifications of the events they span and inform" (Young 1987: 23). They signal to the listener how the different narrative units are connected, and in doing so, they reveal an "overarching perspective" from which the narrative whole is being constructed.

Another insight came from minute comparisons of form-function devices the way they were employed for the picture book telling task across different age groups of children and across different languages (Berman & Slobin 1994): when comparing the use of references marking the protagonist's "inner state" (i.e. his reaction to the appearance of one of the antag-
onists) as surprise and/or scare, we found that other narrators made the same point by qualifying the action of the antagonist in this same scene as having occurred suddenly or unexpectedly. Thus, what at first sight looked to be a description of an internal state of the protagonist, turned out on closer scrutiny the expression of a particular perspective for the discursive purpose of narrating. Characterizing actions or events as occurring suddenly is an instruction to view these actions or events from the point of the character to whom they come "suddenly" or "unexpectedly", and thus can result in a surprise, or a scare. Instructing the listener to take this particular point of view reveals the overarching narrative perspective from which the narrator has delineated single events and orchestrates them into a narrative whole.

In yet another, separate investigation (Bamberg & Damrad-Frye 1991), we could establish that children learn to use these kinds of devices to first mark more local-level narrative scenes, before they establish the functions of these devices for more global narrative perspective-taking purposes. More specifically, at around the age of 4 years, children use emotion references to locally connect a single (precipitating) story event to an "internal" outcome "in" one of the story characters. At around 8 years, children begin to tie together emotions, motivations, and story events from a more global perspective, orienting their listeners more clearly to the narrative whole. At all times, however, references to emotions (here as ascriptions to others) function to construct a particular perspective that links or transfixes actions that would otherwise be seen as unmotivated and therefore as unconnected. 7

In sum, our early investigations of how references to emotions in picture book narrations were put to use led us to see these references as rhetoric devices that orient an audience toward a perspective from which characters are orchestrated in relationship to one another. At this point, the critique could be launched that this function is typical but specific to discourse about third-persons, of which the picture book narration is (yet) another specific case. Since a narrator has no secure "knowledge" of (i.e. privileged access to) a third-person character's emotions, he/she is forced to present the emotions of that person from his/her perspective. Thus, in order to decide more conclusively whether the established audience function of emotion terms is unique for accounts from a first-person perspective, we turned to emotion talk that was conducted from a first-person point of view. 8

3.3. References to emotions in first-person accounts

In the following we will draw on an investigation in which we asked American-English-speaking children to tell emotion experiences from two different perspectives. More precisely, we asked 80 children ranging from preschool to 3rd-grade (4-10 years in age) to tell us about "one time when they were angry/sad/scared/happy" and "one time when they made someone else angry/sad/scared/happy". Thus, with both elicitation questions children were required to "report" concrete, personally experienced incidents of so-called "emotion experiences". In response to the first question, they were supposed to present the experience from the perspective of the I as under-goer (where the other is to be constructed as the causal agent), while the second question asked them to place the I in the role of the causal agent who instigated the emotion experience (leaving the other to be constructed as the under-goer).

The first finding of this investigation (reported in detail in Bamberg in press a, in press b) consisted of two quite different profiles in the responses to the two different elicitation questions: presentations of I as causal agent (and other as under-goer) for anger-scenarios were typically done by construing the I as inagтивive, and the other as vague and de-individualized (e.g. by way of pluralizing them). Further, the whole incident was presented in terms of a probable appearance (by use of modality markers such as could, might, probably, or maybe) or as a plain accident. Examples (1) through (3) illustrate such construals:

(1) it was a couple of years ago
when I took the crab away from my brother
then I stuck my fist out
and he ran right into it
and got a bloody nose

(2) we were fighting maybe
I don't really know

(3) I lifted the hockey stick probably
and it hit them
kind of by accident.

In sharp contrast, constructions of the other in the role of causal agent (and of the I as under-goer) in anger scenarios were achieved by individualizing the causal agent, and marking his/her actions as highly transitive and affecting the I:
(4) I was in the room
and my sister kicked me
and it went right into the rib bone
and I went down to my mother
and told her
my sister got into trouble

(5) when my sister slapped me across the face
just because she didn’t let me in her room.

The syntactic frame of these constructions followed a highly regular pattern: the other was kept in subject position, while the I occupied the direct object slot (me). Often implicit, though not plainly expressed in these constructions were implications that the act was not justified, such as in line 2 of example (5).

In general, children seemed to organize the latter type of accounts in sharp contradistinction to the first type of accounts: while the other as undergoer was constructed as inagentive, the I as undergoer was highly agentive; and while the other as causal agent was constructed highly agentive, the I as causal agent was highly inagentive. In spite of the fact that the scenario was kept the same ("someone does something that causes someone else to become angry"), it seems to make a real difference for (American) children as to who is doing what to whom.

Of course, it should be clear that the issue in these two different construction types is the difference in discourse purpose: construing the other as highly agentive when the I is the undergoer serves the purpose of attributing blame. The discursive force of this construction type is to align the audience with the person who gives the account, and potentially assist in a possible revenge scheme. In contrast, construing the I as inagentive when the other is the undergoer serves the purpose of saving face: having been caught in the (narrative) act of inflicting physical harm on someone else, is viewed as less aggravating when it was not fully intended, or at least, when the reasons for "who is to blame" cannot be clearly located anymore.

To summarize, accounts that supposedly report one's own feelings and emotions (as caused by others) or that report someone else's emotions (as caused by the same person who is doing the reporting) are fashioned for different discursive purposes. Grounded in these different purposes, the reports themselves gain their specific linguistic structure: none of them "more real", "more true", or "less constructed" than the other. The way other and I are linguistically positioned with regard to one another at the plane of character construction cannot be viewed any longer as the linguistic representation of events the way they "happened". Rather, these so-called "content arrangements" are representing (i.e. standing in for) the way the speaker positions him-/herself with regard to the audience. Thus, constructions of a textual reality are always co-constructed in concert with a local moral order for the purpose of becoming understood.

When these first-person accounts given in response to the two types of elicitation questions were compared to accounts in which the children had to view the same two emotion scenarios (of making someone else angry/sad/scared/happy and being angry/sad/scared/happy) from the point of view of a generalized other, a different picture emerged: the differences in positions with regard to how the characters were aligned as well as with regard to the local moral order vis-à-vis the audience were washed out. This finding, which did not come unexpectedly, nevertheless underscored the relevance of the notion of discourse perspective, and its dependence on what general perspective is chosen by the narrator/speaker: the discursive purposes that hold for first-person accounts are clearly different from those that require the narrator to take the perspective of a generalized other, with third-person accounts leaving open different perspectives to chose from.

3.4. Talk about having two emotions at the same time

In a different study (reported in Bamberg, Ammirati & Shea 1995), we investigated children's and young adults' accounts of having two emotions simultaneously. Again, we elicited their accounts from three different actor-perspectives (first-person, third-person, and generalized other perspective), though here we will only touch upon their first-person accounts and summarize the more general conclusions and insights that we drew from this study.

The following three accounts are typical answers to the elicitating question "Can you tell me about a time when you felt both sad and angry (examples 6 and 7)/happy and sad (example 8) at the same time?":

(6) I was sad that someone I love is leaving
and I am angry that he left.

(7) I was sad that he [my grandfather] was dead
and I was angry that he died.

(8) I am happy that I am going to college
but sad that I am leaving my friends and family.
First, it should be mentioned that children prior to the age of 7 years face difficulties in fitting the two different emotion perspectives together into a coherent account; especially when it comes to two emotions of different valence (such as happy and sad). Older children, and, more typically, young adults, who generally are more apt to construct dual emotion accounts, nevertheless seem to find it more difficult to coordinate two "simultaneous" perspectives on anger and fear which are actually two emotions of the same valence.

More relevant for the present purpose, examples 6 through 8 document clearly how narrators are employing linguistic means (construction types) to bring about the framing (or "illusion"?) of two simultaneous (emotion) experiences in one event construal: apart from the different temporal reference points ("was sad" versus "am angry"), the narrator in example 6 employs the aspectual unboundedness of *leaving* to contrast with the aspectual boundedness of *left*, resulting in two different vantage points from which the same happening is being "perspectivized". The same perspectivization is being construed in example 7: the state description of "being dead" is contrasted with the process of an activity that linguistically construes a syntactic subject with its semantic role of a potential agent. In both examples, these differences in construction types impact on how the speakers seem to index their stance with regard to agency and responsibility: states and agentless happenings typically result in sadness, with no animate agent to blame, while situations that evoke anger are more likely the results of willful, intentional actions brought about by animate others.

Example 8 illustrates a similar technique of event construal, here by use of two different perspectives on the situation of transitioning from high-school to college. While both predicates construct this situation by use of motion verbs, *leaving* focuses on the source, keeping the telos unspecified, thereby orienting the audience with regard to the transition from home to college in a backward fashion. In contrast, *going* keeps the source unspecified, and focuses on the telos of the motion. As such, this construction orients forward, toward a future reference point. Simultaneously, the telic orientation of *going* in this example construes a more agentive perspective for the transition event, thereby setting up the contrast to the less agentive perspective for the act of *leaving*. Though the contrast between these two construction types does not foreground as clearly as in the previous two examples who is responsible and blameworthy (as in anger) and what happened agentlessly and by accident (for sadness), the *leaving* perspective chosen for the event construal in example 8 nevertheless resembles the inagentive construction type that is typical for sadness accounts from third- and first-person perspectives.

The discussion of the examples is oriented to extrapolate two related points, one holding for the assumption of having two emotions simultaneously, the second for having emotions in general. The first is meant to address the production of the appearance - or, if one prefers, illusion - that is achieved by these particular linguistic construction types. The accounts given for situations of two simultaneously existing emotions are linguistically constructed from two different perspectives: perspectives that are not existent nor available a priori or outside of language. In other words, the ability to linguistically take different perspectives (for different discursive purposes!) on the same "event" is a prerequisite for the construal of this event type called dual or mixed emotions (for which English does not provide a class of lexical items). Or, put more strongly, this discourse ability to take different perspectives on events, and to hold these perspectives concurrently, is the basic constituent out of which conceptual impressions such as having two emotions simultaneously are made. Consequently, this linguistic ability cannot be seen as being derived from two "actual" feeling constellations that are simultaneously "experienced", such as the simultaneous feelings of anger and sadness. Rather, these so-called "feeling states" are the products of conceptual framing, which in turn are the products of the linguistic ability to take perspectives. If we accept that having two emotions simultaneously cannot be derived from the composite of two concurrent feeling states, nor from the overlap of two emotion concepts (applied to one situation concept), but that it is the product of the linguistic ability to view a situation for two discursive purposes, we may be forced to take this insight back to how references to single emotions are maintained and achieved. We will follow this argument in a more elaborate fashion in the following concluding section.

4. Emotions as linguistic construction types

An intriguing question lies hidden behind what I have discussed thus far: why do people, when asked to give emotion accounts, construe elaborate circumstances around happenings and events; and why, when asked to construe events or happenings (in which they themselves or others figure as actors), do they resort to references to feelings and emotions? Edwards & Potter argue that in natural discourse, talk about events and happenings is designed in particular ways "to allow inferences about mental life and cognition" (1992: 142) - and I would like to add, particularly inferences about emotions. Edwards & Potter also argue that the converse is equally true. Assumptions about the world, what happened and why it happened, are inferred from the way the speaker designed the emotions and motivations of
the actors. Thus, event construal and the construal of characters' "inner 
psychologies" are closely orchestrated with regard to one another. 
Accounting for one - at least to a large degree - stands as an index for the 
other.

However, these worlds of actors and events within which references to 
emotions are embedded, do not stand on their own. They are versions pro-
duced in discourse situations for discursive purposes. The particular 
purposes can be manifold such as to attribute blame to others (in order to save 
face or restore one's dignity), or to elicit sympathy (in order to pursue joint 
retaliation or revenge). How the speaker "wants" to be understood vis-à-
vis the audience results in the particular construction design that is given to 
the world of actors and events. Thus, the world of the interactants (speaker-
audience) functions as the regulator for the way the psychological "reality" 
of the actors is construed as well as what is happening in the events in 
which the actors have a role.

This close relationship between the world of the characters and the world 
of interactants can be equally well described in terms of a positioning pro-
cess that works both ways: by positioning the characters at the content 
plane with regard to one another, the speaker positions him-/herself with 
regard to the listener; and this process works simultaneously the other way 
around. The coordination between these two planes results in the establish-
ment of a moral position for which the speaker can be held accountable, ir-
respective whether the speaker him-/herself figures in what is being talked 
about, or whether the talk is merely about others.

In sum, the approach to which I see this work contributing tries to 
systematically deconstruct two language functions that traditionally have 
been dealt with as independent domains: the referential/ideational and the 
communicative/interpersonal. While most semantic approaches rely heavily 
on the former, I see my own work as systematically extending Rom Harre's 
challenges to narrow, semantically based emotionologies. Inquiries into the 
discursive purposes of emotion terms necessarily have to take into account 
how a referential world is being construed in light of how the speaker-audi-
ence relationships are being construed. Thus, the content (of what is being 
constructed) and the purpose (for which content is being constructed) are 
closely linked by way of the linguistic construction types employed.

Along with the deconstruction of the linguistic dichotomy between 
referential and communicative planes of language functioning runs a chal-
lenge to a deeply seated assumption of psychological theorizing: while it is 
traditionally assumed that the person has privileged access to his/her own 
psychological "inner states" (one's feelings) (e.g. Harris 1989; Lubinski & 
Thompson 1993), the orientation adopted here runs counter to this assump-
tion. Accounts that present emotion situations from the first-person 

Notes
1. Parts of the research presented in this chapter were presented at the Fourth 
and Fifth Annual meetings of the Society for Text and Discourse in 
Washington, DC (July 1994) and Albuquerque, NM (July 1995), and at the 
20th Annual Boston University Conference on Language Development (No-
vember 1995). The research on ambivalent and mixed emotions was 
supported by a two-year National Academy of Education Spencer Fellow-
ship (presented at the National Academy of Education Forum in Cambridge 
MA, 1993).
There are radically different assumptions behind whether language is assumed to reflect, shape, or construct psychological entities such as thoughts, intentions, or emotions. These assumptions will be spelled out in more detail in section 4 of this contribution.

I selected these two different approaches for two reasons: first, they start from quite different assumptions of what language is and how it functions. As such, they assist in revealing some of the background that led to my own linguistic-constructivist approach. Second, these two approaches were (and still are) the most appealing to me, in as far as they were most influential after my interest in the relationship between emotions and language had been spurred originally by my two mentors in my graduate training, Dick Lazarus and George Lakoff.

And it can’t be stressed enough that “language” cannot be used synonymously with “culture”, as Wierzbicka often seems to suggest (see also Walters 1995).

It also should be stressed that due to space limitations, this section cannot present the adopted underlying approach to the relationship between language and emotion in its full scope. Rather, the examples and illustrations from some of my ongoing investigations into emotion talk in adults and children (and across different languages and cultures) are supposed to stand in for the orientation towards a coherent approach to this very relationship; one that is meant to productively connect with the two approaches reviewed in the second section of this paper.

Though the picture book is typically told from the perspective of the protagonist, a little boy who is searching for his lost pet, it is possible to present the (same?) story from the perspective of all characters involved, i.e. not giving a privileged status to any of the story characters. This narrative strategy, which seems to be presenting “facts” from “no point of view” (see Moffett & McElhenny 1986), nevertheless is as carefully orchestrated and linguistically achieved as any other that identifies (with) a particular character and establishes the “facts” of whatever happened from his or her perspective.

The abundance of references to characters’ emotions we found in parental narrating activities (i.e. how the characters feel, why they feel the way they do, and even in questions such as “How would YOU feel in that situation?”) seems to be an integral part of parental moral and educational practices in modern (and post-modern) middle class families (see Bamberg 1987, 1994a).

In the following, I will refer to these types of narratives as first-person accounts, and not as “personal narratives” or “narratives of personal experiences”, which is the term more commonly employed in narrative research. However, these terms run the risk of implicating that first-person accounts are less constructed or more “real”, since the narrator seems to have privileged access to the “facts”, and can resort to the genre of reporting what happened. First-person accounts are neither more “real” or “realistic”, nor are they necessarily more “authentic” or “natural” (see Bamberg 1994 b, and in press a, for a more elaborate critique of these misconceptions).

The elicitation questions asked were, respectively: “Can you explain to me what it means to be angry/sad/scared/happy?” and “Can you explain to me what one does to make someone else angry/sad/scared/happy?”

Though one may want to argue that this is not any longer the same event.

This may take place in terms of a preconceived plan that the speaker seems to be following with his/her turn, but it may as well take place in spite of - or against - the intended goal of the speaker. In addition, it should be mentioned that discourse purposes are not to be misconstrued in terms of a one-to-one form-function relationship.

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